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PREFACE
This study on the Republic of Korea is the twelfth case study that has
become available in the ILO research project on Employment, Trade and
North—South Co—operation (Phase II).
The project, which is the follow—up of an earlier project carrying the
same title' makes an attempt at analysing the economic and especially the
non—economic constraints under which economic policy—makers operate, placing
strong emphasis on the implications for employment and unemployment Past
policies are evaluated in an effort to explain their "success" or "failure'1.
More specifically the questions that the project tries to answer are:
(a) What are the socio—political factors, the behavioural responses and the
institutional arrangements as well as the policies initiated by
governments which have shown to be important in the promotion of
successful industrial adjustment policies in developed countries;
(b) What are the socio—political, cultural and economic factors which have
contributed to the successful economic developments of the Newly
Industrialising Countries (NICs); and
(c) What lessons can be learned from the success of the NICs that can be
useful to other developing countries which have committed themselves to a
broadly similar growth path.
These questions are being approached at two levels:
(i) By means of a number of country case studies on Developed Countries
(United Kingdom, United States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands), Newly Industrialising Countries (the Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Brasil and Mexico) and Developing Countries (Cameroun, Tunisia, Sri
Lanka and the Philippines).
1 For a description of the results of Phase I, see Geoffrey Rensaw
(ed.): Employment, Trade and North—South Co—operation (Geneva, 1981).
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(ii) Through a general report that is being prepared in Geneva and which,
to a large extent, will be built on the findings of the country reports.
The phenomenal success of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) has
been the subject of a number of studies. These have examined such as
role of foreign capital, international sub—contracting and governments'
export promotion policies. In our project we are focussing on two sets of
questions. First, to what extent will the rapid economic growth rates of the
NICs be continued; how has their product range changed during the period of
rapid growth and along what product lines are the NICs likely to develop in
the future? Second, what elements of the NICs' development path can be taken
as a model to be emulated by other developing countries? In order to answer
this second question it is important to understand to what extent social,
political and cultural factors, unique to the NICs, have contributed to their
success and to what extent institutional arrangements and economic policies
can be successfully paralleled by other developing countries attempting to
follow this path.
This study on the Republic of Korea has been written by Professor
Tony Michell of the University of Hull, United Kingdom. It is organised as
follows:
The introductory Chapter provides a general background to the study. It
describes how Korea's colonial past, the separation between North and South,
the civil war, and economic aid have influenced the country's pre—1960
economic development. The post—1960 years are subdivided into periods of
"transition to growth", "export—led high growth", and the more recent
"unstable growth" period. A few institutional and cultural factors that are
considered relevant to a better understanding of the economic analysis are
discussed. These include the early exposure to industrial discipline and the
high educational level of the population, the dominant place of the
government and the absence of effective political opposition, as well as the
historically fairly equitable income distribution.
The country's economic development is the subject of Chapter II. The
priorities of each of the five development plans are discussed, as well as why
these priorities changed over time.
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The phenomenal growth in output and employment, and the role of exports
and the domestic market in this growth process are analysed. The crucial role
of the government, through its ownership of the banks, as most important
financier in the economy is highlighted.
Chapter III considers in more detail the role that government, workers
and entrepreneurs have played in rapid growth. Government officials identify
greatly with the interests of the sector they serve. The system of
quasi—government institutions equally contributes to efficienct government—
business relations. The very comprehensive and well organised system of
statistics allows the government to take quick action whenever necessary.
The government has frequently and effectively used its considerable power
to steer the economy, even at a time that some of the large Korean enterprises
have become multinationals in their own right. Most Korean enterprises have a
high debt equity ratio, and depend on loans for their expansion and survival.
This made them dependent on the government that, until recently, owned most of
the financial sector.
Wages and labour conditions tend to be superior in companies that produce
for the domestic market and in modern and big enterprises. The success of
light export industries has depended to a large extent on the young women they
employ. These young women are paid at least 20 per cent less than their male
counterparts. The role of the unions is small. They are closely controlled
by the government. Moreover, an elaborate system of dispute mediation
exists. The traditionally very equitable income distribution appears to have
worsened in the 1970s. This is, in large part, due to the increase of
non—wage income in national income.
Chapter IV deals with two of the major export industries: textiles and
clothing, and electronics. It gives a more detailed illustration of the
trends and issues discussed in the previous chapters. The most remarkable
aspect of the development of textiles and clothing is that it remained such an
important export sector in spite of a forecasted decline and a simultaneous
decline of government support. Clothing because it needs little capital
investment was frequently used in the past to finance other activities in the
same company. But lower demand and higher protectionism abroad has led to a
trend towards other activities now subsidising clothing, rather than the other
way around.
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Electronics is the sector that has received most foreign investment. It
provides a good illustration of the dilemma the government has faced, on the
one hand desirous to promote rapid growth of the industry and, on the other
hand, not wanting to become overly dependent on foreign investment. This
dilemma was partially resolved by the government providing substantial
financial and logistic support to the industry, most of it channeled through
the Fine Instruments Centre, where a great deal of research was also
undertaken.
In the concluding chapter, the leading threads are picked up again and an
attempt is made to present a complete picture of the causes and consequences
of the country's high economic growth. When asking what lessons can be
learned from the experience of the Republic of Korea that might be applied in
other countries, the author mentions the advantage of planning as a way to
foresee and prepare for bottlenecks as well as the efforts made to let the
rural sector participate in growth. Control of credit and thus of its
allocation proved a mechanism that greatly enhanced the efficiency of the
planning process. Yet despite the obviously large degree of public
intervention in the economy, he reminds us that application of rules and
regulations has been very flexible. Michell is pessimistic about the
employment prospects in the Republic of Korea. Rising wages and lower growth
prospects, together with a steadily rising labour force, lead him to believe
Laac a rise in unemployment may be inevitable.
This working paper is a component of the final output of our research
project on Employment, Trade and North South Co—operation (Phase II). It is
also an input into a broader study that is being written in Geneva, and we
would welcome any comments provoked by it.
Gijsbert van Liemt
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INTRODUCTION
In describing the Korean process, the main problem is to do justice to
the major discontinuity which occurred in 1979. Since the major brief was to
describe the Korean process from the point of view of potential lessons, much
of the analysis deals with the pre—1979 economy. As the report was prepared
1982, data was not available, and 1978 and 1979 represented the high point for
most important indicators. 1979 represents the end of an eighteen year
process.
In 1979—80 a number of transitions began which cannot yet be fully
assessed. After the first year of negative economic growth since the Korean
war, the aim of policy makers has been to achieve a "second take—off". It is
too early to be certain that this has been achieved although the results for
1982 and forecast for 1983 look promising.
There is a rapidly growing literature on Korean development in English,
and an explosive growth of literature in Korean. The following study is based
as far as possible on a reinterpretation of the original data, rather than
studies, although the footnotes make the debts to other scholars
obvious. Two books in particular have provided vital information, Jones and
SaKong's Government, Business and Entrepreneurship in economic development:
The Korean Case, and Wontack Hong's Trade, Distortions and Employment Growth
in the Republic of Korea. In addition one seminal article by Bai Moo—gi, "The
Turning Point" has provided an important basis to much of my interpretation of
the Republic of Korean development in the 1970s.
The final result is a condensation of my original research in which the
chief victim has been the statistical material. It is probably only the
author who ever wishes his work were longer, but to all those who gave their
time so generously in interviews and in providing material which does not
appear goes my especial thanks.

CHAPTER I
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1. Korean characteristics: The setting of Korean development
The internal cultural, historical, sociological and geographical
variables which have influenced the Republic of Korean development have often
been commented on, but rarely analysed in depth. It is essential to sketch
these factors and indicate their relative importance both in order to
understand the dynamics of the Republic of Korea development and to delimit
the degree to which the Republic of Korea forms a unique case whose experience
offers limited usefulness to other developing countries.
The Republic of Korea is an unusual country in a number of respects. A
temperate country lying across the latitudes comparable with Spain or
California, it suffers much colder winters than either country. Historically
it is only half a country, cut—off from the North with which it shared a
common course of development to 1945. Although part of mainland Asia, from an
economic point of view it is an island, distant from every economy with which
it has relations except Japan. Physically the terrain is a constraint on
development with approximately 70% of the land area mountainous.
The Republic of Korea is the fourth most densely populated country in the
world with 38.2 million inhabitants in 1980. Of the 96 countries classified
by the World Bank as low or medium income countries, only 13 have a larger
population.' Though large in terms of population, The Republic of Korea2s
land area is small. Of the same 96 countries, only 20 have a smaller area
than The Republic of Korea's 99,000 sq. kilometers. There are distinct
advantages in being such a compact country, as well as obvious disadvantages.
Notably it has been possible to create a unified market with a minimum of
infrastructural investment and low transport costs. Thus it might be argued
that the effective Korean domestic market was equal to that of
considerably larger developing countries.2 Table 1.1 sets out some of the
key characteristics of The Republic of Korea.
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Table 1.1 Basic economic data
1953 1960 1970 1980 1982
Land area 98.431 98.431 98.477 98.969 99.022
(Sq. km)
Population 21.502 24.954 31.435 38.124 39-331
(million)
Rate of Increase n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a.
Labour force:
Unemployed n.a. 8.2% 4.5% 5.2% 4.4
Agriculture n.a. 63.1 50.4 34
Man, and mining n.a. 8.7 14.3 22.6
Services n.a. 28.2 35.2 43.4
(1963)
Industrial share of GNP:
Agriculture 51.7 47.2 33.1 17.2 16.3
Man. and mining 6.3 9.1 17.5 31.3 30.3
Services, etc. 42 43.7 49.4 51.5 53.1
(1975 prices)
GNP current prices ($) 1.353 1.948 56.460
PEr capita GNP 67 80 243 1.481
Gross domestic fixed
capital formation 7.2 10.8 24.4 32.7
(current prices)
Gross domestic savings 8.8 0.8 17.3 19.9
Foreign savings 6.6 8.6 9.3 10.2
Ratio of exports/GNP 3.2 4.1 16.0 40.2
Ratio of imports/GNP 9.8 12.7 25.3 50.4
GNP growth rate 3.7 8.5 8.1
(1953—60) (1960—70) (1970—80)
Sources; BOK National Income in Korea 1982;
EPB Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1982
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In considering Korean development it is important to stress the fact that
the population has been growing rapidly for the last thirty years. In 1955
the density was only 217 persons per square kilometer, whereas by 1979 it was
382. With 67 per cent of the land area mountainous, bearing only poor quality
forests, and only 22 per cent of the land area under cultivation, despite
efforts to expand the agricultural sector to the limits, the Republic of Korea
had little prospect of supporting its population through primary sector
activities.
After land reform between 1948 and 1958, the average farm contained less
than 0.5 of an hectare of paddy and 0.34 of an hectare of dry field. This
left limited scope for commercial agriculture, and only in 1979, after a 20
per cent drop in farm households since 1968 did the average farm size increase
beyond 1 hectare.
Given the lack of agricultural land, and high rates of population growth,
rapid urbanisation was almost inevitable. One of the notable features of
Korean development has been the relatively smooth way in which the influx from
the countryside has been handled, so that each year since 1961 urban
unemployment appears to have fallen.3
In 1946, the year after liberation from thirty five years of Japanese
colonial rule, the American Military Government estimated the population of
the south at 19.4 million of whom 17 per cent lived in cities of more than
By 1960, when the population was growing at 3 per cent per annum,
the total population was 24.9 million of whom 24.4 per cent lived in cities.
Population growth slowed gradually until it had reached about 1.58 per cent in
1980, partly for natural demographic reasons after the post Korean war boom,
and more recently through increased family planning and abortion.
By 1970 the total population had reached 31.4 million with 41 per cent of
the population living in cities. This was the peak of the exodus from the
countryside with major cities recording annual growth rates of up to 10 per
cent per annum. Major policy steps were taken to improve rural standards of
living and discouraged the growth of Seoul. Despite these measures, the urban
population continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate and by 1980, 69.4 per
cent of Koreans lived in cities, 32.5 per cent of them in Seoul which in 1982
was estimated to be the fourth largest city in the world, with a population of
8.4 million.5 At projected rates of growth the total Korean population will
reach 45 million by 1991 and 50 million by the year 2000.
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If geography and population growth formed part of the framework of the
Republic of Korea's distinctiveness, the division of the country left a heavy
mark on economic and social life. A major reason for wishing to restrict the
growth of Seoul is that the capital lies only 50 kilometers from the
demilitarised zone, and therefore within range of North Korean conventional
artillery. The separation can be seen to have affected ideology, political
development, military preparedness and competitive spirit. Memories of the
confused period after the Liberation in 1945—1950 and the Korean war 1950—53
have led to the tolerance of an Anti—communist Law, a National Security Law
and Labour Laws which have discouraged not only communist thought, but also
mildly leftist notions with serious implications for the operations and
ideology of organised labour and other areas of public life.6
Broadly one may say that fear of the North and anti—communist propaganda
have reinforced residual Confucian ethics of deference to superiors including
employers, and discouraged attitudes which might have made the labour force
much less tractable. Politically the effect of the presence of the North has
had a similar effect dampening opposition for fear of a recurrence of the
Korean war, and discouraging the development of a, left wing critique of Korean
development.
The constant threat from the North has led to a military establishment
far beyond the normal size of a developing country, estimated to be the
world's sixth largest army.7 Although much of the expenditure has been
supported by the United States so that the proportion of GNP spent on defence
has been relatively low, the effect of the labour market has been distinct
with 600,000 men removed from the labour force at any one time. As a United
States advisor remarked in the late 1950s the size of the Korean army could be
regarded as a form of concealed unemployment relief.8 The political and
social influence of the military establishment itself has never been fully
evaluated. It is pervasive but has fluctuated in importance considerably over
the period of development.9
The final element stemming from the division is the sense of
competition. The consensus that South Korean development must take place,
which grew around 1960 was partly determined by public awareness that North
Korean growth was much more rapid. This has also affected the shape of Korean
strategy in the sense that the Republic of Korea not only requires a strong
army but also a level of social contentment which will prevent North Korean
agents from being able to ferment widespread unrest.
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The sociological factors are considered in more detail in section 1.4.
However most commentators have stressed the importance of the high literacy
rate of Koreans and the exceptional stress put on educational achievement0
The precise relationship between education and labour force is considered in
more detail, but it seems probable that the benefits of Korean education lie
as much in the heavy indoctrination of obedience and discipline as in the
teaching of the liberal arts.
2. The historical development of the Korean economy
Before it is possible to review the recent dynamics of Korean economic
performance, it is desirable to consider the stages of economic development
since the Second World War. Essentially there have been five phases:
1) The transition from a colonial economy to an independent economy
1945—1950;
2) The Korean War and reconstruction 1950—1959;
3) The transition from low growth to high growth 1960—1969;
4) Export led growth 1970—1977;
5) Unstable growth and recession 1978—1982.
These divisions differ from those conventionally used in that the
transition from low to high growth is argued to have preceeded both the first
economic development plan inaugurated in December 1961 and the Military
Revolution of May 1961, the two ingredients frequently cited as being the
initial conditions of take—off. Secondly the approach is unusual in
classifying only the period 1970—1977 as that of export—led growth. This is
justified in detail in section 2.2 but is based on the contribution to
economic growth of exports compared with other sectors of the economy.1°
This second point is essential if any lessons are to be derived from Korean
experience in the l960s by other developing countries in the l980s. In
essence, the argument is that high growth was achieved in the l960s by other
means than exports, rather than exports stimulating the whole process of rapid
growth.
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2.1 The transition from a colonial economy to an independent economy
1945—1950.
A satisfactory economic history of the Republic of Korea has yet to be
written. Research in progress in both the colonial and post—liberation eras
has challenged many of the existing notions of Korean development in the first
half of the twentieth century.11 Equally there is no authoritative
analysis of the degree to which the Republic of Korea's pre—1945 heritage has
been transmitted into the present and the extent to which it has influenced
development between 1960 and 1982.12
It is impossible to summarize these influences adequately within the
space alloted. The colonial era left a profound psychological mark on all
Koreans, which if anything, increases with time and with the generations which
did not experience it. Essentially it tended to conserve traditional ways of
thinking (which were seen as Korean, as opposed to modern, which were seen as
Japanese) and at the same time enhance the status of the two modern forces
which were anti—Japanese, Christianity and communism. Unlike other colonial
countries the Koreans did not feel any hostility against the West, which was
seen as a natural ally against Japan.
For men of ability during the colonial era the options were
collaboration, exile or opposition, or increasingly, migration to Manchuria
where a unique experiment in economic and social planning was underway.
The Japanese directed substantial areas of the Korean economy, first as a
major rice producer for Japanese consumers in the l920s and then as an
industrial base with cheap labour for an advance into Asia, and finally as an
industrial haven out of reach of the United States air force.
The Republic of Korea emerged from the colonial period as a part economy
in two senses. The liberation divorced the Republic of Korea from its major
market for exports, Japan, and the division of the country separated
complementary functions as table 1.2 shows, with light industry and
agriculture in the South and heavy industry and energy sources in the North.
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Table 1.2 Division of the Republic of Korea
(Based on 1937 Production data)
Industries South (%) North (%)
Textiles 88 12
Lumber 68 32
Printing 90 10
Food Processing 67 33
Machinery 71 29
Metal 15 85
Ceramics etc 38 62
Chemicals 16 84
Gas & Electricity 16 84
Miscellaneous 77 23
Overall 49.8 50.2
Source: A.J. Grajdanzev "the Republic of Korea Divided",
Far Eastern Survey, XIV, 20, October 10, 1945, 283.
The United States Military Government attempted with far fewer resources
and far less information to make the sort of reforms MacArthur was making in
Japan. They were hampered by ignorance, left and centre opposition,
uncertainty about the long term separation of peninsula, and even guerrilla
warfare.
Despite these handicaps, by the time the United States handed over South
Korea to an elected Korean Government in 1948, the economy had recovered to a
considerable extent. This was despite the shutting off of power supplies from
north of the 38th parallel to the south in February 1948, and problems in
obtaining raw materials. Considerable attention was given to creating an
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effective national education system which was one of the more effective forms
14
of aid from this period.
The other major contribution of the period was the initiation of land
reform. About one third of all arable land was owned by Japanese in 1945 and
this was redistributed to the cultivators by the Military Government in 1948.
The legislation to redistribute the rest was at an advanced stage when the
Korean war broke out in June1950.
By the end of 1949, United States economic experts were confident about
the self—sustained future of The Republic of Korea as an agricultural nation
exporting rice, coal, tungsten and fishery products. In this they had
reckoned without the Korean war and the rapid acceleration of the Korean
population.
2.2 The Korean War and reconstruction 1950—1959
The estimates of damages sustained during the Korean war suggest that
most investment prior to 1950 was destroyed in the fighting. If so then the
recovery was remarkably quick, since industrial production indices show that
by the signing of the cease fire in 1953, many areas of production were as
high as in 1949 or early 1950.15 In fact, reconstruction took place from
1951 onwards since the front line was reasonably stable from that year and
United States air superiority prevented bombing from the air in the South. A
total of 2.08 thousand million current dollars poured into the Republic of
Korea during the 1950s, compared with a total estimate of 6 thousand million
(1953) dollars damage)6
Despite the high level of aid the Republic of Korea received, in fact
supposedly the highest per capita level of aid received by any country, it
should not be concluded that all this aid was effectively utilised. A very
high proportion of this aid came in the form either of non—essential consumer
goods or as agricultural surplus items which depressed domestic agriculture
rather than as capital which could be used to redevelop the country.17 In
addition, there was continual friction between the United States aid
establishment and the Korean Ministry of Reconstruction over the form of aid
and basic economic policy. The result was less affirmative government action
18
throughout the economy than might otherwise have been the case.
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A major cause of conflict was the attitude to stabilisation policies to
reduce inflation. Even prior to the war the United States had threatened to
withdraw all aid unless deflationary measures were adopted. This inflation
was accelerated by the war, reaching 630 per cent in the first year and
compounded by the U.N. command printing local currency to pay foreign troops
without the consent of the Korean fiscal authorities during the early stages
19
of the war.
Throughout the 1950s the United States advised that the fundamental
strategy must be the stabilisation of prices, whereas the Korean preoccupation
was with reducing the gap between imports and exports, and with building up
national resources. In a tacit bargain in the second half of the l950s, a
number of major projects were undertaken which set the foundations of the
growth of the early 1960s (as will be shown in the sectoral study on textiles)
but at the price of suppressing food prices below the cost of domestic
production. In 1958, wholesale prices actually fell. This however was at the
cost of throwing the agricultural sector into complete depression.
With agriculture accounting for over 40 per cent of GNP and employing
over 60 per cent of the labour force, the result was' to slow the growth of GNP
20
to the point where it was overtaken by population growth. At the same
industrial production was growing at over 10 per cent per annum. However
this was overlooked in the general gloom about the Korean condition which was
increasingly described by the United States as a "hopeless basket case". Per
capita income was only just above that of India and falling. Moreover the
gloom was deepened by an awareness that industrial recovery in DROK had been
unusually rapid, which made the performance of The Republic of Korea even more
discouraging.
Despite this outwardly discouraging picture stressed not only in
United States documents, but in the lengthy prologue to the First Five—Year
Economic Development Plan of 1961 and the early writings of Park Chung—hee, a
number of promising developments had taken place in the l950s.21 It is
part of the received doctrine on the transition from low to high growth to
paint the picture of the economy at the end of the l950s in as sombre colours
as possible.
Industrial production was rising at a respectable rate. Between 1955 and
1960, 1,021 industrial enterprises of sufficient scale to still be operating
11 —
in 1978 were founded, which some sectors, notably textiles, gave the economy
surplus capacity, either to boost exports or to supply a rapid increase in
domestic demand.
Land reform had been completed, solving the longstanding problem of rural
unrest. Only the unfavourable agricultural policies retarded peasants from
investing in their own land. Land reform, inflation and the war had left the
Republic of Korea with an unusually equal distribution of income, meaning that
even a slight improvement in per capita income would have a large effect on
items of mass consumption. Moreover the war had had the effect of drawing all
social classes together, and Koreans who lived through this experience stress
the nature of the transformation which assisted greatly in producing "the will
to develop" in the early l960s.
A widespread symptom of this desire was the rise in demand for education
at all levels. Whereas illiteracy had been as high as 78 per cent of the
population in 1945, it had dropped to 27.9 per cent by 1960.22 The number
of Koreans in institutes of higher education had risen from 34,000 in 1952 to
101,000 by 1960, and whereas in 1944 12 million out of 14 million Koreans over
14 had had no education, by 1960 only 6.5 million: out of 14.8 million had not
received any education and over 1 million had had more than 10 years of
education.23 The demand for education was so high that by the early 1960s
there were large reserves of unemployed graduates.
The l950s also left negative marks. Primarily these manifested
themselves in consumer behaviour. There was a marked preference for hoarding
commodities rather than holding savings, and for liquid assets rather than
assets which were difficult to liquidate at a moment's notice. In respect of
company structure the high rate of inflation had allowed outstanding debts to
be paid off, and the nature of financial assets appeared much more primitive
in 1960 than in 1948.24
2.3 The transition from low growth to high growth 1960 to 1969
In 1960, the Republic of Korea had a per capita income in current dollars
of This approximates to estimates of the 1868 Japanese per capita income
at 1960 prices. The industrial structure in terms of industrial share of GNP
and labour force corresponded to that of Japan of 1900 or Britain as far back
as 1700. Even assuming that agricultural pricing policies of the later 1950s
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were reversed it seemed difficult to predict more than a 2—3 per cent increase
in per capita income.
Between 1960 and 1969, the Republic of Korea confounded all such
predictions, achieving a per capita growth rate of just under 7 per cent and a
GNP growth rate of nearly 9 per cent. A sizeable part of this study must be
devoted to explaining this transition.25
The early growth of exports, which began in 1960 was not the initial
determining factor, given that the contribution of exports to GNP growth in
the early l960s was only about 15 per cent of total growth leaving 85 per cent
to be explained by domestic resources.26 Exports are the most easily
explained. The overthrow of Syngman Rhee in April 1960 led to the removal of
the extreme constraints under which Japanese trade had operated, augmented by
a set of policies mostly adopted in 1959 to encourage exports. It was further
encouraged by the favourable conditions in Japan which encouraged Japanese
enterprise to subcontract basic labour intensive processes in the Republic of
Korea.
If the initial growth came from domestic sources then the major source
was not so much new investment as the rational use of underutilised existing
Accounting for the rapid rate of growth without the planned rise
in domestic and foreign savings by 1965, the Economic Planning Board decided
"the high growth rate registered with the relatively small investment ratio
was attributable to the remarkable expansion of agricultural production...,
and also to the fact that hitherto idle capacity and surplus labour were more
effectively utilised."27
In this process, economic planning also played an important part. An
economic development plan which had been under discussion since 1958 was
rapidly completed after the overthrow, in May 1961, of the democratic
government which had been formed after the fall of Syngman Rhee in April
1960. The military group who were to rule Korea for the next seventeen years
were determined to achieve economic development, and energetically set about
creating a climate in which economic growth became a primary national goal.
The initial performance was disappointing (see Figure 1.1). Growth
slowed from 4.8 per cent in 1961 to 2.2 per cent in 1962, while inflation
soared alongside growth in 1963 and 1964. However, after 1962, all sectors of
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the economy expanded rapidly, with manufacturing leading. This began the
structural transformation of the Republic of Korea, so that by 1969 industry
was contributing 20 per cent of GNP compared with 13.5 per cent in 1961. By
1968 exports were contributing over 20 per cent of incremental growth and
rising rapidly as increased investment came to maturity.
The Second Five—Year Plan, 1967—71, identified labour intensive
manufacturing as the most rapid source of economic growth, and encouraged
investment in export industries at the expense of other sectors. The effects
of this strategy became apparent from the late 1960s with the rural—urban gap
growing dangerously and resulting in a massive exodus from the countryside to
the cities. By the final years of the decade Seoul and other major cities
were experiencing annual population growth rates of 11 per cent.
2.4 Export—led growth
By 1969, the export market was beginning to take a larger share of
industrial production in many sectors than the home market. Exports were
contributing between 20 and 35 per cent of incremental growth, but the
domestic economy seemed in danger of slowing down. At the same time labour
was growing. Finally, rural electoral support for the government was
reduced in the 1971 Presidential elections.
Despite the rapid jump in importance of exports in 1972—73, Government
concern was reflected in a new strategy which put great emphasis on building
up a new generation of heavy and chemical industry which would initially have
an import substitution effect, and the modernisation of the countryside
through the New Village (Saemaul) Movement and high agricultural support
prices.
The Republic of Korea weathered the oil crisis of 1973—74 and subsequent
recession remarkably well. This was through good economic management
including maintaining investment so that expansion could be resumed as soon as
foreign markets recovered. Hence in 1976 exports leapt once more by 43 per
cent at constant prices. The Republic of Korea was also assisted by adroit
economic diplomacy which led to the rapid growth of overseas construction in
the Middle East, which allowed Korea to realise a current account surplus in
1977 for the first time through her own earnings.28
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2.5 Unstable growth and recession 1978—1982
The brilliant recovery from the oil crisis and the growing impact of the
policies adopted in the early 1970s stimulated the domestic economy, so that
both urban and rural consumers reached a consumption threshold where the sharp
rise in demand for consumer goods created unanticipated problems for the
economy. Simultaneously the "turning point" in the labour market was passed
in the mid l970s and near full employment in both urban and rural areas pushed
up wages, and therefore increased consumer purchasing power further.
Shortages in a wide range of commodities further pushed up inflation.
The Government became more concerned about inflation than ever before,
and adopted a monetarist policy which severly depressed the domestic
market.29 After years of easy money, businesses were suddenly starved of
credit while export markets were lost due to an overvalued exchange rate.
Corrective measures were adopted a year too late; and by this time, the
economy had ground to a halt. Real exports fell for the first time in 1979,
and in 1980 economic growth was negative for the first time since the outbreak
of the Korean war. GNP dropped by 6.1 per cent.
Exports recovered in 1980, but this was insufficient to prevent negative
growth. Exports grew at a slightly slower rate in 1981. Since the most
severe damage in 1980 had been the result of harvest failure which converted a
zero growth rate into a negative one, the recovery of agriculture in 1981 and
export growth created an increase in GNP of 7.1 per cent. With exports
slowing down even more, and little domestic recovery, growth in 1982 was just
over 5 per cent.
Under these circumstances a radical reappraisal of economic management in
the 1960s and l970s began in 1980. Consequently the Government adopted a
strategy which would keep tighter reins on the money supply which it was
believed would keep inflation under control, and a series of measures intended
to reinforce the market mechanism. The Fifth Plan which came into effect in
1982 was to be dedicated to reducing government involvement in the economy,
which would create the conditions for "a second take—off" into stable high
growth rates.
40
— 15 —
Figure 1: GNP growth rates and inflation
Wholesale
prices
Retail
prices
2.2 9.1 9.6 5.8 12.7 6.6 11.3 13.8 7.6 9.4 5.8 14.9 8.0 7.1 15.1 10.3 11.6 7.1 6.1
6.2
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 i971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Source: EPB: Major Statistics of the Korean Economy 1982.
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3. Review of economic performance
The basic outline of Korean development given above can be summarized as
follows. In 1960, the Republic of Korea was amongst the poorest nations in
the world with a structure highly dependent on agriculture and a chronic
balance of payments deficit. By 1982, the Republic of Korea had moved from
the ranks of a low income country, overtaking developing country after
developing country to a position approximately half way up the ranks of middle
income countries. Between 1960 and 1979, only Japan, Romania and Singapore
grew faster.
Figure 1.1 shows the annual growth of GNP. It should be noted that
despite the high aggregate rates of growth, the variation from year to year is
extremely high. GNP growth rates increased or decreased from year to year by
up to 100 per cent, creating a highly unstable situation in terms of demand
for money, investment capital and domestic demand. Although other countries
might experience a similar degree of fluctuation in percentage terms, a shift
from 13.8 per cent to 7.6 per cent (1969—70) or from 5.8 per cent to 14.9 per
cent (1972—73) had a tremendous impact on the economy.
The instability of the economy called for a cool nerve on the part of
and government who live from month to month, and not on long term
trends. It has encouraged government intervention in every aspect of the
economy and business dependence on the government in a series of short term
policies aimed at the crisis of the moment outside the long term planning
process.
Contrary to the opinion held by opponents of export led growth that
exporting throws a developing economy at the mercy of world trends, the input
from exports has on the whole been more stable than the inputs from the
domestic economy. Post—1973 experience seems to modify this statement,
reflecting the increasing instability of the world economy, but it is hard to
argue that a lesser dependence on the world economy would have increased
stability or growth in the case of a country like the Republic of Korea which
must import most raw materials.
Since manufacturing has been the most rapidly growing sector and
agriculture the least, the structural transformation has been dramatic.
Agriculture's contribution to GNP has dropped from 38.7 per cent to 18 per
cent between 1961 and 1981. At the same time manufacturing has risen from
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13.5 per cent to 29.5 per cent during the same years. The service sector has
grown more slowly from 45.9 per cent to 50.1 per cent (Table 1.3). In
employment terms the shift is even greater. Agricultural employment has
fallen from 60.6 per cent in 1963 to 32.3 per cent in 1981. Manufacturing has
risen from 8 per cent to 21.7 per cent, and employment in services from 28.2
per cent to 44.5 per cent.
Industry and services in the 1970s were able to absorb not only a 57.7
per cent increase in the economically active population, but also a shift of
nearly 1 million workers from agriculture to other employment between 1976 and
1980, consequently allowing large productivity gains for the remaining
agricultural workers.
Unemployment is more difficult to measure for reasons which will be
explained in Chapters II and III, but official figures show a drop from 8.2
per cent in 1963 to 3.2 per cent in 1978, with a rise to 5.2 per cent in
1980. In 1981, it was 4.5 per cent. In short, the Republic of Korea had
successfully created enough jobs for a rapidly expanding working population
while undergoing a structural transformation which had brought the economy to
about the mid—point of development. To reach structure of modern
industrial nations, the agricultural share of GNP would need to be halved and
crie agricultural labour force would need to drop to a third of its present
share. Even at optimistic growth rates this process would take another 20
years.
The impressive growth rates of exports are shown in Table 1.4. It should
be noted that these growth rates are expressed in 1975 dollars, as most Korean
export statistics are. While reflecting the Republic of Korea's dealings with
the outside world accurately, it will be noted that the growth rates expressed
in 1975 won, which reflect the impact of exports on the domestic economy,
follow a slightly different regime resulting from changes in the exchange rate.
A comparison with imports in the same table shows that whereas in 1962
commodities imported were seven times the value of exports, by 1971 there were
just under twice the value. During the rapid expansion of exports in 1972 and
1973 this fell to just 17 per cent higher. The rise in oil prices widened the
gap but by 1977 it had fallen to 4.7 per cent. For a number of reasons import
liberalisation was preferred to achieving a commodity surplus, and the trade
deficit has widened to about 22 per cent in 1981. The increase in overseas
earnings since 1975 has reduced the current account deficit to negligible
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Quite apart from the structural transformation of the Republic of Korea
the improvement in the balance of payments has been impressive. Although
foreign borrowing has been high, it has never reached the proportions of
Mexico or Brazil and with the rapid growth of exports it has always been
possible to meet repayments. Indeed during 1977 and 1978, repayments were
made ahead of time.
The Republic of Korea's policy of deliberately running a trade deficit
has been of obvious benefit to her trading partners. The benefits have not
been equally spread however. With many countries the Republic of Korea has
recently moved into surplus, while the deficit with Japan has widened. As
explained in Chapter 2, both the Republic of Korea and other trading
partners have suffered from this imbalance, while Japan has been the clear
beneficiary of her neighbour's growth.3°
As will be seen in Chapters II and III, foreign investment in the
Republic of Korea has been limited. The Republic of Korea has relied on
foreign borrowing rather than direct foreign investment. With the exception
of 1965 and 1972—73, foreign investment has always been under 10 per cent of
foreign capital entering the Republic of Korea. Indeed under the Fourth
Five—Year Plan 1976—81, it was envisaged that direct foreign investment would
be field at million at current prices.
Although foreign investment was important between 1965 and 1973, the
Republic of Korea has developed along an unusual track by deliberately
encouraging the growth of large conglomerates which are now numbered amongst
the top 500 non—United States companies. Since 1980, the Government has had
second thoughts about this development and has announced more liberal measures
to encourage foreign investment.
In essence, not only has the Republic of Korea managed to develop very
fast, but has done so to a remarkable degree through her own resources. It is
true that overall the Republic of Korea has been one of the largest recipients
of United States aid. (The largest in per capita terms according to some
writers). But the bulk of this was received during the 1950s, and during most
of the l960s and all of the l970s the Republic of Korea received no more
privileged terms than other developing countries.31 The one drawback has
been that the Republic of Korea has experienced a higher rate of inflation
than most Asian developing countries.
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There are those who would argue that the Republic of Korea has enjoyed
high growth rates precisely because successive governments have pursued
Keynesian policies of stimulating the economy by an easy money policy, with an
inevitable rise in inflation rates. There are others who would argue that
inflation has been largely the result of rising real incomes in an economy in
which investment has been directed primarily into export promotion. In either
case it may be argued however unfashionably that the trade—off has been
beneficial. Government policy since early 1979 argues that inflation has
neither been necessary nor beneficial. However, in the last year, it has
loosened the money supply considerably in an attempt to stimulate growth. It
remains to be seen whether the Korean economy can continue to perform well
under such criteria.
4. The institutional and cultural environment
As will have already become clear, the Republic of Korea has an unusual
profile; an exceptionally high population density with low agricultural and
natural resource potential, a unique historical trajectory as a colony of
Japan, followed by United States occupation, a devastating war and then a
remarkable recovery and rapid growth from a very low income to a middle income
country in 20 years. Are there unique institutional or cultural factors which
nave furthered Korean development?
The success of the Republic of Korea has been extensively analysed from
the economic point of view, but the degree to which cultural and institutional
features have contributed to economic success has never been satisfactorily
analysed or integrated.
There is a consensus that the general Confucian culture, the high desire
for education, the homogenity of the nation and the status accorded to
government officials has been of great assistance. However, if successful
development had not taken place an equally plausible set of characteristics
could have been drawn up which would have included the high reverence for
farming in an overpopulated country, the emphasis on learning by rote in
Korean education, the proneness of all groups to form non—productive factions,
emphasis on personal prestige rather than economic ability and an over
bureaucratic mentality. Observers during the colonial period made such
comments as uthe poise and energy and self—reliance of the Japanese is notably
lacking in the Corean... In brain power he is probably at least equal to
Japanese, but in general he lacks the latter's ability to put his powers to
,,32
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4.1 Socio—cultural conditions favourable to rapid growth
The negative features listed above are all present to some degree in
modern Korea. That is to say, while there are indeed characteristics
favourable to rapid growth, there are also unfavourable characteristics, just
as in any other country.
The association of rapid economic growth since the Second World War with
countries with a Confucian heritage, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Hongkong
and Singapore has often been commented on in a journalistic fashion. In his
background to development Edward Mason has written of this connection stating
simply "the parallels with protestantism in the rise of capitalism is obvious"
and leaves the matter at that.33 Not only is the parallel not obvious in
that the connection between protestantism and early capitalism is still
contested, but the question leaves out of account the largest Confucian
country of all — China, which has not experienced the same sort of growth.
The Confucianism of the modern Republic of Korea is very far distant from
that of the late nineteenth century. Indeed few Koreans can now read the
classical Chinese their grandfathers expressed all their thoughts in, though
Chinese characters remain in common usage. What has remained has the
respect for the extended family and reverence for "elders and betters" in
a family context. Even here it may be argued that the managerial class of
modern Korea is less formalistic than the Japanese and less family minded than
the Chinese.
The veneration of learning in general and the high social status of civil
servants remains. Certainly the sub—Confucian culture which remains teaches
extreme ambition and a high desire for success rather than passivity and the
status quo.34 Indeed words implying acceptance such as "destiny" or "fate"
are given special attention in the schools as representing an out—of—date
mentality.
Desire for success was traditionally directed towards a place in the
Government, but with the expansion of education in the l950s, most candidates
were, and still are, disappointed in their quest for a civil service
place.35 Apart from limited openings as a scholar, the other channel of
success has been industry and commerce since the 1960s. It is important to
note that other routes to wealth have been effectively blocked since the early
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1950s. Not only did the war destroy most forms of inherited wealth, but land
reform made tenancy illegal and fixed the maximum landholding at 3 hectares.
This closed off landed wealth and investment in agriculture however culturally
appealling it might be. Likewise inflation eroded savings, so that apart from
blackmarketing, urban land speculation and lending money on the curb or
informal money market, the only source of wealth was industrial and commercial.
At the same time, it became extremely difficult to leave the country
because of highly restrictive regulations concerning passports and the
impossibility of legally transmitting money out of the country for private
purposes. The only ways to leave the Republic of Korea were either for
business or to study. For a long while, the Republic of Korea is thought to
have had the highest rate of students, of any developing country, who did not
return home. The only people who possessed mobility were those businessmen
involved in exporting.36 In recent years it has been suggested that the
appeal of the civil service is losing its attraction and the government is no
longer attracting the highest quality recruits who now opt first for
employment in the large conglomerates. If correct, then the social
transformation of the Republic of Korea is complete.
If these features from the traditional heritage favoured the development
of businessmen, Confucian respect for elders and betters and the low social
status accorded to women provided an exceptionally docile labour force.
Probably what is unique about Confucian societies is the distinctive character
of their labour relations. Moreover although nationalist resistance to the
Japanese was strongly associated both with trade unions and communism, and
although after the liberation trade unions with very left wing overtones grew
rapidly in South Korea, the experience of the Korean war and continuing fear
of the threat from the North destroyed the respectability of most left of
centre ideas round which an ideology of confrontation between employers and
employees might have developed.
It should however be observed that neither in Japan nor Hongkong, where
ideology is much freer, has the Confucian respect for the employer been
damaged. At the same time it might be argued that the average Korean has a
much more egalitarian view of the world than Japanese or Chinese, and there is
a great suspicion about wealth and the assumption that wealth must have been
gained illegally remains.37 Hence when labour confrontation has occurred,
it has been bitter, and government and employers remain nervous about the
possibility of collective action emerging.
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That is has not, has partly been due to the extremely constructive form
of nationalism which prevails in the Republic of Korea. Prior to the Japanese
occupation, nationalism was confined to a few intellectuals. During the
colonjal period when resistance to the Japanese was led by christians and
communists both alien ideologies became popular. However, the distinctive
of Korean nationalism was created by Shin Interestingly,
Shin was the originator of both juche, the concept of self—reliance dominant
in DRRK doctrine and the Park Chimg Hee s concept of being master in
one's own house. Shin combined traditional Confucian thinking with the
concept of making the Republic of Korea not only independent politically and
economically, but also important in a modern sense. Fortunately for both
Korea's, he died before Liberation, but his thought encapsulates the basic
philosophy of development in both Korea's.
In the confusion of the post—war period, the course of the Republic of
Korea patriotism was shaped by a feeling that she was continually being robbed
of her rightful place in the world. First through the Japanese seizure of the
country in 1910, and then through the cold war which divided Koreans amongst
themselves. Every post—Liberation school child was taught that in the
Republic of Korea's "5000 years of history" the Republic of Korea had been the
transmitter of civilisation to the Japanese. It was therefore unthinkable
Republic of Korea could not do what Japan had done. Thus Japanese
development acted as a bench mark throughout the development process.
As mentioned above, the Republic of Korea was also competing with the
DPRK. Since 1949, the United States had encouraged the idea that the Republic
of Korea could become the model of capitalist development. It would not only
be successful economically but also socially so that the country would be
objective proof that capitalism was more effective than communism.38 As the
DPRK appeared to be winning the race for development in the late 1950s, the
Republic of Korea became even more concerned to achieve results. Indeed a
major factor in the acceptance of Park Chung—hee's coup even by convinced
democrats was that their desire for national development was stronger than
their desire for democracy.
Thus throughout the period of rapid development Park Chung—hee was able
to draw on a consensus amongst Koreans that development was essential. The
population at large was prepared to make sacrifices in the long term interests
of the nation in the same way that individuals were prepared to saddle
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themselves with enormous debts so that their children could gain a good
education and thus a better life. At the same time, Park Chung—hee attempted
to restrain examples of conspicuous consumption or ostantatious displays of
wealth in such areas as banning luxury motorcars, expensive weddings, etc.
Even the opposition showed grudging respect for measures which advanced
the international standing of the nation, merely arguing that the levels of
sacrifice were not equally shared between rich and poor. The degree to which
this consensus for development provided a motor force during rapid development
can hardly be denied. There would be few Koreans who argue with the opening
statement of the National Educational Charter of 1967 to be found as preface
of every government publication and every school textbook "We are all born
into the nation charged with the historic mission of national renaissance
only through cooperative effort can this task be achieved."
Along with this national desire to develop can be ranked a long exposure
to industrialisation and industrial discipline. During the l930s
industrialisation in Korea, particularly in the north of the peninsula
proceeded rapidly. An estimated three million Koreans returned to the
Republic of Korea from Japan, DPRK and Manchuria.after 1945, most of them with
urban and even industrial experience. The wartime convulsions, mass
conscription and the presence of large numbers of G.I.s and exposure to modern
warfare gave even deeply rural areas an awareness of modern society.
Hence, by 1960, many of the initial barriers to development in developing
countries described by Inkeles and Smith in Becoming Modern were removed.
Although television ownership was very restricted in the l950s, the importance
of the tabang or teashop with a television set as a meeting place portrayed
images of Western countries, reinforced in the mid 1950s by the fact that
after a fire had destroyed the Korean television station, the only broadcasts
were those of the American Forces Network.
Finally, the succession of governments strong on central direction, and
weak on the defence of individual's liberties, Colonial, American Military,
Syngman Rhee accustomed several generations to authoritarian governments. A
feeling of disorder during the brief periods of more open government merely
confirmed a tolerance of strong government which foreigners often found hard
to understand.
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As a consequence of these forces it might be argued that unlike many
Mrican countries or even India, the Republic of Korea in 1960 contained a
strong minority who were orientated towards development. In other words, the
Republic of Korea in 1960 shouid be considered spiritually not as an
country but a very very poor modern society with a strong
to accuire the material benefits of Western civilisation. This part of
society was of course urban, and one of the main designs of the Saemaul (or
New Village) movement of the 1970s was to bring the same qualities to rural
areas.
4.2 Institutions
Only in rural society did important institutions survive from the
pre—colonial era and even these were of local importance. Since this study is
concerned with modernisation and particularly trade and manufacturing it is
not necessary to consider them. From the colonial period comes much of the
administrative and the legal framework, the educational system and part of the
financial system. The political system reflects the American occupation, as
does the military, modified to meet Korean circumstances. Of non—government
agencies only trade unions and religious organisations require attention at
present.
The original post—Liberation constitution was modelled broadly on the
American system with a separation of powers but on unicameral representation.
The franchise was universal suffrage for both men and women adults. The
Americans modified the system to allow a vetting of candidates to prevent
left—wing candidates from standing.4° In general the scrutiny of candidates
has been an important system of electoral control since 1948.
In the second elections of the New Republic held in 1950, Syngman Rhee's
party was heavily defeated, and to maintain his rule he strengthened the
Presidential system at the expense of the National Assembly. The Second
Republic in reaction created a Prime Ministerial system with two chambers, but
this was overthrown in May 1961 and the Third Republic reverted to previous
practice. In 1971 the Government party failed to gain the two—thirds majority
required to pass constitutional amendments and the following year a new
constitution, the Yushin constitution was passed which allowed for one—third
of the Assembly to be appointed. At the same time direct election of the
President ceased and a new Assembly, the National Conference for Unification
was created to elect the President.
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The Fifth Republic came into being in 1981 with the election of President
Chun—Doo--whan for a seven year term, again through an electoral college. The
appointed members of the Assembly were replaced with a proportional
representation list system.
The consequence of these frequent changes, combined with the importance
attached to the administration has led to the National Assembly playing a
small part in national life compared with Western democracies. It retains the
power to pass budgets and confirm the appointment of major government officers
and to cross examine officials.
The importance of the President and his staff is obvious, but the status
of the bureaucracy is a distinctively Korean feature. Government ministers
are only rarely elected members of the National Assembly and frequently senior
bureaucrats who have worked their way through the system. The actual size of
the central Korean bureaucracy is extremely small, about 12,000 in the mid
l970s.41 In Chapter III, it will be seen how this small size is extended
through the extensive use of semi—government organisations.
Despite the small size of the bureaucracy, it is highly independent.
Inter—ministerial rivalries are sometimes intense3 and during the 1950s it was
claimed that each ministry was virtually a separate government. To
control this, Syngman Rhee tried to prevent any senior official staying in any
office more than a few months to stop him developing his own power base. The
transition to a more stable system under Park Chung—hee therefore immediately
assisted towards a longer view of development.
At the same time in the absence of a strong representative tradition in
the National Assembly (National Assemblymen, although elected by constituency
do not normally try to represent their constituents in a British or American
sense) the Ministries see themselves as the representatives of their
constituencies, farmers, traders, industrialists, transport operators,
etc.42 The importance of the bureaucracy will be considered in further
detail in Chapter III.
From an organisational point of view the ministerial structure broadly
ressembles the Japanese system rather than western organisations. This is
only partly the legacy of the colonial administrative system, further
additions such as the Ministry of Construction have been added later, while
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nothing in the Japanese system ressembles the Economic Planning Board in its
43
strength to enforce its decisions.
The financial system reflects the colonial heritage even more strongly.
The central bank is the evolutionary descendant of the Bank of Chosen. A
feature of the system of development has been government direction and
rationing of credit, In this the tradition of government special or
banks (classed as specialised banks in the Republic of Korea)
initiated in the Meiji period and founded in the Republic of Korea after 1906
is important. It was further assisted by the seizure of the commercial banks
from private ownership in the early 1960s on the grounds of reclaiming illicit
44
wealth.
The legal system is based on the codification of Yi dynasty law by the
Japanese modified by the Meiji criminal and civil codes, themselves based on
German and French models. There is however a strong Confucian tradition that
to go to law over a civil matter is unseemly and it is true to say that Korean
commercial law is still very underdeveloped with many grey areas.45
The educational system of primary, middle and high schools with a dual
track system of vocational and academic higher education owes its origins to
colonial system, though until very recently the academic side has been
more important and the vocational system much less important than in Japan or
colonial Republic of Korea. Many of the 35 universities date back to the
colonial or even pre—colonial period as missionary or private schools
subsequently raised to university status. The prestigious Seoul National
University is the former Keijo Imperial University, the only university
existing prior to 1945. As might be expected even private schools are closely
controlled by the State with carefully prepared textbooks which have served to
reinforce the national determination to develop the Republic of Korea rapidly.
It should however be stressed that despite the immense value placed on
education in the Republic of Korea, the actual quality, as opposed to quantity
has not shown marked improvement in many areas. Although the number of
students per class in primary schools has fallen from 60 in 1962 to 45.5 in
1981, that in middle school has risen from 60.1 to 64.9, and in vocational
high schools from 51.2 to 58.4. Class size has been static in general high
schools for the past twenty years. With classes of this size, learning by
rote has been inevitable, and the amount of attention per child very limited.
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Consequently to ensure success in the university examinations an incredible
network of private tutorships existed until 1980 which nearly every high
school child aiming at university attended.
Of all the institutions in the Republic of Korea, the least studied is
the military. The Korean war and subsequent threat from the DPRK has led to
the maintenance of the sixth largest army in the world and a rather smaller
navy and airforce. The military establishment clearly ought to play a
decisive role in the government if its influence., corresponded to its size.
Both Park Chung—hee and the present President were generals when they came to
power, but subsequently stepped down from their military rank when formally
becoming President. At the same time both in the early 1960s and l980s, large
numbers of generals were removed from their positions and usually found
government or quasi—government offices.
Apart from the early l960s and the present time, military backgrounds
have been rare in economic areas. Generals were much more likely to become
diplomats or National Assemblymen. An outstanding exception is Park Tae—jun,
a former major—general, who founded the government owned Pohang Iron and Steel
Company (POSCO), generally considered to be one of the most efficient
enterprises in the Republic of Korea.
Since 1980 there is an impression that men with a military background are
playing a much larger role in the Government than at any time since the early
1960s, but this is either at ministerial or enterprise level. The control of
the economy and finance remains firmly in the hands of the professional
bureaucrats and so called technocrats who have no professional military
background, except as low ranking conscripts.
Universal conscription was introduced in 1950. It has been argued that
particularly in the l950s and early l960s the period of military service
played an important educational role in taking young men from their villages
for the first time and giving them experience of modern discipline,
rudimentary machinery and the outside world. Likewise it has been argued that
at the time of the military coup of 1961 the military were the most modern
organised group in the country.47 Neither argument has the same force in
the l980s. In particular since the age cohort of military age are now in
excess of military requirements, men with very low educational attainments are
relegated to home defence corps duties. Likewise the sophistication of the
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Korean economy by 1980 prevented the useful transfer of military personnel to
commercial appointments.
Considering the homogeneity engendered by a lack of racial and cultural
minorities and a centralised educational system, the Republic of Korea is
surprisingly pluralistic in matters of religion. There is no state or even
quasi—state religion. Buddhism, the leading religion in terms of adherents,
was disestablished in 1392, and unlike Japan, Christianity has taken very
strong roots. Indeed in the early 1900s, missionaries were beginning to talk
hopefully of the first Christian nation of the East. Christians are still an
arithmetical minority, but more organised and wealthy than most other groups.
Other groups include Confucians, indigenous Korean religions from the
19th century such as Tonghak to the, modern "Moonie" cult, and a strong
persistence of Shamanism which is essentially animistic.48
From the point of view of development forces the Christians have probably
been the most active group from the launching of the 1919 Independence
Movement onwards. They are also the group most interested in economic and
social development. The Catholic Farmers Association forms the most
influential non—government agricultural organisation and a collection of
groups have taken an interest in the conditions of workers. Of
these, the Urban Industrial Mission continually hits the headlines in a
negative sense, being frequently blamed for labour unrest.
Trade unions had their origins in the colonial period and came into their
own during the period of the People's Committees during 1945 and 1946. They
were at that time plant unions organised on a national level for political
reasons. Syngman Rhee soon put a stop to that, and unions are proscribed from
political activity while turned into organs of the ruling party. It was
natural for the Government to wish to control unions and in 1967 it was
possible to publish a book stating "these unions are so dependent upon the
Government that they even work as a goon—squad for a political party in
power. Their purpose for existence is not so much as an endeavour for better
working conditions of higher wages, but as a pawn in the hands of the
so—called union leaders".49 In the next two years the unrest amongst the
rapidly growing industrial labour force was high. The characteristic labour
dispute begins at plant level, rather than from the national leadership, and
has not infrequently been aimed against the union leadership itself. The
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growing unrest in the late 1960s was curbed by Presidential Decree under the
Emergency Decree of December 1971, and the next era of general unrest was in
1979 to 1980 when government controls were relaxed. 1982 has also been
relatively eventful, and this may be an unexpected consequence of the new
labour laws of 1980 which weaken central control over branch unions.50
The Unions therefore are certainly not tame instruments of the Government
at local level, but operate under extensive constraints and active union
officials have often found themselves in the position of choosing between
allegiance to their members and pressures from the centre.
5. Preliminary appraisal
Contemporary observers in the late 1950s and early l960s saw few signs
that the Republic of Korea would suddenly develop at the fourth most rapid
rate in the world. As has been argued above, this growth did not come from a
single continuous source. It will be demonstrated that exports played a very
limited part in the transition from low growth to high growth, but that in the
second stage they took over as the leading sector. In more recent years there
have been signs of a more balanced growth, curtailed by a dramatic change in
government policy in 1980.
It will be seen from table 1.6 that the Republic of Korea has also been
unique amongst rapidly growing countries in experiencing a very high rate of
inflation, though modest by the standards of brazil or Israel. It will be
argued that inflation has been intrinsic to Korean development and that it is
still too early to say whether the current government policy which starts from
achieving a low inflation rate allows for the way that structurally every
economic activity has been adapted to high rates of inflation and must now
adjust to low rates.51
In 1978, an average growth rate of 10 per cent throughout the l980s was
forecast, which, using a misleading formulae for converting won to constant
dollars argued that by 1991 the Republic of Korea would have reached the 1975
per capita income level of middle income developed countries such as The
Netherlands.52 In fact, the Republic of Korea would have had to have
achieved such a high rate merely to reach the level of the leading NICs.
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Table 1.5 The fastest growing countries
(excluding Oil States)
Country
•
Per capita
GNP
(1979 s)
Average
Growth
1960—79
GNP Averag
rate Inflatio
1960—70
eannual
n Growth rate
1970—79
Japan 8,810 9.4 4.9 8.2
Rumania 1,900 9.2 —0.2 0.8
Singapore 3,830 7.4 1.1 5.5
The Republic 1,480 7.1 • 17.5 19.5
of Korea
Hongkong 3,760 7.0 2.4 7.9
Greece 3,960 5.9 3.2 14.1
Source: World Bank, World Development Report
With per capita income standing in 1981 just below the level at the end
of 1979, the Republic of Korea would have to grow even faster in the l980s.
The projected growth rate contained in the Fifth Five—Year Plan is 7.8 per
cent, but growth in 1982 will be under 6 per cent.
This should be taken as a measure of the problem of all developing
countries. Most of the 67 countries with a per capita income below 1,100
dollars would be happy to reach the level of the Republic of Korea in 1980, a
level in which the distribution of income is still commendably equal compared
with many developing countries. But for the Republic of Korea to come from a
level which in 1960 was still higher than that of about 31 of those countries
today at constant prices has taken twenty years. It will take more than
twenty more years to catch up with the slower growing developed countries, and
of course, since Japan is growing faster than the Republic of Korea, if there
are no limits to growth, it would be impossible to catch up.
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The Republic of Korea's most serious problem is still the large
percentage of the population in low productivity agriculture without a
potential for further productivity gains per hectare. This population must
therefore move into manufacturing and services, but the effect of the past two
years has been to increase labour productivity and the capital intensity of
employment. Each new job will therefore cost more to create, at a time when
the labour force is growing rapidly. Consequently merely to contain the level
of unemployment at present levels without providing for a shift from
agriculture comparable to that between 1975 and 1980 will take high growth
rates. This is more or less what the Fifth Five—Year Economic Plan
53projects.
There are urgent urban problems whose solution will also divert capital
from productive investment, notably road building to accommodate more motor
cars and sewage and water systems. Finally, in order to continue rapid growth
through exports, the Republic of Korea will need to develop new industries and
new markets at a prodigious rate.
The Republic of Korea now has about 1 per cent of world trade, and an
increase in exports is now a noticeable phenomenon especially at a time when
protectionist pressures are rising. An important test case will be the
tuotorcar industry, since the Republic of Korea has already followed most of
the areas in which Japan has excelled. In general, however, the future growth
potential may well be in the Republic of Korea's own domestic market which
will soon consist of 40 million consumers, four times the size of Portugal,
Greece, Belgium or Chile and twice that of Argentina.
Clearly the Korean experience has been highly individualistic,
nevertheless it offers important lessons for other developing countries. When
the Republic of Korea's experience is compared with other NICs, notably city
states like Singapore and Hongkong, or very large countries such as Mexico and
Brazil, its profile is closer to that of many developing countries.54 A
range of experience emerges which ought to be capable of development into a
practical programme for many low income countries.
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CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA
1. Development objectives, plans and strategies
1.1 The pre—planning period
Between 1945 and 1966 the basic goal of the Government was to create a
stable, viable economy out of what was successively a part—economy, a war
ravaged economy and a stagnant economy with imports running at twenty times
exports. From 1966—1982 the strategy changed to overtaking North Korea, and
achieving a high level of development, and since 1976 to be a developed nation
by the end of the century. Throughout this process there have been ambivalent
attitudes to such problems as promoting industry, at the expense of the large
rural population, allowing foreign capital to own a large proportion of Korean
industry and to the degree of openness the economy should have.
Pre—Korean War plans aimed primarily at solving the balance of payments
and fiscal problems. A recurrent myth was that because the Republic of Korea
had exported so much rice in the colonial period, it could sustain substantial
rice exports. The rice exports had only been achieved at the cost of reducing
nutritional standards of Koreans, which was possible in a controlled colonial
economy, but not in an independent one made up largely of peasant farmers.1
Near the end of the war, the U.N. commissioned Robert Nathan and
associates to draw up a plan which would restore output to its 1949 level.
Unfortunately, Syngman Rhee was never consulted, and the plan was never
adopted by the Korean Government. Nathan correctly identified the Republic of
Korea's strength as its labour force and ancitipated the growth of
manufactured exports. However neither the Korean Government, nor the aid
donors (principally the United States) had any real concern for some of the
imaginative ideas in the Nathan plan. The Koreans were concerned with
reconstructing the economy, and with balancing the budget, the Americans were
interested in pushing United States surplus items and bolstering up the
country against communism.
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It should be remembered in evaluation the very large amounts of aid that
the Republic of Korea received in the 1950s, that United States aid in the
1950s was conceived in very different terms from the later 1960s and 1970s.
As Allison, the United States Ambassador to Japan wrote the Dulles
period economic and purely political activity took second place to the
building up of a strong military base, which it was believed would deter
further communist expansion in Asia."2 Syngman aim throughout the
.950s was to get more aid in the form of money and less in kind, The United
States favoured donating commodities which could be sold in the Republic of
Korea and the proceeds used to subsidise the budget and aid programmes.
Moreover the advisors put great emphasis on stabilisation policies which
involved holding down agricultural prices.
Rhee himself seems to have been unconcerned by the slow pace of planning
and development, being more concerned with political inanoeuvring rather than
long term economic development. Thus the development of an economic plan from
1958 to 1961 proceeded in a very desultory fashion. In view of the deadlock
between the Korean Government and the United States aid donors there seemed
little urgency in completing it. Meanwhile the economy slowed down as the
stabilisation policy increased rural poverty, although industrial capacity
increased as new plants were built in areas such as textiles, fertilisers, and
ead steel.3
The Democratic Govermaent which came to power after the April Revolution
also placed political stability above economic growth, hoping to introduce the
first plan in 1961. A draft was available to be adopted hurriedly by the new
military Government in June 1961. Park Chung—hee, who emerged as leader, made
economic development a basic platform of the military regime, attacking
previous governments for the country° s economic ills including the "lack of
long range planning".4 As Cole and Lyman write "the most significant
political development in the economic policy of the Park administration as it
developed after 1963, was that economic policy became the central thrust of
the regime's entire political effort at home and to a certain extent abroad
concrete economic performance became the touchstone of political performance
.5
and national progress.'
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1.2 The First Plan 1962-1966
In economic terms the First Five—Year Economic Plan 1962—1966 was a
slight The long preamble was concerned with an attack on the
previous government, attached to ambitious targets for each sector,
withspecific investment projects enumerated. The basic goal was
"self—sustaining growth of the national economy for a better standard of
living in the future", "to provide or prepare a springboard for economic
progress" or to establish a "period of preparation for industrialisation".6
The basic aims were:
— to achieve self—sufficiency in food production;
— to reduce imports through substitution;
— to increase exports;
— to decrease dependence on foreign aid by increasing saving if necessary
by austerity measures;
— build up infrastructure and by—pass bottlenecks;
— reduce unemployment.
inadequate statistical material was available to build a proper model of
economy.7 In some respects this proved advantageous since the much more
sophisticated adjusted plan of 1963 which established "the limits of the
Korean economy, while at the same time adjusting the growth target to a more
realistic level" proved much less accurate.8 As Lewis observes
"mathematical exercises do not of themselves produce truth."9
However, if the growth target of 7.1 per cent per annum of the first plan
was near to the actual growth rate of 7.8 per cent, as far as planning
procedure was concerned it was more luck than judgement. Indeed the
Government decided late in the process to raise the target to 7.1 per cent
from the draft 6 per cent without adducing any additional reasons or policies.
The first plan therefore introduced some of the aspects of economic
planning which have continued to the end of the fourth. First the
manipulation of growth targets for political purposes. Second the degree to
which the Government was willing to use every measure within its power to
achieve economic growth. The plan was criticised as lacking any measures
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which would ensure the prescribed growth rate. Indeed in the area on which
the Government pledged most faith, the drop in consumption to provide
additional savings and the growth of foreign savings (as opposed to aid) the
plan notoriously overestimated the growth rate. Fortunately the incremental
capital—output ratios had also greatly been overestimated. Moreover, no one
had calculated either the degree to which factors of production in the economy
were underutilised in 1960, nor the responsiveness of peasant farmers to
market incentives.
It is important to note that a thorough reform of the Government
structure had preceeded the introduction of the plan. There had been a purge
of corrupt officials, followed by the creation or strengthening of the
overlord ministries, the Economic Planning Board with planning, budgetary,
economic co—operation and co—ordination functions, the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry charged with promoting industry, curbing imports and increasing
exports and later, in 1963, the Ministry of Construction which was to oversee
the creation of the physical environment for the development process.
Equally important the Government appropriated the major banks and
modified or created additional specialised banks which would handle foreign
loans and domestic credit. In implementing the succesive plans, control and
of credit has been the Government's most important instrument. In
order to achieve this completely it was, however, necessary to make sure that
funds flowed through institutional forms of credit and not through the
disorganised curb or unofficial money market. Between 1962 and 1965 a number
of monetary experiments were conducted, all of them limited by a desire to
keep interest rates low, whereas the unofficial market reflected supply and
10
demand more accurately.
In 1965 under the advice of Gurley, Patrick and Shaw, the simple
expedient of raising the real interest rate from negative to positive across a
wide range of accounts was adopted, from 9 per cent to 20 per cent)1 The
effect was instant and beyond the expectations of the reformers. Time and
savings deposits increased by 25 per cent in one month, tripled in the first
12 months, and doubled again in the following 12 months. The increase in
deposits alone, equalled 5 per cent of GNP in 1966 and 6 per cent in 1967,
whereas in the three years prior to the reform real savings had not increased
at all.
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The initial effect was the result not of new savings, but a transfer of
resources from the unofficial to the official sector. This was precisely what
was required to finance future investment according to Government direction.
Kim Kwang—suk has argued that the overvalued won was "a factor of considerable
importance in explaining the Republic of Korea's economic performance in the
1950s". It encouraged imports which were controlled by licenses which were
highly profitable to license—holders and the Government which sold the
licenses, which Krueger believes "constituted a major distorting infuence
within the economy".
Again major experiments in exchange rates and import controls were
conducted between 1960 and 1964, but in 1964 the basic policy which continued
for ten years of adjusting the exchange rate to allow for a differential
inflation rate in the Republic of Korea, and which controlled imports for the
domestic sector while allowing free imports for exports was established (see
Appendix, Table 1 for exchange rates). It is important to note that these
policies evolved by trial and error after high growth rates in 1963 and 1964
had been achieved, and the "take off" was not dependent on these policy
reforms, rather the policy reforms sustained growth.14
Little has been said about exports in the First Plan. Indeed the section
in the draft plan which listed the measures that might be adopted to promote
exports was dropped from the final version. But soon after the military
assumption of power, monthly export promotion meetings began to be held in the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, presided over by Park Chung—hee. Later
these meetings became a matter of report, but in the early stages the direct
oversight of the holder of executive power allowed instant decisions to be
made. Indeed throughout the development process the speed of decision making
has been a characteristic of the Korean Government.
A comprehensive battery of measures to encourage exports and to allow
them to compete on free market terms was established (See Appendix Table 2).
As will be seen later in the work, these measures creating the environment for
freer trade were undoubtedly important, but in the Korean case Government
intervention, exhortation and promotional activity went far beyond merely
creating the conditions under which exports could develop freely)5
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1.3 The Second Plan 1967—71
By 1965 preparations for the Second Five—Year Development Plan 1967—71
were well underway. As a piece of economic planning the second plan is
perhaps the most impressive of the five Korean plans. It was able to draw on
the first input—output tables (for 1960 and 1963) which had ever been compiled
Thr the Republic of Korea which allowed the linkages to be evaluated much more
precisely.
The second plan was based on round population projections which showed
that employment would have to be expanded rapidly to prevent an increase in
unemployment during the 1970s as the post—Korean war generation reached
maturity. It was clear that a further expansion of the agricultural sector
would be unlikely, and manufacturing appeared the obvious area for
development. In the first plan export promotion had been essentially a shot
in the dark. In the second plan it was a question of building on firm
foundations. The second plan therefore put much greater emphasis on an
export—led strategy, encouraging foreign investment areas where labour
intensive manufactures could be developed, notably electronics.
At the same time import substitution remained an important goal.
which did not have immediate export prospects but which would save
foreign exchange and increase self—sufficiency were programmed including
fertiliser plants, oil refineries, cement, and the early petro—chemical
plants. Against international advice an integrated iron and steel mill was
also planned.
In the case of import substitution the basic nationalistic policy of
self—sufficiency won against the arguments of the foreign advisors and
enthusiasts for a more open economy. However, in the bitter debate over
balanced or unbalanced growth in which the nationalist school of thought
argued for rural industrialisation and the dispersal of industry while the
other side argued for economies of scale and allowing market forces to dictate
location of industry even if all of it was sited in Seoul, the nationalists
lost.
It is questionable whether the Korean Government got value for money out
of its foreign consultants. The integrated iron and steel mill started in
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1968 was the outstandingly sucessfull POSCO plant, while cement went on to be
an import export commodity. In the debate over the potential rate of export
growth the Ministry of Commerce and Industry argued for a high rate, while
others, mainly consultants, argued this was too high. The subsequent
compromise of 21 per cent proved too low.
The third major issue was whether domestic machinery manufacturers were
to be encouraged to expand or whether imports were to be encouraged. As Cole
and Lyman state "despite statements at various points in the Second Plan about
the importance of building up the machinery sectors, which were designed to
appease nationalistic sentiments, the investment tentatively earmarked for
them was not very large and much of it was expected to go into electric and
mechanical appliances for the export and consumer markets, rather than the
heavier machine tool industries".
The essence of the planning mechanism allowed bottlenecks to be forecast
and investment scheduled to overcome them. With intermediate goods the point
at which domestic demand would reach a level where investment was justified
could also be forecast. One major policy shift was away from railway
construction and towards motor transport as a of a comprehensive
transportation study by the World Bank. This study categorically concluded
railways should be constructed".17
From the time of the adjusted first Five—Year Plan of 1964 an annual
economic review had been instituted which allowed modifications to be made to
the basic plan according to developments in the past year. This was known as
the Overall Resources Budget (O.R.B.). This introduced more flexibility into
the planning process and allowed new projects, such as the Seoul—Pusan
expressway to be introduced.
The second plan was successful in increasing the export sector and in
laying the further foundations of industrialisation, but as Table 2.1 shows,
the percentage growth of manufacturing value added was inferior to the first
plan, as was the rate of growth of exports, although the overall GNP growth
rate was nearly two percentage points higher. As will be seen, the absolute
number of new jobs created in manufacturing was also disappointing.
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The worst criticism of the second plan was that it neglected the
agricultural sector, so that the differential between rural and urban
household incomes increased rapidly and caused a massive migration to the
cities. Shanty towns multiplied on the edges of the major cities, while
unemployment amongst new migrants was high.
1.4 The Third Plan 1972—76
If the second plan had seen a triumph of market forces over nationalistic
sentiment, the third plan was to see a return to political rather than purely
economic principles (or a triumph of nationalistic thinking). Adelman and
Westphal put it even more graphically. "the Republic of Korea's Second
Five—Year Plan was probably exceptional among development plans in the use of
comprehensive development planning techniques and in the degree of Government
participation in its formulation. For reasons that will be developed in the
course of this paper, the Korean Government gave up comprehensive planning
when preparing the Third Five—Year Plan."19
The essence of the authors' argument is that comprehensive planning aims
at exploring the consequences of balanced, consistent and efficient growth.
"The actual growth process, if it takes place, is unbalanced, inconsistent and
inefficient."20 Implicitly the semi—managed nature of the Korean economy is
blamed for not adjusting to market signals which resulted in adjustments to
imbalances in economic growth occurring "through an admixture of quantitative
rationing of scarce resources, administrative allocation of targets and
21
tinkering with covert adjustments to official prices."
Finally "by 1970 the very success of economic growth had generated (a)
demand for more political participation in plan formulation, (b) latent
demands for a wider distribution of the economic benefits of accelerated
growth, (c) imbalances among demand and supply of key resources leading to a
resurgence of inflationary pressures and to potential pressures on foreign
exchange balances, (d) vested interests in the perpetuation of the imbalances
and (e) a general feeling by top policy makers that the only way these
economic imbalances and demands for greater participation could both be
accommodated simultaneously was through greater reliance on centralised
control of resources allocation."22 As a result although the Korean economy
was much more complex in the 1970s, and the use of planning less
sophisticated, Government control and direction of the economy increased.
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The basic concept enunciated in the third plan was "the harmonisation of
growth, stability and balance" with the continued rapid expansion of exports
alongside the attainment of a "viable independent (my italics) economic
structur&' which was to include "innovative development of the economies of
farm and fishing villages" with a return to the First Plan9s emphasis on
self—sufficiency in major food grains. At the same time the industrial
industries, as well as improving scientific, technological and manpower
development.
The plan also contained detailed social goals, the balanced development
of power supply through rural electrification and development of the
transportation and communications systems, the acceleration of regional
development and the optimum dispersion of industrial manpower. Social
security and public welfare systems were to be instituted since this was to be
the plan dedicated to "improving the quality of life of workers".
The third plan was therefore more ambitious than the second. The second
had aimed at maximising economic growth, the third aimed at high economic
growth while harmonising the various problems that unbalanced growth had
created.
Simultaneously with the third five—year plan, a National Land Development
Plan which was to last ten years was introduced. For a country with such a
high population density, a national physical development plan was an obvious
step. The Presidential order to draw up this plan had been given in 1963 and
in a country in which the decision making process is normally rapid, the delay
in adopting a physical plan indicates unusually strong conflicts of
23
interest. It was not until December 1968 that the basic guidelines were
drawn up. The history of the development of the land use plan is a reminder
that even the Republic of Korea, without strong regional differences compared
with most LDCs found it much more difficult to make a regional plan than to
frame national policies.
The basic aims were fourfold:
(a) The dispersion of industry away from Seoul,
(b) Expansion of rural development and market integration which was termed
the "foundation of development".
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(c) Enhancement of the efficiency of land use and management.
(d) Development of land resources and conservation and protection of nature.
The dispersion of industry from Seoul was a major priority, in 1970, it
was estimated that 45 per cent of industrial output emanated from the capital,
and a goal of 29.9 per cent was set for 1981. Although the exact figures are
not available, this goal was approximately reached. The method used was the
development of industrial estates and large industrial plant along the
south—east coastline. The process had already begun at Pohang with the
location of POSCO. At Ulsan were located shipbuilding, petrochemical and
motor industry plants, at Pusan large manufacturing complexes, at Masan an
export zone and subsequently major machinery complexes at Changwon and further
west petrochemical plants and refineries (see Map 2.1).
Despite the fact that balanced growth, rather than maximum growth, was
the aim of the Third Plan, the economy grew more rapidly between 1972 and 1976
than between 1967 and 1971. To a considerable extent this was the result of
the time lag between plan and implementation. This will be discussed in
section 2. The time lag meant that policies and prograimnes introduced under
the preceediag period were still producing their maximum effect after the plan
had finished, while new direction were taking time to work through the economy.
Thus as Table 2.2 shows the domestic economy was slowing down drastically
in 1972 and appeared to be negative, while exports were continuing to
increase. The high degree of social unrest or potential unrest led to an
acceleration of policies which would rectify this. One was the Saemaul Undong
(New Village Movement) launched in 1972 which was to aim at the rapid
modernisation of the countryside, the other was the Heavy and Chemical
Industry Plan of 1972. The latter set out new targets for all areas of heavy
industry and was put under the direction of the Heavy and Chemical Industry
Committee based in the Presidential Offices. Thus for instance the target for
shipbuilding capacity by 1976 in the third plan was 1.3 million gross tons,
but the actual capacity achieved under the new plan was 2.6 million gross tons.
Unlike the third plan itself, the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan was
not drawn up by standard economic planning procedures, but by reference to the
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industrial structure of more advanced countries with scant regard for
comparative advantage.24 The investment requirements were by no means
accurately calculated, nor the economic efficiency of investment in capical
intensive industries at this stage of the Republic of Korea's development. It
w&s also assumed that the Republic of Korea could profitably export capital
intensive industrial products on scales which were determined by internal
factors rather than world market conditions.25 From a locational point of
view, the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan gave a specific content and scale
to the industrial estates planned in the National Land Development Plan.
- 49 —
Figure 2.1: Map to illustrate the
1972—1981
First National Land Development Plan
Port
Industrial
Estate
Dam
Expressway
Expressway
Proposed
Electric
Railway
345 KY
— 50 —
When the third plan and the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan were drawn
up, no one envisaged the oil crisis of 1973—74. The Republic of Korea has
been widely praised for the politics adopted during the crisis. No
attempt was made to cushion consumer or industrial prices0 The belief was
that iimnediate exposure to the changed world was desirable, but at the same
easy credit was available to stockpile inventories and keep new
investment proceeding. The Government was assisted by the small part oil
played in ordinary KoreansB lives, the increase in rural incomes resulting
from high grain support prices started under the third plan, and the fact that
wages kept pace with inflation0 Hence domestic demand held up in 1974 when
exports were badly hit.
Two new strategies were adopted as a result of the oil crisis. The first
was the growth of labour exports for construction, especially in oil rich
countries, backed up by Government diplomacy. The second was the vigorous
exploitation of new markets. This was pursued through diplomatic means and by
creating General Trading Companies paralleling aspects of the sogo shosha of
Japan. Essentially this was an attempt to convert Korean exporters from
passive to active exporters. Most exports prior had been through
non—Korean importers. Now Korean branches
over this role.
1.5 The Fourth Plan 1977—81
The fourth plan was drawn up during the tail end of the oil crisis. The
hands of the planners were tied by the continuing Heavy and Chemical Industry
Plan and the Saemaul Movement. Moreover the political goal of eliminating
further foreign direct investment was added. The aim was to have the domestic
savings ratio exceed the investment ratio by 0,1 per cent by the end of the
plan period. It was predicated on both a current account and trade surplus
and, of course, a rapid rise in domestic savings. It also marked an important
change of direction from the policies of the late 1960s regarding foreign
investment.
The industrial structure was to be UdeepenedU, by art increasing share of
GNP from manufacturing and an increasing share of industrial value added
coming from heavy and chemical industries. The prediction that by 1981 39,7
per cent of GNP would come from industry reflects an interesting blindness to
the service sector. Although many areas of the tertiary sector were greatly
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in need of overhaul and nowhere more than the financial sector, little
attention was given to these areas. It was correctly foreseen that the
agricultural contribution would decline slowly to 18.5 per cent in 1981, but
also assumed that the service sector would decline from 46.5 per cent to only
40 per cent.27 There was no model or recent historical experience of any
country undergoing industrialisation which lent support to this projection,
although the tertiary sector had declined during the first half of the 1970s.
The Republic of Korea, by 1976, had reached the industrial structure of a
number of developed countries at the start of the 1960s, the point where the
services sector might be expected to increase.
To further strengthen Republic of Korea's self—sufficiency, the ration of
R & D expenditure to GNP was to double, as increasing investment was made in
research to develop more sophisticated products. The Government was supposed
to make fewer interventions in the economy, administrative procedure was to be
overhauled and subsidies phased out. Corporate management was to be improved,
alongside enhanced management/labour cooperation, new fair trade practices and
increased industrial information services.
Under the fourth plan, the Republic of Korea was therefore attempting to
do mutually contradictory things. It aimed at increasing integration in the
world market, but to exclude foreign capital; to increase savings while
keeping interest rates for industrial investment low; to reduce Government
involvement and phase out subsidies, while making massive subsidies and
central direction under the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan. Although the
social welfare legislation envisaged under the third plan had reached the
statute books in 1973, its implementation was suspended because of the oil
crisis, and the fourth plan did not project implementation during the fourth
plan period.
No one foresaw that the success of overseas construction would result in
a current account surplus ahead of schedule in 1977, and instead of phasing
out foreign capital and revaluing the won, it was decided to liberalise
imports. One reason for this was the inability of the financial structure to
accommodate an inflow of dollar remittances from overseas construction workers
without the central bank issuing more currency.28 The liberalisation of
imports was only achieved after a bitter debate and the balance of opposing
forces was so even that the implementing Ministries of Commerce and Industry
and Agriculture were able to liberalise only imports which were
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non—competitive or of minor value. Adopting import liberalisation, while
beneficial in principle for the economy, meant that the goal of achieving a
trade surplus in the Fourth Plan, which was very close in 1976, was totally
abandoned.
Unfortunately the increase in the deficit was greatly augmented by the
new oil price increases of mid—1979. Thus by the second year of the plan
there had been major shifts in goals and policies. These were to increase as
concern about inflation mounted in 1978, and to lead to a major re—evaluation
of the basic framework of economic policies in 1979 and 1980.
From the moment the first plan enunciated the principle of "guided
capitalism" until 1978, Korean economic policy was clearly at variance with
many of the principles of neoclassical economics. The goal of
self—sufficiency so often repeated in the first, third and fourth plans had no
meaning in neoclassical terms, though it was self—evident to every Korean that
it must be beneficial to the nation as a whole. Macropolicy in as far as it
resembled any mainstream economic theory it may be described as "Korean
Keynesianism". Its major justification was that itdelivered growth. But
with middle class concern about inflation increasing, and United States
trained economists, out of sympathy with the tried and trusted methods, in
positions of responsibility, a major shift towards monetarism was made in
1979
29
Interest rates were increased greatly in January 1980 and the won, which
had been pegged against the dollar since 1974, devalued. Much more sweeping
measures were announced in August and September 1980 and the Heavy and
Chemical Industry Plan drastically curtailed. Even the principle of having a
fifth plan was contested in 1980. But this challenging attitude did not
prevail throughout the Government structure which was cheerfully continuing to
generate plans, targets and taking measures to achieve them.
1.6 The Fifth Plan 1982—86
Initial drafts of the Fifth Five—Year Economic and Social Development
Plan 1982—1986 were strongly critical of past policies. The final version
accepted that "the Republic of Korea now stands on the threshold of
fundamentally changing its economic management in order to lay the foundations
for sustained development. The Republic of Korea will have to nurture its
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capability to participate more actively in the world economy and to flexibly
--
adapt to changes in the external environment." The new plan portrays "the
changing role of the Government private economic activities0 Aside
from a limited number of large scale projects, investment choices wil. be left
to the initiative of the private sector, while the Government will indicate
only the general framework and direction in which such choices should be
31
made.
The general tenor of the plan was that the Government would withdraw from
intervention in the marketplace, •but play a larger role in social,
technological and manpower development. In terms of priorities economic
stabilisation took the highest place. This meant not only reducing inflation
to below 10 per cent but improving the market mechanism to increase supply to
match demand. The growth rate was put at between 7 and 8 per cent which was
"called for to absorb the ever—increasing labour force and simultaneously to
,,3 2
raise the income level.
In accord with the economic theory that argues there is nothing a
Government can do to infuence growth rates "the Republic of Korea will depart
from quantitative target oriented methods as were the primary tactics of the
past four plans. The present plan, in its place, relies mainly on the
structural reform of economic institutions and policies, working toward, among
others, import liberalisation, autonomous banking operations, and efficient
industrial incentive scheme and a competitive market mechanism.33
In conversation, the planners alluded to the conditions created by the
policy reforms of the mid l960s, exchange rate, export incentive policies and
interest rate reforms. The plan also parallels the central concern of the
second plan of employment, rather than national prestige or "national
development". "The growth objective of the fifth plan is mainly to reduce the
rate of unemployment from 4.8 per cent to a 4.0 per cent
Exports were to remain the leading sector, but the domestic market will
be exposed to more foreign competition, including foreign direct investment.
Hence the economy would be fully open by the end of the 1980s in every
respect. Import substitution was to be abandoned, only industries in which
the Republic of Korea had a comparative advantage were to be encouraged while
energy intensive industries were to be positively discouraged.
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The fifth plan is the first to include the words "and social" and
promises that the social welfare scheme of the early l970s would be revised
and implemented and increased environmental investment would be made
obtain balanced growth in all regions, sectors and social groups."35 In
particular the quality of education in all its forms is to be greatly improved.
1.7 Conclusion
It can be seen that, on paper at least, there has been a dramatic change
in the conception of what a Government should do in an economy. Under this
new orthodoxy much of what was done in the early 1960s and during nearly all
of the 1970s was misguided. The mid—1960s are seen as the high point which
created the growth momentum in the Republic of the Republic of Korea,
departure from which led to the problems of the late 1970s. Indeed a KDI
working paper by the highly respected Dr. Kim Kwang—suk entitled "Lessons from
Korean Economic Development" pursues precisely this line, and much of the
account is taken with mistakes to be avoided drawn from Korean experience in
the 1970s.
Substantial sections of the business and Government community remain
unconvinced by this critique. Its greatest appeal is to academic economists
whom the benefits of conforming to the precepts of neoclassical theory are
self—evident. The line argued in the present work is that, in the words of
W.A. Lewis, "there is no doubt that the market economy left to itself, gives
the wrong answers in underdeveloped countries".36 Moreover it argues that
the new orthodoxy is historically incorrect about growth in the l960s, and
that while the overall line pursued by the Korean Government down to the
beginning of 1979 while not always the best policy, it was still a good
policy. The Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan was overambitious, and because
of miscalculations about the scale of investment required distorted the whole
economy by 1978. However it seems inconceivable that the Republic of Korea
could have developed areas of successful industry such as shipbuilding on
anything like the scale or speed of the early l970s under guidance purely from
market forces.
The present work agrees that much was out of balance in the economy by
1978 and that a degree of liberalisation was called for. However it argues
that the problems facing the Republic of Korea in the 1980s are immense and
require swift Government response rather than awaiting a response to market
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signals from businessmen who have had only a limited experience of how a free
market economy works.
2. The development experience
As has been shown in Chapter I, section 3, the Republic of Korea has
experienced dramatic increases in GNP, exports and imports, employment and
relatively rapid increases in population. At the same time, there has been a
rapid change in the industrial structure and the composition of the labour
force so that by 1981 the structure of the Korean economy looks much more like
that of an industrial country, whereas in 1961 it had the classic structure of
an LDC with over 60 per cent of the labour force in the primary sector and
between 45 and 50 per cent of GNP derived from agriculture, forestry and
fisheries.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the rapid growth of the three main sectors and
GNP, while figure 2.3 illustrates the course of structural change.
Figure 2.2 shows that manufacturing industry has grown more rapidly than
the other two sectors (mining after maintaining 10 per cent growth to 1966,
fell back to an average of under 5 per cent for the rest of the period).37
Tertiary industry, which in the Republic of Korea includes construction, has
grown at about the same rate as overall GNP, while the primary sector achieved
a growth rate significantly lower than GNP.38 The poor performance of
agriculture relative to the other two sectors is a reflection partly of the
very unfavourable resource position of Korean farmers described in section
1.1. As result of the inability of farming to keep up with the other sectors,
the course of structural change portrayed in figure 2.2 was more rapid than it
might have been in an LDC with more favourable resource endowments.
The transition from LDC structure to near DC structure has been achieved
in twenty years.39 Since the goal of all Korean planning has been to
develop an industrialised nation, how closely does the actual growth accord
with Korean planning and the policies adopted, and how far was it the result
of factors beyond the control of the Government and even unforeseen by the
planners and policy makers? Moreover since as will be argued in Chapter 3,
the Government has tried every trick in the book (and many that are not in the
book) to achieve a high growth rate, to what degree are the measures used in
the Republic of Korea transferrable to other countries?
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2.1 The transition from low growth to high growth
2.1.1 Export—led growth
According to the conventional view of the Republic of Korea, the
development process has been a classic case of export—led growth.4° No one
can deny that exports have been extremely important to the Republic of Korea.
It is essential to delimit exactly how important exports have been. The basic
argument presented here is that export growth has been an integral part of a
development package pursued in the Republic of Korea, but that the
quantitative role of exports in the critical transition from low growth to
high growth was actually rather small.
Export—led growth has been used in a number of ways in economic
literature.41 Its primary use in the case of the Republic of Korea has been
within the framework of a Rostovian leading sector whose higher than average
growth rate is transmitted through backward and forward linkages to other
parts of the economy, thus stimulating growth in all areas of the modern
sector. As will be seen in Table 2.3 in three years in the l970s, exports
actually contributed more than 50 per cent of growth of GNP.
Table 2.2 offers export and GNP data. Column A gives the commonly used
ratio of exports to GNP. This is a potentially misleading ratio, comparing
like with unlike. GNP is a measure of value added, while exports are a
proportion of total output. Only in the case of selected agricultural and
- 42
mineral products will domestic value added approach output value. Given
the high import content of many Korean manufactures, the value added to total
export values is much lower than in agriculture and in the pre—1970 period
less than half the f.o.b. prices. Column B of table 2.2 therefore gives the
Ministry of Commerce and Industries estimates of the value added ratio of
manufactured exports. This is based purely on imports declared as raw
materials for exports and exaggerates the value added ratio.43 Accepting
the figures in column B as accurate, column C gives the value added of exports
to GNP.
Based on this data, Table 2.3 gives suggested contributions of export and
domestic market to each year's GNP growth. In this the contribution of the
increase in exports was calculated and the residual treated as the domestic
contribution. This is a crude measure but is more likely to overstate the
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Table 2.2 Exports and GNP
A B
Value added1 Exports Increase of exports Actual
GNP Ratio of A x B necessary to raise increase
exports GNP by 1% of exports
0%
0% %
1959 60
1960 60
1961 6.4 50 3.2 31.25 24.3
1962 6.0 50 3 30 32.4
1963 5.4 50 2.7 37 56.3
1964 6.7 49 3.3 30.3 34.3
1965 9.5 48 4.6 21.7 41.6
1966 11.9 45 5.4 18.5 29.8
1967 13.6 48 6.5 15.4 27.8
1968 14.7 50 7.35 13.6 41
1969 15.4 52 8.0 12.5 42.3
1970 16.0 55.3 8.8 11.4 28.4
1971 17.1 53.5 9.1 11.2 30.1
1972 2..8 60.9 13.2 7.5 46.3
1973 31.3 61.1 19.2 5.2 54.2
1974 29.5 58.2 17.2 5.8 9.0
1975 29.1 58.3 16.9 5.9 19.6
1976 34.5 63.2 21.8 4.6 39.8
1977 37.2 65 24.3 4.2 17.4
1978 36.2 67.8 24.6 4.1 14.3
1979 32.5 67 21.8 4.6 —3.2
1980 67
1981 67
1For limitations of these figures see text. Pre—1970 figures are
estimates.
Source: Handbook of Korean Economy 1980, Tables 1, 50, 100.
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Table 2.3 Contribution of exports and domestic markets to GNP
Year Exports Domestic market Total
1961 1.0 4.6 5.6
1962 1.1 1.1 2.2
1963 1.5 7.6 9.1
1964 1.1 8.5 9.6
1965 1.9 3.9 5.8
1966 1.6 11.1 12.7
1967 1.8 4.8 6.6
1968 3.0 8.3 11.3
1969 3.3 10.5 13.8
1970 2.5 5.1 7.6
1971 2.7 6.7 9.4
1972 6.2
—0.4 5.8
1973 10.4 4.5 14.9
1974 1.6 6.4 8.0
1975 3.3 3.8 7.1
1976 8.6 6.5 15.1
1977 4.2 6.1 10.3
1978 3.6 8 11.6
1979 —0.7 7.1 6.4
Quoted from Economic Planning Board.
Source: Handbook of the Korean Economy 1980, Tables 1, 50 and 100,
Tony Michell "Domestic Bliss: Lessons from Korean Economic
Development 1962—1982", Euro Asia Business Review, Vol. 2, No. 2,
pp. 22—27.
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importance of exports than to underestimate them. By using a high measure of
value—added it is intended that the Indirect effect of exports would also be
- 44
included.
Thus it can be seen that during the 1960s, except for poor harvests
1SS2 and 1965, exports contributed between 11.5 and 27.3 per cent of
growth, while the sector provided between 88.5 and 72.8 per cent of
growth. During the l970s, excluding the exceptional years of 1972, 1974 and
1979, the export sector contributed between 28.7 per cent and 69.8 per cent,
and the domestic sector between 30.2 and 71.3 per cent. To put it another
way, assuming the total effect of exports to have been captured, in the 1960s
without the development of exports, the Republic of Korea might still have
grown at 6.7 per cent instead of the 8.5 per cent actually achieved. This
would have made the Republic of Korea the fourteenth fastest growing
developing country in the 1960s, compared with its actual position of joint
fourth. Without exports in the 1970s the Republic of Korea would have grown
at 5.38 per cent instead of 9.62 per cent, placing her 30th instead of third.
Therefore exports cannot explain the transition from low to high growth
in the 1960s and due attention must be given to domestic market. However
during the 1970s the degree to which exports were vital to the Korean economy
h&raiy be exaggerated. Nevertheless the slowdown in contribution between
1976 and 1979 cannot be overlooked and although in part this was the result of
an overvalued exchange rate, it must be asked whether the position assumed by
exports in the early l970s was one which could be maintained or whether it was
abnormal. Since 1980 the Korean Government strategy has been predicated on
the level of the early 1970s being normal. To continue at this level, the
Republic of Korea's share of world trade must increase rapidly from the
present 1 per cent to about 8 or 9 per cent by the end of the century. This
question will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.
2.1.2 Alternative sources of growth
If exports were not the prime mover in the transition from low to high
growth, what was? In the long run only a combination of good, if not optimum,
Government policies and high rates of investment can produce rapid
growth.45 In the short term if available inputs are undarutilised then
potential output will be curtailed.46 The underutilisation of capital and
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or labour could be the result of structural imbalances, or of Government
policy.
it could be argued that Government policy can in the short
term achieve a higher rate of growth than the potential of the economy by
using or encouraging the use of factors of production at more than normal
intensity. Communist Governments certainly act as though this were true and
claim to achieve results. Whether a Government such as that of Republic of
Korea employing the concept of guided capitalism could have the same effect
remains a matter of debate. It will be argued that in certain sectors,
Government action had the effect of encouraging the economy to work with more
than normal efficiency.47 Whether this success was more than outweighed by
Government induced inefficiencies in other sectors remains to be researched.
To have an impact on the whole of the economy, in the early l960s the
source of the gap between potential and actual output had to lie in
agriculture. Indeed manufacturing had been expanding at the respectable rate
of 10 per cent per annum between 1957 and 1960, whereas agriculture had grown
by only 1.6 per cent. The critical measure was taken in June 1961 shortly
after the military came to power. Entitled the Farm Products Prices
Maintenance Law it aimed to proper prices of agricultural products
to insure the stability of agricultural production and the rural
economy."48 Between 1962 and 1965 agricultural output increased at an
average of 8.8 per cent. The tertiary sector grew at the same rate. During
the l950s under United States pressure, and using P.L.480 grain to flood the
market, the Government held down agricultural prices below the cost of
49
production.
By reversing the agricultural policies of the l950s and by creating a
system of rural credit through merging the existing system of agricultural
cooperatives with the Agricultural Bank, so that a national system reaching
into every hamlet was created. The primary sector received an enormous
input.50 In the first year, 138 million dollars were lent to farmers,
permitting old debts to be paid off and new investments to begin.51 These
moves were central to the beliefs of Park Chung—hee and his associates and to
traditional Confucian economic thought in which agriculture is regarded as the
basis of a nation's strength.52
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As a result of these moves, despite two bad harvests in the plan period,
agriculture achieved an average growth rate twice that of the second plan
period. Since the profits were largely consumed rather than saved, the result
was inflationary (see Figure 1.1) but set in motion supplementary growth in
industries catering for the home market and hence produced derived growth
throughout the economy.
Rostow likened early industrialisation to the take—off of an aircraft,
with pre—conditions, the run up to take—off and then the development of
self—sustaining growth.53 From the point of view of the Republic of Korea a
better analogy would be with a multi—stage rocket. The Government's success
in the early 1960s was in creating a package of growth areas, some of short
term duration, some sustaining the growth rate to the point where exports
could become the main driving force.
Like the first stage of a rocket, agriculture could not sustain rapid
growth in Korean conditions, which allowed neither expansion of area, nor
labour productivity gains, until alternative employment was available
elsewhere. As figure 2.2 shows, the growth rate ofagriculture fell away
rapidly in the mid 1960s. What then would act as a middle stage before the
scale of exports became sufficient to provide a dominant driving force in the
1970s?
The expansion of domestic demand begun by the agricultural policies of
1961 was continued to a considerable extent by rapid investment in the public
sector, not only in social overhead construction, but also in manufacturing.
A second feature was the concentration of development in the Seoul and Pusan
region which formed sufficiently large urban markets with a higher per capita
income than rural areas again encouraging domestic manufacturing. As the
transport infrastructure grew rapidly in the late l960s, these enterprises
encountered not only a rapidly growing urban market but also previously
unexploited rural markets.
By the early 1970s the third stage, that of export led growth was ready
to take a leading role. The importance of the two preceeding stages can
hardly be minimized since they created the conditions of success, and indeed
ten years of high growth. There is evidence that the Government believed that
the third stage would be insufficient at the beginning of the 1970s, and that
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this marked the beginnings of both the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan (1972)
and the rural modernisation movement, the Saemaul Undong
Rostow defines leading sectors as growth sectors where
possibilities for innovation or for the exploitation of newly profitable or
hitherto unexplored resources yield a high growth—rate and set in motion
expansionary forces elsewhere in the economy."55 On this definition and the
preceeding discussion, the following primary growth sectors can be identified:
Table 2.4 Primary growth or leading sectors
1956 — 1972 State enterprise
1959 — 1978 Exports
1957 — 1978 Manufacturing Sector
1961 — 1966 Agriculture
1964 — 1982 Seoul and large cities
1961 — 1969 Social Overhead Capital
In the public sector the Government not only planned and guided, but
actually created growth. The public sector went far beyond providing
infrastructure necessary for private enterprise. The Government did indeed
use the social overhead capital sector as a leading sector and in every year
from 1961 to 1969 the rate of growth was higher than in manufacturing and
therefore higher than in any other sector. Despite the lack of a national
physical development plan, a rapid expansion of electricity capacity, harbours
and communications networks proceeded under the First and Second Plans.— A
new series of railways and harbours integrated the mining regions of the
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eastern seaboard into the national economy, and mining also showed a rapid
growth rate until 1966.56 Not only did the Government achieve a further
stimulus of the economy, but because the infrastructure was built to a plan
incorporating ambitious growth targets, the Republic of Korea was rarely
seriously incommoded by any bottlenecks to manufacturing emanating from the
tertiary sector.
But the Government went much further in promoting growth directly through
building "model enterprises". Appendix table 5 sets out public
enterprises' share in the Korean economy in 1963 and 1972 as calculated by
Leroy Jones. It can be seen that public enterprises contributed just over 15
per cent of value added in manufacturing throughout the 1960s, despite the
rapid growth of the whole economy, indicating rapid Government investment
throughout the decade. Overall, nationalised industries'share of GDP rose
from 6.98 per cent in 1963 to 9.0 per cent in 1972 and to 9.6 per cent in
Leroy Jones and SaRong II have refined their analysis of
nationalised enterprises to show that it had exceptionally high backward and
forward linkages, compared with Korean manufacturing as a whole, and the total
public enterprise sector had a higher ration of forward linkages than the
economy as a whole (Table 2.4). In other words, public enterprise in the
Republic of Korea fulfilled the classic role of a leading sector in which
that average growth stimulates the rest of the economy.
The explicit aim of Park Chung—hee in encouraging public enterprise was
based on the fact that "the key problems facing a free economic policy are
co—ordination and supervisory guidance by the state of mammoth economic
strength. Neither state nor society can be the victim of the greed of
powerful interest groups. There was once a time when the "laissez—faire"
policy was the only way to guarantee the maximum freedom of people's economic
activities; but it was realised subsequently that such a policy was apt to
widen the gap between the haves and have nots
Even in 1975 when privatisation had begun, 20 of the Republic of Korea's
largest enterprises were in the public sector including 12 of the 16
largest.59 During the 1960s only one divestiture took place, Korean Air
Lines in 1969, but in 1972—74, 33 public enterprises were sold, nine founded
and a further seven acquired. Under the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan
there was a reversal of policy, and new industries which would once have been
Figure 2.4: Direct linkages among sectors of
the Korean economy, 1972
Direct Forward Linkages
Intermediate Soles
Total Value of Soles
P.E. Public enterprise
"Old" P. E.s Those existing as of 5/61
"New" Those added since 5/6!
P E. Manufacturing (— Monopoly) Public
enterprises providing manufactured goods
except for the Office of Monopoly (which
is atypically consumption
Non-ag. Korea Korean economy less
agriculture, forestry and fishing
From Jones and SaKong: Government, and Entrepreneurship,
p. 152. See Table 5 in Statistical Appendix.
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public enterprises were now built by the rising number of large Korean
conglomerates (known as chaebIl).
The reasons for this policy shift are not clear. ifl effect the State
dictated the nature, scale and location of the plant and provided the bulk of
the investment, so that it wOuld have cost little more to make them public
enterprises. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was anxious to build up
firms of a size which could compete with foreign multinationals, and one may
also presume arguments of foreign advisers and increasingly influential Korean
economists trained in the United States who were heavily biased against public
60 . 61
sector industries. The results will be considered in detail below.
In case of companies failing which were deemed in the national interest, such
as the Shinjin Motor Company in 1975 or the Korea Heavy Machinery Company in
1980 the State was still willing to take over large enterprises, but no longer
willing to found them.
State enterprise was also located in order to give a regional boost to
areas with little industry, increasing regional demand. At the same time most
private industry was located around Seoul and to a lesser extent Pusan and
Taegu. Much development literature has an anti—urban bias, regarding the
rapid development of a few cities as creating an uneven economic structure.
As a short run phenomenon the use of such growth poles may have distinct
advantages. By 1970, 45 per cent of Korea's manufacturing output was produced
in Seoul and a sizeable percentage of the remainder in Pusan. All modern
services, a population with a per capital income 50—100 per cent higher than
the national average, most modern industries and nearly all export industries
made the cities leading sectors in themselves. Seoul was by this time bigger
than Hongkong and Pusan approaching the size of Singapore.
It should be noted that these regional developments took place against
the Government's wishes, rather than with its blessing, but the fact that
during the l960s the Government did not place any negative barriers to growth
helped to stimulate the economy.
Manufacturing industry was largely dependent on the domestic market until
the later 1960s, but exports were important from the start in encouraging a
mood of success, a business environment in which entrepreneurs were prepared
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domestic market. The export surge was already underway from 1959 and as
Appendix table 2 suggests a number of important incentives were initiated in
that year. The devaluation of the won in 1960 and above all the removal of
some of the restrictions on trade with Japan allowed a rapid growth of
62exports.
The record of the early 1960s shows a period of five years of
experimentation before the Government found a set of policies which were
conducive to the foundations of export-led growth, notably the exchange rate
reforms of 1964 and interest rate reforms of 1965. From 1966 a set of
policies relating to imports had also evolved which satisfied the requirements
of the balance of payments and Korean industry. A complicated list system was
devised which allowed a rebate to export industries, automatic approval for
certain items and a variety of measures ranging from special approval,
prohibitive tariffs and outright prohibitions.
By the time of the second five year plan 1967-1971 a dual structure was
established with an export sector existing in conditions close to free trade
and a domestic sector hemmed in with restrictions. This structure broadly
corinued in existence until the l980s when the Government began to realise
that further liberalisation was required.
The transition to high growth was therefore a complex phenomenon in which
exports gradually came to play a more and more important part. High growth
was created before exports were quantitatively significant by utilising short
term sources of growth. Such a process only became clear in retrospect and
Korean planning cannot be said to have moved steadily from a preconceived goal
in 1961. There were abrupt changes of policy even after the establishment of
the policy package of the mid l960s, notably in 1972-73 and 1979-80. The
Korean achievement is therefore more in the nature of satisfactory adjustment
to changir'.g problems and perspectives and in finding new ways to sustain
growth when the tried and trusted ways seemed to fail.
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2.2 Growth of employment
The great success of the Republic of Korea has been in creating
employment for the large number of people entering the labour market during
the twenty year period. During the first decade of rapid growth, 1960—1970
the rate of growth of the economically active population was 2.9 per cent,
higher than all but 7 developing countries0 The growth rate declined in the
1970s to 2.8 per cent but 20 developing countries experienced higher rates of
growth,64 This fall appears to have been the result of more years in
education rather than the demographic effects from the slowdown in the
increase in population which did not begin until the early l960s, and only
began to affect the labour market in the second half of the 1970s. In the
first half of the l970s, the population aged 15 or over was growing at its
maximum, However, during the 1970s the economy did not have to cope with the
rates of increase which are now affecting a large number of developing
countries.
Throughout this period the rate of unemployment fell. Table 2.6 gives
the official figures. It should be noted that Korean statistics on economic
activity contain some important anomalies. The most important •is seasonal
fluctuations within the non—farm economy. The reproduced in Table 2.6
average figures for each year. In 1978, it will be argued later, the
labour market was at its tightest and unemployment at its lowest, the
economically active population ranged from 15.4 million workers in the second
quarter to 12.1 million in the last quarter. Some 3.3 million people were
transferred from the economically inactive category. This makes the
unemployment rate (ratio of those classifying themselves as unemployed to
economically active population) somewhat suspect. Had even half the
tránsferees classed themselves as looking for employment, then the
unemployment rate in the last quarter of 1978 would have been 15.7 per cent,
and not 3.6 per cent.
In rural areas this phenomenon can be explained in terms of members of
farm households not really thinking of themselves as employed, but merely
helping the family in planting out rice, or harvesting. But for non—farm
households this can hardly be true. At the end of the second quarter of 1978,
8.2 million were at work, but only 7.7 million at the end of the fourth
quarter. One might have expected the number unemployed to have risen by
Table 2.6 Unemployment rates
Year National Urban Rural Seasonal Fluct. as percentage of
Economically Active
Urban Rural
1963 8.2 16.4 2.9 n.a. n.a.
1964 7.7 14.4 3.5 14.7 73.8
1965 7.4 13.5 3.1 13.9 64.1
1966 7.1 12.8 3.1 9.1 69.3
1967 6.2 11.1 2.3 9.2 58.4
1968 5.1 9.0 1.9 8.2 54.7
1969 4.8 7.8 2.2 13.8 56.8
1970 4.5 7.4 1.6 2.8 54.8
1971 4.5 7.4 1.5 12.6 52.
1972 4.5 7.5 1.3 11.6 53.6
1973 4.0 6.8 1.0 11.2 53.1
1974 4.1 6.8 1.2 7.4 53.
1975 4.1 6.6 1.3 5.6 57.6
1976 3.9 6.3 1.0 6.2 55.3
1977 3.8 5.8 1.1 7.4 50.4
1978 3.2 4.7 0.9 7.0 47.5
1979 3.8 5.6 0.9 5.8 44.4
1980 5.2 7.5 1.1 2.9 49.8
1981 4.5 6.5 0.9 5.2 48.1
Source; E.P.B. Economically Active Population Survey. Various years.
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558,000, but in fact it had risen by only 25,000. Had the former been the
case, the unemployment rate amongst non—farm workers would have risen from 4.9
per cent to 11 per cent.
As might be expected the tendency was more pronounced amongst women than
men. Of a decrease in the number of employed of 187,000 men, only 53,000 more
classified themselves as unemployed. But with a drop of 371,000 women, the
number of women classing themselves as unemployed actually dropped by
28,000.65 Under these circumstances unemployment statistics of the Republic
of Korea must be read circumspectly. Nevertheless the fall in non—farm
unemployment from 16.4 per cent in 1963 to 4.7 per cent in 1978 coupled with a
rise in economic participation rates from 50.8 per cent to 54.6 per cent in
the same period indicates the general success of Korean development.
Table 2.7 gives employment by sector from 1963. Because of changes in
the way the statistics were compiled, the preceeding years (which show a
higher number of people employed) cannot be reconciled. It can be seen that
primary sector employment rose by 15 per cent to1974, but then began to
decline. By 1981 employment in agriculture was lower than in 1963 by 0.6 per
66
cent. Employment in manufacturing has grown by 412 per cent to 1979, but
declined by 8 per cent since that year. Employment in the service sector has
grown by 189 per cent. Table 2.8 summarises the increase in employment by
i&gged plan period.
Table 2.8 Manufacturing employment and share of
GNP increases by lagged plan period
Plan period Average Increase in Increase in Export growth
GNP manufacturing manufacturing average
growth employment share of CNP current)
% workers Share of GNP at
terminal dates
in parenthesis
1963—67 8.7 670.000 4.2 (14.6—18.8) 43.8
1968—72 9.5 588.000 3.4 (18.8—22.2) 38.2
1973—77 11.0 1.353.000 4.8 (22.2—27.0) 45.7
1978—81 7.1 174.000 1.4 (27.0—29.5) 20.2
Source: Calculated from EPB: Major Statistics of the Korean Economy 1983
and EPB Census of Manufacturing, various dates.
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This reveals some curious features of Korean development. In the period
1963—1967 manufacturing employment provided 42.5 per cent of net employment
creation. But in the years 1968—1972, the period in which manufactured
exports were increasing in importance, the net increese in
menufacturing was absolutely less than in the preceeding years, and
contributed only 23 per cent of new jobs. Between 1973 and 1977 the number of
new jobs in manufacturing was three times as great and contributed 57 per cent
of the increase in employment. Conversely as a result of the recession from
1979 the net increase in manufacturing was the lowest since rapid growth
began, creating only 6.6 per cent of new employment. However down to 1979
manufacturing had supplied 44.6 per cent of new employment.
During the years 1968—1972 services supplied 42.5 per cent of new jobs
and agriculture 29 per cent. But in the following period agriculture supplied
no more than 2.4 per cent but services 38.3 per cent. In the final period
services created 145 per cent of all new jobs (covering a decline in
agriculture equalling 63 per cent of all new jobs).
Clearly from an employment point of view the service sector has played an
extremely important role in keeping Koreans at work. This is considered in
more detail in section 7. However it is important to remember that although
export and import sector stimulates sections of the service sector, much
of the service sector is concerned with the domestic economy. It should also
be remembered that the figures do not allow any comment on the Koreans
employed abroad either in offices connected with exports, a growing area since
1972, nor in overseas construction or other overseas labour exports.
One major problem about Korean employment statistics is that while the
quarterly survey by E.P.B. gives overall sectoral employment, for two or three
digit employment statistics the sources are less comprehensive. Three sources
may be used, employment data taken from the quinquennial population census,
manufacturing employment can be derived from the manufacturing censuses
conducted in 1958, 1963, 1966, 1968, 1973, 1976 and 1978 and intervening years
in the l970s covered by manufacturing surveys, or from the Ministry of
Labour's monthly labour survey. The latter which offers statistics on all
sectors but is based on a sample of 3,865 establishments which are supposed to
form a "stratified random sample" excluding employment in establishments with
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less than 10 regular employees. The figures for 1980 cover 0.4 per cent of
agricultural 66.8 ceriL of and mining workers, and
22.2 per cent of service workers, on the basis of the E.P.B. survey.
Table 2.9 shows employment by two digit manufacturing between 1962 and
In 1962, textiles and clothing (32) were already the largest, with
food and beverages well under half the size, and fabricated metal
products, machinery etc (38) in third place. By 1969, the total had tripled,
but the growth of employment was fastest in miscellaneous industries (39),
which wigs, toys, and sporting and atheletic goods, labour intensive
items which could often find export markets. No other sector could match the
seven fold increase, but chemicals, rubber and petroleum (35) and fabricated
metal products and machinery (38) had both more than quadrupled. Despite the
importance of textiles and clothing, employment in this sector had grown by
just under the average. By this time food procesing had fallen to third
place, and was overtaken by chemicals etc. in 1974.
Between 1969 and 1978 employment in manufacturing grew by just over two
and half times. The fastest growing sector was machinery (38) with a fourfold
increase, basic metals (37) with a threefold increase and textiles just
keeping up with the average. Miscellaneous manufactures, food processing and
products failed to keep up. Textiles remained the most important source
of employment, employing about a third of all Korean manufacturing workers in
1978, with machinery and metal products employing about 27 per cent. Only
chemical products employed more than 10 per cent amongst the rest. Within the
two largest 2 digit sectors, by 1978, manufacture of textiles (321) employed
about nearly 80 per cent of workers, and clothing just under 20 per cent.
Although leather goods and footwear were exported in sufficient numbers to
attract protectionist measures they employed only about 8 per cent of
classification 32. In classification machinery (38), 18 per cent worked in
fabricated metal (381), slightly less in machinery (382), 40 per cent in
electronics (383) and about 20 per cent in transport equipment (384).
Of the third largest classification chemicals, rubber and petroleum (35),
nearly 40 per cent worked in rubber products, three—quarters of them producing
rubber footwear, 20 per cent in fertiliser and basic chemicals (351), 20 per
cent in other chemicals (352) and only 1 per cent in oil refining etc (353).
The apparent importance of chemicals therefore depending largely on rubber
footwear, a Korean speciality since the 1930s.
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Table 2.9 shows a 38 per cent increase in employment in establishments of
more than tive employees in 1979 compared with a 3.1 per cent increase given
by the survey of economic activity. The 1979 figures are taken from a sample
survey, and it appears that a new coefficient was used to the total
closer to the survey of economic activity figure. This leads to further
confusion in the case of the enormous increase of such sectors as paper and
publishing of 84.9 per cent, compared with the minimal increase in textile
employment. This certainly reflects the problems of the textile industry but
almost certainly overstates the growth of paper and publishing and basic
metals. The balance of employment was certainly changing, but the 1979
figures appear to exaggerate the rate of change.
It can be seen from Table 2.9 and this summary that textiles have done no
more than keep pace with the general rate of manufacturing employment, and
that machinery and electronics and chemical products and basic metals have
been the most rapid generators of employment. How does this growth of
employment match up to the growth of manufacturing output?
2.3 The growth of manufacturing industry
Table 2.10 shows the growth of manufacturing by 2 digits. It also shows
sectors concentrating primarily on the domestic market, food and
beverages, wood and wood products and paper and paper products were already
well developed by the early 1950s, and experienced much slower growth in
production and in employment than other sectors. Nevertheless the underlying
growth of manufacturing in the 1950s, with production 100 per cent higher in
1960 than in 1954 is underlined. During the l950s strongest growth was in
paper and paper products, chemicals, rubbers and plastics and basic metal
industries, with sluggish growth in textiles and wood and wood products.
During the l960s, aggregate production increased four—fold, compared
with a three fold increase in employment. This productivity increase was not
even across sectors. Wood and wood products production grew slightly faster,
and categories 35, 36, 37 and 38 experienced the strongest growth. Despite
the rapid growth of employment in 39, output had increased by less than 70 per
cents representing a marked increase in labour intensity.68 Despite the
high rates of employment growth neither 35 nor 38 had shown any increase in
productivity whereas 36 and 37 showed above average growth.
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Between 1969 and 1978 aggregate production increased more than six—fold,
with a two—and—half—fold increase in employment. This is strong
evidence for a real improvement in productivity in the 1970s. Textiles showed
an eight—and—a—half—fold increase, compared with a four—and—a—half—fold
increase in 35, a nine—fold increase in 37 and a fifteen—fold increase in 38.
Food, timber, paper, non—metallic products and miscellaneous were well below
average and showed little productivity growth.
The leading sectors of the Korean economy in the l970s had therefore
shown impressive rates in growth of output, and of productivity. Sector 38,
and within that basic metals, electronics and measuring equipment (381, 383
and 385) had shown rapid growth in productivity. Transport equipment and
machinery had shown much less satisfactory progress. By three digit the
fastest growth of output by a long way was 323 leather goods, but excluding
this, during the early 1970s, clothing, electronics and transport equipment
had been the most rapid growth areas. However, since 1975 only electronics
had continued to fulfill its earlier promise.
Growth rates do not tell the whole story. If gross output is taken as an
approximation of the industrial structure of the Republic of Korea, textiles
have retained their position of approximately 20 per cent of gross output, but
their position of 25 per cent of value added. Machinery has exceeded
textiles in terms of output since 1976 and in terms of value added since
1977. Chemicals overtook textiles in terms of output, but remain well behind
in terms of value added. Sector 31 foodstuffs and beverages while well behind
the other three in terms of output exceeds chemicals in terms of value added.
2.4 Exports
The period of maximum growth of employment in manufacturing 1972—1977
identified in table 2.8 is also the period during which exports exerted their
maximum impact on economic growth, (Table 2.3).69 it is important to
remember that part of Korean success appears to have been the ability to
absorb labour in non—manufacturing sectors during the 1960s until the
manufacturing scale had reached point, about 1970, where it alone could
provide more than 50 per cent of the increase in employment.
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The question to be considered in this sub—section is how exports could
develop to the point where more than half the output was exported in the major
employment sectors of manufacturing, textiles and electronics and other
machinery. The Republic of Korea might easily have joined the ranks of LDCs
which attempted to promote exports and failed. If this had been the case
growth in the 1960s would have been about 20 per cent lower and might have
faded away in the 1970s altogether.
If planned increase of exports under the First Five—Year Economic
Development Plan is compared with the actual performance, it can be seen that
the total value of exports was almost twice as high as had been envisaged
under the First Plan. Food and live animals performed rather better than
planned but mining and other developments in raw materials underperformed.
Manufactured exports however were three times their predicted value rising
from 14.8 per cent of exports to 61.8 per cent in 1966.
In view of the method of compilation of the First Plan, it is not
surprising that the predictions were highly inaccurate.70 However, the
ability to both produce and market items which had never been exported before
was truly remarkable and requires some explanation. It is important to
observe that the whole expansion took place rapidly within a narrow range of
commodities. In 1955, 91 per cent of exports lay within 20 three digit
categories, but by 1961, as table 2.11 shows, this percentage had fallen to
85. Between 1961 and 1971, the top 20 three digit exports remained above 78
per cent. Throughout the l960s therefore the Republic of Korea was expanding
its market in a narrow range of commodities. This may well be an inevitable
stage for a country with limited export experience and a fairly
unsophisticated manufacturing structure. Development in the 1970s change the
commodities, but not expand the range until the end of the decade. By 1976
the top 20 commodities accounted for 80 per cent. By 1980 it had fallen to 70
71
per cent.
Under the second plan 1966—71 the total value of exports almost exactly
attained a level double the predicted figure. Again planners accurately
predicted the total value of primary and mineral products, but completely
underestimated the growth potential of manufactures. This was largely a
failure to recognize the scope for clothing exports, which achieved a value of
304 million dollars compared with a predicted 84 million, along with
underestimates of the potential of plywood, wigs and other manufaètures.
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The failure to predict export performance under the Second Plan which
used much more sophisticated techniques was a lot more troublesome.lL
However, the continued failure to predict accurately into the Third Plan is
even more Again the total value of exports achieved was twice that
predicted in the plan despite the downturn of the world economy after 1973.
To some extent this is mitigated by much higher levels of inflation than
foreseen and by the new targets introduced by the Heavy and Chemical Industry
Plan of 1972. The percentage shares of each major commodity were more
accurately predicted than in previous plans, the major discrepancies being the
more rapid growth of clothing, ships and miscellaneous manufactures and a
total failure to predict the collapse of wig exports and over—optimistic
estimates for electronics.
The predictions for the Fourth Plan in terms of current dollars were
slightly overshot, but in constant dollars the actual achievement was
considerably below the plan figure 10,387 million instead of 14,165
million.73 Major shortfalls occurred in machinery and transport equipment,
and smaller shortfalls in textiles and footwear.
The story of the inability of the Government to identify those
commodities which will form the basis of export growth, and to predict the
rate of growth accurately, even with the best international advice, obviously
spells a note of caution for other countries wishing to follow the Republic of
Korea's path. In the Republic of Korea's case this failure was minimized by
the fact that under the first three plans the error took the form of
underpredicting performance. This was not the case in the Fourth Plan, though
by underpredicting the rate of inflation, the current dollars projection was
much closer to reality. However, in terms of the role of exports in the
economy as a whole, the Fourth Plan had notably overestimated the position.
Koreans would wish to emphasise the problems of the world recession, but in
fact exports were slowing rapidly at the end of 1978 and first half of 1979
under the impact of an overvalued exchange rate.
A strong case can be made for supposing that, had the Republic of Korea
adjusted the exchange rate flexibly in 1978, export performance would have
been much better than the actual level. Especially important in the case of a
country like the Republic of Korea was the need not to lose buyers to
competitors like Hongkong and Singapore and even in certain commodities,
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Japan. Buyers were particularly unsettled by the fact that prices were highly
unstable, and delivery prices were often higher than when the order was agreed.
It remains to be asked, how was this successful growth of exports
achieved?' It is not possible to allocate weights, but the following factors
were the most important:
a) Favourable international situation 1960—73.
b) Foreign Assistance and Investment.
c) Adequate availability of human and financial capital.
d) Favourable credit, export incentives and exchange rate regimes.
e) Positive Government leadership.
The above are listed in order of increasing ease of Government control.
2.4.1 Favourable international situation 1960—1873
For a country located close to Japan, there can have been no more
favourable time to enter the world economy than the early 1960s. Japan had
passed the "turning point" in the labour market, and companies were looking
for off—shore bases for labour intensive manufacturing processes. In 1960
the various indirect barriers to trade with Japan were removed. The barriers
were chiefly on imports, but a considerable amount of two way trade was
sponsored by sogo shosha which had previously been difficult, or
impossible.74 In 1965, a full accord with permitted direct Japanese
investment was signed.
The Republic of Korea's long standing links with the United States
permitted access to the United States market on favourable terms. Commodity
prices were stable from the point of view of the necessary imports for Korean
manufactures, and in a world of fixed exchange rates, profits could be
accurately gauged. The Republic of Korea encountered early barriers to
textile exports to the United States under the Kennedy administration, but
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compared with the 1970s there were no serious impediments to the growth of
exports from developing countries.
These circumstances changed dramatically in late 1973. this time, the
Republic of Korea was well enough established to weather the
as well as any country. Inventor accumulation was encouraged by the
Government and this allowed the Republic of Korea to take advantage of the
recovery in Japan and the United States in the second half of There
was during this phase a notable transition in the handling of exports from
foreign buyers to domestic exporters. The much less satisfactory performance
in 1979—80 can largely be attributed to exchange rate policies followed by the
trough of the recession. Export performance was highly creditable in 1981,
but very sluggish in 1982. The general experience since 1974 suggests that
the Republic of Korea was able to grow in adverse circumstances largely
because it was moving into areas it had not previously exploited, notably the
growth of Korean exporters, the growth of exports to Europe and exports
associated with overseas construction in the Middle East. These openings were
fully developed by 1980 leaving a much lower potential for further expansion.
In 1981 exports grew by 20.7 per cent. About one third of this growth was in
exports to Latin America and Africa, markets which the Republic of Korea had
underpenetrated in the past. Slower performance in 1982 was partly the result
this limited potential of these markets being exhausted.
Consequently if the world economy remains in recession, the ability of
Korean exports to grow further must be placed in doubt. It is especially
important to note that the Republic of share of world trade actually
decreased in 1979 and 1980. For any country embarking on export promotion in
the 1980s the much less favourable prospects for the world economy,
independent of the growth of tariff and non—tariff barriers can hardly be
overestimated.
2.4.2 Foreign assistance and investment
The Republic of Korea received a very high level of aid in the 1950s.
As pointed out above, much of this aid probably retarded development and
self—reliance as much as it helped. During the first half of the 1960s, aid
remained high by relative standards, although at lower levels than the 1950s,
Appendix 6 shows that in the early l960s the Republic of Korea was receiving
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the highest value of aid after India and Pakistan, though it was overtaken by
Vietnam in 1964. A high percentage of this aid, rising from about one third
in 1966 to more than a half by 1969, was in the form of P.L. 480, mainly
cotton and grain.76
By 1969 the Republic of Korea was at a stage where direct investment and
commercial and development agency loans were of increasing value, and this has
steadily increased in the 1970s. Apart from the supply of cotton which
supplied the needs of a section of the textile industry, the switch from
commodity aid to development and commercial loans was beneficial in forcing
the Government to evaluate each offer of aid carefully on its merits. While
many loans were not directly applied to the promotion of exports, they
provided foreign exchange for the import of capital goods, and released
Government funds for investment in public enterprises and loans to private
enterprises.
Technical assistance can hardly be assessed in monetary values. Large
numbers of experts were supplied through United States AID and through
international agencies. Their usefulness was limited only by their use of
long written reports in English which were probably only read by one or two
Koreans. Direct technical assistance in construction, direction of projects
and in evaluating the potential of different schemes was more important.
Probably also invaluable was the day to day contact between officials of
E.P.B. and United States AID which were located in identical buildings next to
each other.77
Table 2.12 shows the rising value of foreign investment. In terms of the
number of projects foreign investment peaked in 1973. Foreign investment
therefore was of most importance between 1969 and 1974, and has declined in
importance since. As has been seen this was partly the result of policy
decisions taken at the beginning of the Fourth Plan, It will be argued below
that foreign investment is important in introducing new processes into the
Republic of Korea, which have then been taken up by Korean enterprises, and
that the learning experience in all its phases from production to marketing is
more important in an economy like the Republic of than the capital
investment. In this respect the number of projects is probably more important
than the actual value of the investment. The foreign investment from 1967 was
highly trade related and this is reflected in the fact that bonded processing
Table 2.12 Annual foreign investment
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(arrival and commitment basis)
Source: of Finance.
Korean Economy, 1982,
As quoted in EPB: Najor Statistics of
1983, p. 239.
In
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2 015
3 050
10 761
4 822
2 075
3 050
621
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I 963
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1965
1,966
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1970
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61 232
156 435
162 629
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grew in importance from about 2 per cent in 1962—3 to nearly 20 per cent in
1968, but has declined from 23 per cent in 1974 to 12 per cent in 1981.
Bonded processing is not confined to foreign investment, and the Japanese
often preferred to but it can be seen that the Republic of Korea
moved through its bonded processing phase quite rapidly. It should also be
noted that early export growth did not owe its origins to bonded processing or
foreign investment. Subcontracting was probably important, though not well
studied, nevertheless the early growth of exports came from Korean owned
factories.78 This is perhaps one of the most unusual features of the Korean
experience.
2.4.3 availability of human and financial capital
Both the Republic of human endowment and the sources of financing
for investment are considered below. The two types of capital are very
different. In the 1960s the Republic of Korea was drawing largely on a
pre—existing stock of human capital and it was only in the 1970s that the
Government seriously began to consider how that stock could be improved. It
lay beyond the power of the Government either to provide the initial starting
quality of the labour force and entrepreneurs or to solve short term
aeficiencies after 1975. It is for this reason that the Fifth Plan takes
manpower development much more seriously.
Theoretically beyond attracting foreign savings in one form or Government
direct investment or another the Government could do little to increase the
stock of financial capital. In practice both by deficit financing of a
straightforward Keynesian type and by credit rationing, the Government did
ensure that a shortage of capital in the export sector was rarely a serious
impediment.79 This will be discussed in the following section.
2.4.4 Favourable credit, export incentives
and exchange rate regime
Appendix Table 2 sets out the major policy measures adopted to promote
exports. In this section only those which may be classified as "field
manipulation" are considered since these fall within conventional economic
analysis. The general outline has been described in section 2.1., and of all
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the policies, Korean exports have responded most clearly to exchange rate
changes. There are strong pressures on developing countries, especially those
which need to import to satisfy basic domestic needs, to maintain an
overvalued exchange rate. Even for a well established exporter like the
Republic of Korea in the later 1970s, it is impossible to increase exports
with an exchange rate out of line with rising domestic costs.
No doubt in an ideal world model the domestic economy can be allowed to
adjust to international circumstances over time and devaluation tends to
increase domestic inflation so that the short run benefits may be
exhausted.8° Nevertheless in a country like the Republic of Korea where
inflation is caused by other factors than changes in the exchange rate, and in
which zero inflation is never envisaged in the post devaluation period,
continuous adjustments to reflect the differential between world and domestic
inflation rates are part of the package keeping the export sector within an
open economy. Such a devaluation also acts as a stimulus to domestic industry
in those areas where imports compete.81
It will be seen from Appendix Table 2 that many of the measures started
from 1959, and combined with the 50 per cent devaluation in 1960 and more open
attitude to Japan produced a 65 per cent increase in exports, the largest real
of any year between 1959 and 1981. The two crucial measures, tariff
exemptions for imports used in exports, and loans to cover working capital
requirements during the period of production for export, both began in 1959.
Appendix Table 7 sets out the priorities in credit allocation. Again it
will be seen that these priorities predate the period of high growth. The
introduction to the First Five Year Plan makes it clear that these regulations
were not properly observed and that banking was a highly corrupt business in
the 1950s. By taking control of the private banks in 1961, the Government was
82
in a position to enforce credit priorities throughout the financial system.
Given the poor financial structure of most Korean companies, with low, or
non—existent equity and very high debt—equity ratios, access to credit was,
and is, vital for the growth of companies.83 The great attraction of
production loans to exporters were that they were given automatically on
— 87 —
deposit of a letter of credit, and gave 90 per cent of the letter value for 90
days. For most Korean products this was long enough to complete the
production and shipping process. However it tended to create dependency on
importers and discourage enterper.eurial exporting.
The Government has provided the conditions under which exporters could
operate with less interference from the many regulations, taxes and
restrictions which hedged the domestic market, in the system worked out
between 1959 and 1965. It allows both exporters and would—be exporters to
enter the marketand enlarge their enterprises in fields favoured by the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). The rules have been reasonably clear
and consistent and very favourable to exporters as opposed to domestic
production. Professor Anne Krueger estimates that the measures constituted a
differential of about 9 per cent between production for domestic and export
markets. This does not take into account the fact that production might have
been impossible for purely domestic purposes because credit would have been
unavailable. On the other hand 9 per cent is only an incentive if profits in
exporting and the domestic market are equal. There is every reason to suppose
that this was not the case and that the profits were made in domestic
85
sales.
2.4.5 Positive government leadership
In addition to creating an institutional environment in which business
could export successfully, the Government directly intervened in the system to
promote exports. The role of MCI in masterminding the expansion of exports
will be discussed at length in Chapter III. MCI rapidly created a system
which allowed potential growth areas to be exploited rapidly. This included
creating special funds for favoured sectors for investment, as opposed to
working capital, in both domestic and foreign currencies.
An extensive range of quasi—governmental agencies were created which
allowed a very close and symbiotic relationship to grow up between the
Government and business. Examples will be given in the following Chapter, but
one, KOTRA must be mentioned here. In 1964, the Government created this
Korean Overseas Trade Association, which was to be a purely Government
organisation, which would open up overseas offices, liaise with the network of
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commercial attaches around the world and feedback to MCI and enterprises
information on market opportunities, prices, marketing techniques and foreign
companies' credit ratings, thus accelerating the learning process.
From 1961 onwards not only did the Government hold monthly export
meetings in which the President, officials and businessmen sat down
to discuss necessary measures, but pioneered economic and trade diplomacy in
which a mixture of Government officials and businessmen formed a delegation to
visit prospective markets abroad. Trade diplomacy has been an important part
of Korean policy ever since and paid handsome dividends during the oil
crisis. It has become a major strategy since 1980 in advancing Korean trade
into the Third World.
2.5 The scale of exports in manufacturing
The most difficult calculations are those related to the size of the
export sector within the total manufacturing structure of the Republic of
Korea. Calculations have been offered earlier as to the role of exports in
promoting economic economic growth (see Table 2.3).; But what percentage of
total manufacturing output is expected; what percentage of the manufacturing
labour force is employed in exports; are the export industries atypical?
The one question which can be directly answered is the percentage of
Korean output which is exported, since this can be calculated from
input—output tables. Starting from 9.7 per cent in 1966, it reached 29.5 per
cent in 1973, but had fallen to 23.1 per cent in 1978. A better indicator is
perhaps the ratio of exports to final demand (see Table 2.13). This shows the
exceptionally rapid growth between 1963 and 1966 when exports rose from 8 per
cent of final demand to 22 per cent, but then a virtual stagnation between
1966 and 1970, illustrating once again the scale of expansion of the domestic
economy, followed by another period of rapid growth to the peak of 40.1 per
cent in 1973. Then followed was a bad year for exports in 1975 and the share
of final demand dropped to 22.7 per cent. There was then a rise to 36.4 per
cent 1978. Were figures available for all years, it might be that in 1976 and
1977 the share of final demand was higher than in 1978, and that it dropped
sharply in 1979.
These figures largely support the conclusions drawn earlier. During much
of the Republic of Korea's development, manufactured exports have contributed
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Table 2.13 Estimates of the contribution of exports
to final demand and employment
1960 1963 1966 1970 1973 1975 1978
1.
Manufactured
exports as a 70 — — 9.7% 19.5% 23.1%
of manufactur-
ing output
2.
Manufactured
exports as a 70 5% 8% 22% 26% 40.1% 22.7% 36.4%
of final demand
3,
Export manu—
fac tures
7. of total 5% 6.4% 16.5% 22.5% (34.5%) (31.3%)
manufactur-
ing employment
4.
Share of total
employment 0.5 1.6 3.0 5.5 3.6 7.0
Figures from 1960, 1963, 1966 and 1970, columns 2, 3, 4, taken from
D.C. Cole and L. Westphal: "The contribution of exports to
employment in Korea". Data for 1973, 1975 and 1978 calculated
from: BOK, Input Output Tables for the respective years.
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about 22—25 per cent of manufactured final demand, with abnormal peaks in the
early 1970s and a probably trend of just over a third in the later 1970s.
Calculating the contribution to employment is much more Table
2.13 also reports the calculations of Cole and Westphal for 1960 to 1970 where
it can be seen that the share of employment in manufacturing generated by
exports was somewhat lower than the share in final demand.86 No independent
calculations can be offered for the 1970s because of the complexity of the
assumptions used by Cole and Westphal.87 However it may be assumed that the
general trend bore much the same proportion to the ratio of exports to final
demand as in 1970.
On this basis employment generated by exports reached 34.5 per cent of
manufacturing employment in 1973, fell back to 19.5 per cent in 1975 and stood
at 31.3 per cent in 1978.88 The share of total employment in the Republic
of the Republic of Korea generated by manufactured exports constitutes the
final indicator. Because of the growth of manufacturing employment in the
total economy, even though the share of exports in final demand was lower in
1978 than in 1973, the share of total employment is higher. Hence as the
agricultural sector continues to contract in the 1980s, even if the share of
exports remains static or declines slightly, its contribution to total
is likely to increase.
The final question is whether export oriented industries differ
fundamentally from the structure of Korean manufacturing as a whole. A prima
facie answer must be yes. The Republic of Korea exports along the lines of
its comparative advantage, while the Government created institutional and ad
hoc conditions which allowed exporting industries to develop in a much more
open economy than domestic industry. Hence Korean export industries should be
more labour intensive and more efficient than Korean industry as a whole. It
might well also be more generally import dependent than Korean industry.
Appendix Table 8 shows the structure of Korean industry for 1978 from the
point of view of labour intensity and import dependence.
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2.6 Export markets and import dependence
2.6.1
If the products exported and the factors influencing the early growth of
exports has been considered, it is now important to look at the principal
Korean markets which underlines some of the points previously made.
Table 2.14 shows the considerable changes in export markets. Between
1960 and 1964 Japan wa the major export market, taking over 40 per cent of all
exports in 1961 and 1962. However by 1965, the United States had overtaken
Japan, taking an increasing share of Korean exports until 1968 when exports to
the United States exceeded 50 per cent. Between 1968 and 1972, exports to the
United States remained above 45 per cent of total exports, but then dropped
abruptly in 1973 and has remained at around 30 per cent until 1979 when it
fell further to 29.1 per cent in 1979 26.3 per cent in 1980. By 1980 the
share was lower than at any time since 1963. Exports to Japan fell as low as
21 per cent in 1968 and 1969, but then advanced as high as 38 per cent in 1973
before declining to around 21 per cent towards the end of the 1970s, and
falling to 17.4 per cent in 1980, and 16.5 per cent in 1981, lower than at any
time since 1960.
Thus these two major markets consumed 60 per cent of the Republic of
Korea's exports from 1960 to 1965, and around 70 per cent until 1973, but a
decreasing proportion during the later l970s, falling as low as 43.7 per cent
in 1980 and 43.2 per cent in 1981. By 1979, 78 per cent of the Republic of
Korea's exports went to developed countries and 22 per cent to LDCs and oil
exporting countries. Exports to developing countries accelerated in the next
two years, so that in 1981, 36.7 per cent of exports went to Third—World
countries, and only 63.3 per cent to developed countries. Included in
Third—World countries is 4.4 per cent listed as "not classifiable" which may
be presumed to be communist countries, primarily the People's Republic of
89
China.
This development of Korean exports is fairly simply explained. Between
1960 and 1965 non—manufactured exports were important, finding their major
markets in Japan and through Hongkong. As manufactured exports grew faster
than non—manufactured, the United States market became more important. As a
result even in 1981, the share of the Japanese market in manufactured exports
Table 2.14 Principal Export Markets
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Source: EPB: Kajor Statistics of the Korean Economy,
1983, p.231.
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is exaggerated in aggregate statistics, since 9 per cent of Korean exports are
still foodstuffs and mineral products, going primarily to Japan.
The process by which the United States developed as a major market for
Korean manufactures before either joint ventures or United States buying
offices in the Republic of Korea were established still requires further
research. It appears that the mediation of Japanese trading companies was
important, taking manufactures as barter for imported machinery. The role of
the United States establishments in the Republic of Korea in assisting Koreans
to export at this stage also requires examination.
The huge amount of direct investment and subcontracting by Japanese firms
in the late l960s resulted in the rapid increase of exports to Japan in the
early l970s, but this phase in the Republic of Koreans development was cut
short by the oil crisis. Thereafter the Government began to take direct steps
to boost exports to other markets, both through the creation of G.T.C.s and
direct trade diplomacy. The major success was penetration of the European
market, largely with products already developed for the United States or
Japan. The European market share of exports rose from 10 per cent in 1972, to
17.5 per cent in 1976, and to 18.8 per cent in 1979 despite the rise of trade
barriers on Korean goods. Europe's share of the Republic of Korea's exports
Leil in 1981 to 15.9 per cent. The other success story was the penetration of
the oil exporting countries, notably Saudi Arabia.
The type of export to the OPEC countries was quite different to the
previous type of export, since these were countries with a low population
density and preference for quality over price in consumer goods. However,
this was closely related to the growth of overseas construction companies in
the Republic of Korea which were able to use Korean construction materials and
equipment. This was largely a fortuitous accident, but one of great
importance in Korean development.
No one in the early 1970s had foreseen the oil crisis or the growth of
overseas construction. However Government policy had been directed towards
developing precisely the sort of industry which would serve overseas
construction. Had the new market not developed, one can imagine that the
industries sponsored under the heavy and chemical industry plan would not have
prospered as they did.
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The presence of a large number of Koreans in such countries allowed the
development of further exports both to Koreans and to natives. Thus Saudi
Arabia has for instance developed as an important market for the limited
number of cars exported.9°
Penetration of other markets notably African and Latin American markets
has been slow, although patient trade diplomacy and salesmanship appears to be
paying off in the last two years of the 1970s, and led to a rapid increase in
1980 and 1981.
2.6.2 Imports
In every year of the Republic of Korea's existence as an independent
state, it has imported a larger value of commodities than it has exported.
Certain countries have therefore been great beneficiaries from Korean
development. Table 2.15 sets out sources of Korean imports over time. Here
there is an inverse relationship compared with exports as far as Japan and the
United States are concerned. In the early 1960s imports from the United
States far exceeded those of any other country, reflecting the close AID
relationship developed during the 1950s. In 1965, at the very time exports to
the United States were overtaking those to Japan, imports from Japan expanded
reaching 41 per cent in 1966 and still totalling 40 per cent in 1978, though
there has been a dramatic drop in the last two years.
By 1981 Japanese imports comprised only 24.2 per cent. However if
figures for commercial imports only were used in the 1960s, then Japan would
figure much higher in the Republic of Korea's trade, vis a vis the United
States. The combined total of imports from the two countries ranged between
73 and 65 throughout the period of development to 1978, despite the leap in
oil prices that lifted oil imports share of the Republic of Korea's import
bill to around 25 per cent after 1974.
Whereas the United States economy had been the main beneficiary during
the 1950s and early 1960s, Japan has been the major beneficiary between 1966
and 1979. By the later 1970s Japan's trade surplus with the Republic of Korea
was running at over thousand million, about 20 per cent of Japan's total
trade surplus. At the same time the United States experienced a trade deficit
only 1972, and between 1976—1978, though of a much smaller scale. Most other
— 95 —
Table 2.15 Principal sources of Korean imports
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countries have enjoyed considerable surpluses in their Korean trade until
1972, but have tended to experience deficits since 1972, this is largely
off—set by the healthy French surplus. This surplus appears to be partly the
result of the barriers to trade implicit in the French market, including the
direct exclusion of 12 major conunodities by 198:. (more than any other country
except Australia), but also of much more aggressive marketing than either the
Eritish or West Germans.9'
Thus throughout most of the period under discussion all the developed
countries have reaped considerable benefits from trade with the Republic of
Korea. The calculations of job gains and job losses such as those contained in
Employment, Trade and North—South Co—operation assume that there is a quid pro
increase of exports and imports to NICs. However historically imports
from DCs have far exceeded exports to DCs and hence the positive gain has been
quite large to most DC economies.92
2.6.3 Structure of imports
The Korean War totally distorted the the Republic of Korea's
trade. The ratio of exports to imports deteriorated from 76 per cent in 1949
to 9 per cent in 1954. The ratio was only 10.8 per cent in 1960. Under such
circumstances it is hardly surprising that the dominant thought of the
Government in the l950s was to constrain imports and promote industries on an
import substitution basis. It also explains why the framers of the First
Five—Year Plan and indeed all subsequent plans were as concerned with import
substitution as with the promotion of exports. The two policies seemed
intimately connected with a mutual aim, a balanced current account.
Studies of import substitution have tended to either concentrate on the
policy of the 1950s or to try to analyse the contribution to growth of import
substituting policies. Indeed the conventional view of Korean development is
that the Republic of Korea changed from import substitution to export
promotion in the early l960s. In its sophisticated version a stages of
growth thesis is enunciated in which import substitution precedes export—led
growth.
The adoption of a unified exchange rate and reduction of import controls
in the wake of the 1960 devaluation was a bold attempt to create free trade.
— 97 —
Unfortunately the high rate of inflation eliminated the advantage of the
devaluation, and import controls came back. In the reforms of 1964—5, import
controls remained, except for export related and strategic items. The
limitations on imports are reviewed every year in the Annual Export and Import
Notice of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). Table 2.16 summarizes
the situation in recent years.
By 1967 the ratio of commodity exports to commodity imports had improved
to 36 per cent, a remarkable achievement. As a result a new import system
advised by Professor Ronald McKinnon with a shift from a positive list of
items which might be imported, to a negative list in which most items would be
subject to automatic approval. Table 2.16 shows that although the number of
items prohibited decreased, the items subject to restrictions increased
between 1968 and 1970.
Moreover, for countries with which the Republic of Korea had an
unfavourable balance of trade, such as Japan, even items on automatic approval
required the consent of MCI. Finally the low rates of tariff suggested by
Professor McKinnon were not adopted.93
Although minor measures of liberalisation were initiated, it was not
until early 1973 that a major tariff reform was initiated with a general
reduction of tariff rates from 38.8 per cent to 31.3 per cent with the special
tariff used to tax large differences between the price of local and
international goods abolished. By 1972, the ratio of exports to imports had
grown to 74.4 per cent, and this sort of liberalisation could be accepted.
In 1978 after the current account surplus of 1977, a year in which,
despite the rise in oil prices since 1973, exports equalled 92 per cent of
imports. New import liberalisation measures were adopted which pushed the
ratio down to 74 per cent in 1979 but back to 87 per cent in 1981. The Korean
record on import liberalisation in the later l970s has therefore been
exceptional, with liberalisation rather than a trade balance being pursued,
even at a time when protective measures were being adopted in developed
countries.
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Table 2.16 Number of items in each import regime
1968—1975
Automatic
Prohibited Restricted Approval Total
Second half 1967 118 402 792 1,312
Second half 1968 71 479 756 1,312
Second half 1969 74 530 708 1,312
Second half 1970 73 524 715 1,312
December 31, 1971 73 570 669 1,312
December 31, 1972 73 571 668 • 1,312
December 31, 1973 73 556 683 1,312
December 31, 1974 71 563 678 1,312
December 31, 1975 66 602 644 1,312
Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p.59 for 1967 to 1970; IMF, Annual Report
on Exchange Restrictions, various issues from 1971 to 1975. Quoted
in A. Krueger, The Foreign Sector and Aid, p. 129.
Note: After 1967, the enumeration of items within lists was done on an
SITC basis. The total 1,312 represents the total number of SITC
categories. These data were issued by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry. There are, of course, sub—categories within each major
group. Thus, the 17,128 sub—items on the AA list after July 25,
1967, were from 792 items. See Frank, Kim and Westphal, pp. 58—59.
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Many foreign observers take an opposing view9 suggesting that the
Republic of Korea has tended to liberalise raw materials and items where the
domestic market could compete or where the products are needed9 but not where
imports would be cheaper than domestic manufactures. The major category where
Korean imports have been low have been consumer goods. In comparison with
other developing countries, the Republic of Korea has indeed restricted
imported consumer items, only India and Turkey having a lower percentage of
consumer goods in their total import bill.
From the point of view of Korean development strategy this seems not
unreasonable. It is not merely a case of wishing to conserve foreign exchange
for investment, though this is certainly important, nor to protect domestic
manufacturers, though this too has been a major factor, but to prevent the
conspicuous displays of wealth by the rich which might have created jealousies
between rich and poor. Under the Fifth Five—Year Plan it is Intended to
increase the liberalisation rate. This reflects a change in the basic social
policy as well as a response to neoclassical trade theory.
2.6.4 Imports and the balance of payments
From the foregoing it will be clear that like most developing countries,
balance of payments problem was uppermost in the minds of Government
officials until 1977. Table 2.17 sets out the balance of payments since
1961. The enormous importance of foreign aid prior to 1967 in balancing
payments is clear. Likewise the importance of foreign loans which have
largely replaced foreign aid since 1966.
While imports have been constrained, and exports steadily increased, the
gap since 1967 has been largely filled by long or short term loans and a
surplus in invisible receipts which grew rapidly after 1975. A major priority
has been to ensure that sufficient long term loans have been available. The
actual repayment of long term loans was never a problem as long as exports
were increasing rapidly, so that loans with more than three years maturity
rapidly diminished in importance by the time repayment of the principal began.
In this context the grace period on any loan was a major consideration.
The longer the grace period, the better for the Republic of Korea. Appendix
Table 9 suinmarises the situation of foreign debt. It can be seen that in
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recent years, short—term finance and refinance has been extremely important.
In part this was by choice, since in 1978 and early 1979 the Republic of Korea
believed more favourable long term loans would be available in a few months
time. The dramatic rise in interest rates from 1979 caught the Koreans out in
this respect, so that as in all other debtor countries the debt ratio (debt
repayments to current account receipts) rose steeply after falling steadily
since 1972.
Compared with many debtor countries the Republic of Korea seemed an
excellent risk to most foreign banks. In 1978 it could get commercial loans
at terms almost as favourable as from international agencies or exim banks.
Obviously if Korean stability ever seemed threatened, a foreign exchange
crisis could develop at any time, given the level of foreign exchange reserves
and short term debts. Foreign confidence is a highly volatile element.
Between October 1979 and October 1980 foreign confidence was shaken in the
aftermath of the death of President Park and foreign exchange reserves fell.
The crisis passed rapidly and even at its height a number of foreign banks
were prepared to lend more money.
Because foreign loans have always been available, it was possible to
pursue the policy described in section 1 of not giving great encouragement to
investment under the Fourth Plan. A high proportion of this direct
foreign investment was not in the form of foreign exchange, but in machinery
and plant, some of it even second—hand.
The point at which the decision to try to phase out foreign investment
was made is unclear, but appears to have been when much of the promised
investment failed to materialise in 1974. The policy was reversed in 1980,
but at the time of writing foreign companies appear to remain sceptical.95
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2.7 Savings, investment and inflation
The preceeding sections may appear to represent the Korean experience as
good to be The Republic of Korea succeeded in
and in retrospect the type of description given above makes the process appear
very simple. The Republic of Korea entered the world economy at a favourable
point in history, was assisted by two powerful nations and by a Government
which was determined to succeed, despite negligible resource Why
did the Republic of Korea not encounter the problems which have blocked the
path of most developing countries? In particular how could a country with a
domestic savings ratio of only 3.3 per cent achieve an average growth rate of
9.2 per cent between 1961 and 1979.
Neoclassical growth models assume that investment (and growth) are
savings constrained. The financing of the First Five—Year Plan had been
predicated on this hypothesis. Neo—Keynesian models argue rather that savings
adjust to investment demand. There are good grounds for preferring the latter
description in the Republic of Korea's case. However there are equally good
grounds for believing that this was only true because the Government was
willing to increase the money supply to close the domestic gap between savings
and investment demand.
Norton and Rhee for instance argue that output is determined by
expectations and by availability of domestic credit.96 Output growth
therefore determines investment, and investment needs determine savings.97
Therefore the level of savings was not a constraint to Korean growth.98
Implicit in this argument are three assumptions:
— growth could have been no higher;
— unlimited credit was available;
— credit was not directly related to savings.
The proponents of this view never intended proposition one should be
considered by itself, and the second assumption is demonstrably false. Credit
was rigorously controlled and rationed by the Government as described above.
Under the third proposition if credit exceeded domestic and foreign savings,
then the money supply would be enlarged and inflation might be expected.
— 103 —
It will be argued that not only was inflation present throughout the
period of rapid growth, as shown in figure 1.1, but this was not merely a
by—product of KOrean development but integral to it. Inflation was minimised
because the enlarged money supply was largely directed towards increasing
productive capacity but inflation served as a general tax on consumption0 The
revenue from this tax was then directed into development by the
Secondly inflation favoured capital accumulation by industry since real
interest rates were frequently negative.
Table 2.18 sunimarises the data since 1961. It shows that the Republic of
Korea was fortunate in receiving such high levels of aid at the outset of
rapid growth since domestic savings were so low, but that it rapidly fell in
importance. Between 1968 and 1972 foreign savings increased, partly in the
form of direct investment and partly as foreign loans.
While the phasing out of foreign investment lay within the reach of the
Republic of Korea in the mid 1970s, the possibility of phasing out foreign
savings altogether was clearly out of the question, once the current account
surplus of 1977 was past. The foreign savings were, as has been shown,
essential to the balance of payments. Were they also essential to
investment? Chenery and Strout and Chenery and Eckstein have suggested that
an inflow of foreign capital could reduce domestic savings when the trade gap
was binding, as it has been in the Republic of Korea except in Kim
and Park found some evidence for this in the early 1970s.10° Since the
Republic of Korea has not been in the position to experiment in this direction
and few other LDCs are likely to either, the question would be academic were
it not for an allied question of whether foreign savings also allowed private
consumption at a higher rate, and a lower rate of inflation.
One further riddle is the Government policy after the interest rate
reform of 1965. The demand for time and savings deposits combined with
inflows of foreign capital led to a marked increase in broad money, by 64 per
cent, 80 per cent and 62 per cent in three consecutive years, compared with an
average rate of 30 per cent in the five years before. The Government
therefore adopted a restrictive stance on monetary and credit policy. The
required reserve ratio on time and savings deposits was raised fron 10 per
cent to 20 per cent in February 1966, and to 25 per cent in November 1967 and
did not return to the 1965 level until 1971. Demand deposit ratios reached
the all time peak of 35 per cent in November 1967. The monetary policy was
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therefore contradictory. Interest rates were positive to attract savings, but
1 Al
savings were not being turned into investment to prevent inflation. The
mechanics of credit limitations appear to have hit the agricultural sector
worst and been partly responsible for record migration out of rural areas at
the end of the l960s.
By 1971 interest rates had fallen and many real rates remained negative
until the major upheaval at the beginning of 1980. Yet despite the negative
rate of interest, the domestic savings ratio remained high. Indeed although
interest rates were negative, the savings ratio doubled between the late-1960s
and mid—1970s, at the same time as the Government found it impossible to raise
its share above the level reached in 1968.
This contradicts, the evidence of the savings rate reform of the mid—1960s
which led even Vos to believe that "interest rates have affected household
savings Table 2.18 shows that household, private and
non—profit institutions increased their share of savings. Unfortunately
national income accounts do not distinguish between private households and
households which are also responsible for unincorporated enterprises. Hence
it cannot be automatically assumed that savers and investors are different
entities. Nevertheless it has been shown in other countries that when wages
ahead of people tend to save more in times of rapid inflation
even though real interest rates are negative.
The work of Kim and Park suggested that had the savings ratio been
higher, then the inflation rate would indeed have been lower, and illustrate
this from the experience of Taiwan where at the early stage of growth with low
savings rates, Taiwan also experienced high inflation.
One thing is clear, in the Republic of Korea of the l960s and l970s, the
role of the Government was crucial. Had it either pursued conservative and
deflationary monetary policies, credit would not have been available to
finance investment, or if it had not controlled credit allocation so tightly,
the market might have rationed credit in very different ways, The peculiarity
of the Republic of Korea was that financial institutions lay almost entirely
within the public sector from 1960 onwards.103
If Government action could be beneficial it could also blight0 The power
over the financial system allowed a serious distortion of the economy in the
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2.19 Creation of credit and growth of the money supply
Total
4
Reserve
Loans for
Currency
I
I
r—
.Time &
credit money Money deposits money issued deposits exports
Q % Rate of increave : •
41.6 24.9 10.1 17.3 84... 1.i.O19.1 L.4 6.3 5.7 -*.. 5.8 —34.1 68.8
1c34 8.8 14.6 15.8 12.4 17.4 21.4 —21.7 —7...
40.1 52.? 35.3 111.0 48.C 26.2 180.9 84.030.5 81.? 29.? 119.1 65.? 32.1 155.3
76.2 t1.1 44', l3,.6 38.3 240.884.8 72.0 44.6 98.4 40.8 40.5 41.0 46.759.2 el.4 41.1 76.1 .38.3 35.1 42.3 43.!
2?... 21.o 38.8 21.3 63.5 59.1
1911 30.9 20.6 16.4 23.0 —3.8 17.6 —28.0 43.5
33.8 45.1 28,6 48.3 312 80.0 35.3
31.7 40.6 34.0 46.0 44.3 106.4
5 20.5 4.1 28.o 18.5 62.3
32.2 15.0 32.1 39.0 43.4 61.1 —5.7
21.1 32.5 0.? 34., 33.5 31.3 35.9 36.3
23.6 39.1 40.7 37.3 44.1 40.4 47.9
45.9 35.0 14.9 43.0 35.3 44,3 26.3 55.1
297% 35.6 24.6 20.7 27.3 23.8 21.8 26.0 38.9
2980 41.9 26.9 16.3 31.3 —6.5 11.2 40.1
1981 33.9 25.2 4.1 34.2 —13.6 8.2 —50.5 27.7
Source: EPB: Major Statistics of the Korean Economy 1982,
1983, p. 151.
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1970s by an overallocation to industries designated as part of the Heavy and
Chemical Industry Plan. This meant that both light industry engaged in
exporting, and industry producing for the domestic sector, as well as housing
investment was curtailed. With rising home demand this led to such serious
inflation that the Government re—evaluated the entire system.
Although growth had been continuing rapidly, at the beginning of 1979 the
Government convinced itself that only a monetarist policy could solve the
Republic of Korea's problems and in 1980 raised all interest rates
dramatically. In essence all the rules under which Korean development had
taken place were reversed. As table 2.18 shows, private savings fell
dramatically under this new policy, and substantial foreign savings were
required. Firms lost their confidence in future growth. At the end of 1982
it cannot be said that the former level of confidence has been restored.
3. Sectoral appraisal: moving on
In a rapidly growing economy, the "production mix" and indeed the whole
structure of the economy is constantly changing. It has been argued that the
Korean economy moved rapidly through a succession of overlapping stages in the
last 20 years. The discussion above identified different manufacturing
sectors growing at different rates with wide differentials in labour
productivity changes. In the 1970s productivity grew much more rapidly than
in the l960s.
To what extent was this the result of Government planning and to what
extent market forces and entrepreneurial initiative? The Government policy is
conveniently summarised in the following quotation: "In the process of
industrialisation in the l960s, priority was given to light industry because
of the shortage of capital and low technical conditions. But since the Second
Five—Year Plan emphasis has been given to the construction of heavy and
chemical industries due to the limited effects of light industries in the
accomplishment of economic self—reliance. ... The long term development plan
of heavy and chemical industries was framed in 1972 to direct the development
and define the role of the industries in accomplishing the one thousand
dollars of per capita income ... by the early 1980s)04
The key phrase, self—reliance rather than comparative advantage and
labour absorption indicates the change of mood of the 1970s. From the
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Government point of view it was forcing the pace of "moving on". Industries
were being created which market forces might not create for many more years.
In moving on to this strategy the guiding star was Hoffman's coefficient of
the ratio of value added in heavy and chemical industries to light industry.
The fact that this ratio rose from 23.4 per cent of manufacturing in 1960 to
37.8 per cent in 1970 under the circumstances decribed above, is probably as
remarkable as the rise from 39.3 per cent in 1971 to 50.7 per cent under
Government sponsorship.
However the misconception lies in the quotations portrayal of the 1960s
as only giving priority to light industry. The Government had tried since
1968 to stimulate both the machinery and the electronics industry, and had
built a number of major plants itself, mainly in chemicals, fertilisers and
metallurgical industries. The most successful was the integrated iron and
steel mill at Pohang (POSCo). All the best advice was against building such a
mill. Experts argued that the domestic market was too small to support an
efficient plant. Taking this to heart, the Koreans built one twice as big as
planned, with aid from Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, and laid it out so that
expansion would be easy. At the time press suggested that the
Japanese were merely making money out of the Koreans. In fact the plant
became one of the most efficient in the world.
The efficiency lay not just in plant design but the use of labour.
Although labour was cheap, this new generation of Korean industry did not
overemploy. POSCO uses half the manpower per ton of iron and steel as British
Steel even after the slimming down of the latter had begun. International
comparisons with other heavy industry such as Hyundai Motor Company suggests
that in addition to efficient plant, efficient use of labour, the plant was
also, in comparision with Western plants, cheap to build. Neither the labour
saving, nor capital saving aspects of the new generation of Korean industry
have been adequately explored. For instance in the early l980s Hyundai
calculated they could build a plant for 60 per cent of the investment it would
take Volkswagen or Toyota.105
Thus in little more than a decade, the leading edge of Korean industry
moved from a wasteful use of labour to some of the most efficient plants in
the world. To what extent was this the result of Government pressure and to
what extent the rise of a new generation of business managers? The apparent
answer seems to be that the Government pushed the entrepreneurs into new
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industries, and the best entrepreneurs made those industries work, often
106
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identified six leading industries, the steel industry, the chemical industry,
the non—ferrous metal industry, the machinery industry, shipbuilding and the
electrical industry. The plan was not well constructed, in 1972 it projected
that the percentage of heavy and chemical goods to total exports by 1981 would
be 65 per cent. In fact it was marginally over 50 per cent. The capital
required to build these industries was also greatly underestimated. As a
result credit was allocated to these industries at the expense of all others.
Table 2.20 illustrates this point. Subsidised loans as a proportion of total
loans and credits increased from 30.7 per cent in 1965—1970 to 43.1 per cent
in 1971—75 and reached an estimated 80 per cent of manufacturing loans by
1978.107
Of the six industries, only one, shipbuilding, which required large
numbers of skilled workers was totally suited to the Republic of Koreas
factor endowments. The electrical industry was conceived as being concerned
as much with power generating equipment as consumer electronics. In practice
only consumer electronics developed rapidly, and this was in line with the
Republic of factor endowments. As will be seen in Chapter IV, the
electronics industry was a success in terms of exports and employment, but
only limited credit for this can go to Government planners who envisaged an
electrical industry with a quite different structure)°8
In theory the machinery industry looked like a potential winner, again
requiring large numbers of skilled workers. In actuality it was again a
failure, as it had been in the 1960s. The reason appears to lie in both
product and production process. Unlike ships or transport equipment, the
machinery industry requires not only great precision, but a fairly small scale
of production. It is therefore a suitable sector for small and medium
industry. But small and medium industry did not, in the l970s, have access to
the experience of the best technicians and managers who were employed by the
large companies, nor could they afford the wages for the most skilled
workers. There are other factors involved, notably consumer preference for
imported machinery)09
The steel industry turned out, agains predictions, to be a very efficient
enterprise, and in 1979 the second most important export category with 14.6
per cent of exports compared with 13.6 per cent in The
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Table 2.20 Share of investment going to heavy and chemical industry
in the later 1970s (investment share by category)
1976 1977 1978 1979* 1979**
Light industry 26 25 20 18 22
Heavy and chemical
industry 74 75 80 82 78
Source: EPB Economic Survey 1979, P. 100.
kShare proposed under Heavy Chemical Plan.
**Revised share according to 1979 Economic Management Plan.
non—ferrous metal industry and the chemical industry were largely import
substituting rather than export industries. The fact that value added has not
in the 1970s suggests that these industries had only limited
The classic case at the extreme end of the spectrum was the
Korea Aluminium Company which produced about a quarter of the Republic of
Korea's needs at a price well above international prices. Even this price was
heavily subsidised by KECO reportedly at 50 per cent less than production
costs. All companies requiring aluminium were forced to buy one quarter of
their needs from this company as a condition of an import licence.
This type of distortion is serious enough, but 1975 estimates put the
cost of creating one job in the basic metals and chemical sector at 31,888
compared with US$ 5,186 in the machine and electronics sector and 4,970 in
light industry. If investment was wrongly allocated in the period 1972—1980
then for every job in the metal and chemical industry, six could have been
created in more labour intensive industries.112
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Professor Wontack Hong has marshalled considerable arguments against the
policy of giving cheap loans which the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan
encouraged. Government policies often make capital relatively cheap
and induce the adoption of capital intensive (imported) technology and/or the
undertaking of capital intensive production. Such production may be
profitable to the subsidised private entrepreneur but may imply a loss for the
country as a whole when calculated in terms of real opportunity costs of
capital. Moreover, the net effect of these policies may be to reduce
employment opportunities and to retard the growth of
In a world of unlimited production possibilities and limitless markets
this would of course be true. The Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan was
conceived as a strategy in a world in which manufacturing employment with low
capital intensity could not be expanded indefinitely, aithouth ironically
traditional labour intensive export industries like clothing grew at their
maximum rate at this time. It was conceived as a long term strategy which
would ultimately yield a higher growth rate than further investment in
textiles. This became steadily more true as trade barriers grew in the later
l970s and early l980s.
Would alternative strategies have yielded higher growth rates or more
employment? In assessing actual performance it is important to remember the
lagged effect of plans on the economy. The great burst of exports in 1972 and
1973, the anni mirabilis of export—led growth were the results of the
strategies of the second development plan which ended in 1971. The
distortions in the economy at the end of the 1970s were the results of
strategies adopted in 1972—73.
The slow—down in 1979, it must be remembered, was the result not of long—
term planning but of a change in monetary strategy, and an overvalued exchange
rate. But many Korean economists would argue that a slow down was merely
accelerated by this change in policies, and would have occurred inevitably
because the rest of the economy was being starved of capital. Up until 1979
there was no sign that the economy could have endured a higher rate of growth
without serious sectoral inflation, unless more credit had been available for
domestic industry (and not labour—intensive export industries). The
employment situation was also extremely tight and as will be argued in
Chapter III for structural reasons could hardly have yielded more workers for
labour intensive No one disputes the fact that too much
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investment was going to favoured Heavy and Chemical projects, merely that a
slight restructuring of credit might have satisfied all parties. That
this did not happen is a fundamental critique of the Government hold over the
sector, azid the use of high level Government intervention over the
heads of the normal levels of bureaucracy.
As Chapter IV will show, although the textile industry was not favoured
by the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan, it still received a high proportion
of Government subsidised loans, during nearly all the 1970s. This was because
of automatic cheap credit for exports against letter of credit, textiles still
commanding 33—40 per cent of exports during this period. The—90 day nature of
these loans allowed a certain amount of capital investment, as did the profits
from clothing. As a result, without discretionary favoured finance, the
textile industry improved its productivity rapidly.
It should be noted that the figures for Table 2.21 are compiled by the
Korea Productivity Centre, a private body and are widely regarded by senior
economists as not having the same standard of accuracy as other Korean
statistics. Nevertheless it can be seen that had textile productivity
remained at 1971 levels, 110 per cent more workers would have been required,
by 1978, i.e. another 762,000 workers. Even greater increases would have been
in most other industries. The notable exceptions were transport
equipment, petroleum refineries, furniture and fixtures. Rapid productivity
gains were made since 1975 in non—favoured areas such as food, beverages,
footwear, printing and publishing and tlothersu. These productivity gains were
almost certainly forced on businesses by higher wages in other sectors, the
result of a growing labour shortage requiring improved management measures.
Interviews in 1981—82 suggest that only after 1980 did enterprises
receiving substantial Government backing go through the same process of
reappraisal.
It is not necessarily a disfavour to deny sectors access to preferential
capital if it forces them to reassess their methods of production. Without
preferential capital, heavy industry would never have been built, nor could
light industry have sustained a capital shortage forever, but it performed
remarkably well up until 1978, and with more funds available in 1980 was able
to make a rapid recovery.
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A much more serious criticism of the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan
would be that the plants created were inefficient by world standards because
the scale was too small. In many cases, however, the schemes aimed precisely
at avoiding this trap) and if anything they were too big. Nevertheless the
Korean Government after the lessons of POSCO was more than aware of the need
to build on a sufficient scale. Chemical plants proved more of a problem. As
Chapter IV shows plants were planned at the optimum size where economies of
scale yielded diminishing returns. However the plan did not foresee the great
advantages chemical plants in oil producing countries would possess, and
Korean downstream products remain well above world prices.
Table 2.22 shows that for an economy like the Republic of Korea with few
natural resources, it is difficult to raise value added in a period of rising
raw material prices. During the twenty years the ratio of value added to
output has risen only marginally by 0.4 per cent in light industry and fallen
by 3.5 per cent in heavy industry. Constant 1975 prices (which reflect post
oil—crisis raw material prices projected back into the past) show the marginal
increase in light industry becomes a fall of 2 per cent and in heavy industry
1.8 per cent. Given that so much investment has gone into industries which
had a strong import substitution effect, the failure of value added to change
is noteworthy.
By contrast the calculations of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
indicate a rapid increase in value added in manufactured exports from 46.6 per
cent in 1970 to 64.4 per cent in 1979, and that the import content of exports
fell from 53.4 per cent to 35.6 per cent. The method of calculation is
however extremely crude being based on no more than imports declared as for
export use)16 Not all inputs into exports are included in this process,
notably imported fuel, chemical products refined in the Republic of Korea and
many others. The rise in value added between 1970 and 1979 may therefore be a
measure of the growth of import substitution, but overestimate its actual
value. It is impossible to go further at this point than Westphal and
conclude "data limitations make it virtually impossible to assess trends in
the domestic value added content of exports."117
Unfortunately the census of production figures make no distinction
between domestic and imported inputs. They show that the average rate of
value added in manufacturing is 38 per cent. For industries using primarily
imported inputs, the total domestic value—added will be this figure, plus
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value—added in shipping from manufacturer to ship. Westphal assumes that
there is a built in bias towards imported inputs. "The system has not
discriminated between imported and domestically produced intermediate inputs
(if the same quality) in the production of exports, except in so far as
wastage allowances on imported inputs provide a bias in favour of domestically
,,llS
produced inputs. The degree to which imported inputs would be preferred
depends on the degree of protection of the domestic market and currency
overvaluation. In the Republic of Korea's case, Westphal argues both were
low, while the Government used the domestic letter of credit to give "the full
range of export incentives to producers of intermediate goods supplied to
exporters to negate the remaining bias. Suppliers of exporters have thus been
permitted access to intermediate inputs at world market prices, the same as
,,ll9
exporters.
This is undoubtedly what the regulations appear to say. But in the
Republic of Korea the written regulation and practice do not always coincide.
Interviews with intermediate producers suggest that domestic producers of
inputs for exports cannot automatically expect favourable credit or import
exemption. This has become more serious since 1975 when tariff exemption was
changed to a drawback system. Under the latter system the manufacturer could
not be sure he would receive the drawback until it actually happened, with
consequent interest charges, transaction costs and paperwork.
On the other hand exporters report deep concern about the pressure from
Government and quasi—Government organisations to buy Korean, even if the
product is more expensive and/or inferior. The case of the Korea Aluminium
Company has been noted above, but widespread complaints about the price of
Korean chemical products are voiced. These instances highlight one of the
persistent problems in analysing the Korean economy, that while regulations
suggest a free and perfectly functioning system, governmental pressure and
often contradictory pressures make actually running a company much more
complex.
From this point of view, the current Government strategy begins to make a
great deal of sense. In the 1970s the Government was concerned with
accelerating structural change both between manufacturing sectors and within
the economy as a whole. In the 1980s current Government thinking suggests
that most attention should be placed on liberalising the economy. The problem
is that this may be described as "sideways change" rather than progress. It
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will change the environment under which existing industry operates, but will
not immediately increase either output or productivity. Clearly within the
existing structure there are widespread inefficiencies, but rather than deal
with these the Government is proceeding to liberalise other areas of the
economy which greatly change the parameters within which business functions.
It could well be that only this sort of "sideways change" will permit further
rapid growth, but it must be recognised that this period of readjustment is
likely to be one of considerable disorientation for much of the economy, and
of uncertainty both for administration and businessmen accustomed to the old
system.
4. Evaluation and change required
The Republic of Korea's pace of development has been rapid over the past
20 years and passed through a number of overlapping phases. The confidence of
the late 1960s and much of the 1970s has given rise to uncertainty about the
future course of the nation. To some extent this uncertainty is masked by the
Fifth Plan's desire to see industrial policy based more on the market
mechanism and less on Government intervention. In only one dimension is the
Government certain, future growth will be based on export expansion.
But this is the one area where most uncertainty lies. The Republic of
Korea's prospects depend not only on a recovery of the world economy (now
considerably delayed) but also on at the very least a static level of trade
barriers. Australia is closely followed by France as leading defenders of
their domestic markets against Korean imports. But many of these countries
also enjoyed a substantial trade surplus with the Republic of Korea in the
same year. The Republic of Korea has now announced it will implement
selective discriminatory measures against such countries. Such a process can
only lead to a further disintegration of the international economy.
Apart from steel, heavy and chemical industrial products attract fewer
quotas than light industry. This has undoubtedly encouraged Korean heavy
industry. This situation cannot continue. Motorcars and other vehicles are
heavily protected, and as the British subsidy for the replacement of the
Atlantic Conveyor to prevent it being built in the Republic of Korea showed,
governments are willing to resort to various measures to protect their
industries, falling short of actual quotas.
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Table 2.5 The Republic of Korea's Exports under Restrictions
(in US$1000)
1978 1979 1980 1981'
Total
Exports
(A)
Exports
Under
restrictions
(B)
B/A Total Exports
• under(%) (A) 'estrictlon:
(B)
8/A
(°/o)
Total
(A)
Exports
under
restrictions
(B)
B/A
(/o)
Total
(A)
Exports
Under
restrictions
(B)
B/A Total
(A)
•
Exports
under
restriction
(B)
B/A
(°/o)
1982
48.8
50.8
18.5
5,660,593
483,501
3,502,785
2,685,962
220,667
544,833
United States
Canada
Japan
Australia
New Zealand
France
U.K.
West Germany
Italy
'he Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
Greece
Denmark
Ireland
Norway
Sweden
Austria
Finland
34.2 293,567 102.229
4.058.345
327.173
2,627,266
148.828
21,721
208.598
393.029
662.884
117,840
3.07.287
94.443
260
27.571
50.082
16,451
68.8 15
157.652
52.383
59.401
1,861,522
52.791
571,602
57,564
21 .721
67,835
158,663
261.536
33,267
122,539
5.378
70
13,989
4,014
26,107
17,515
676
45.9
16.1
21.8
38.7
100.0
32.5
40.4
39.5
28.2
30.5
19.5
0.1
85.0
5.8
16.6
33.4
11.4
4.373.929
387.643
3,353,028
156,967
24,041
249,465
54 1,605
845.340
153,891
330,694
118,940
421
42,165
69.015
23.732
53.346
116,302
46,397
20.308
1,876,37 1
166,544
685.448
57,558
24,041
95,555
272.781
355,431
53.985
145,608
10, 794
31,6 12
6.956
3,613
34,760
14, 162
1,488
42.9
43.0
20.4
36.7
100.0
38.3
50.4
42.0
35.1
32.4
25.6
45.8
29.3
6.8
29.9
31.5
7,3
4,606,625
343.446
3,039.408
230,371
28.032
291,228
572,532
875,486
229,447
349,506
139,020
72
80.119
60.104
21,987
51612
127,342
58,616
26,846
2.246.902
174.60 1
563.660
78.801
28.032
127,252
241,807
377,748
101.210
166,570
30.810
38,233
3.938
4.686
43,772
13,905
2,120
47.5
45.6
15.6
34.8
100.0
32.1
45.7
47.0
29.9
34.8
23.0
51.7
40.5
2.0
35.3
26.3
7.0
100.0
43,7
42.2
43.1
44.1
34.1
38.5
17.9
9.1
34.4
23.7
7.9
6,243.179
442.806
3,388,106
307,387
69.751
263,594
1, 102.646
757,918
154,082
350557.
119,929
152
24,595
54,902
12,594
525.322
129,94 7
50,980
38,073
38,640
402,984
705,012
804,487
327,932
174,420
372
63,714
51,136
20.325
288,246
127,022
50,039
29, 101
2,807,790
216.623
536.711
167.655
69,751
128,501
280,747
343.541
44,324
172,370
9,989
24.444
6,716
6,098
42.117
13,582
3.291
36,640
129,281
321,854
378,387
43,190
175,158
14,646
26,424
8,194
5,879
44.890
13,157
2,034
45.0
48.9
15.8
54.5
100.0
48.8
25.5
45.3
28.8
36.6
40.6
44.5
53.2
1.2
32.4
26.6
8.6
Korea's
Total Exports
Total exports
to 19 natIons 9,400,029 3,276,789 34.9 10,907,236 3,836,707 35.2 11,131,799 4,244,047 38.1 13,166,355 4,753,425 36.1 14,036,520 4,874,253 347
12,710.642 25.8 15.055,453 25.5 17,504,862 24,2 21.253.757 22421,853.394 22.3
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Concentration of heavy and chemical products has enhanced the Republic of
Korea's potential to export to Third World countries. As was noted above,
nearly a third of the Republic of Korea's exports go to non—OECD countries.
These are countries in which traditional Korean exports have small markets,
but the potential for the sale of capital goods and cheap motorvehicles is
much larger. How far the Republic of Korea can develop its Third World
markets depends partly on the growth rate of African, South American and Asian
countries in the 1980s, but also on an area the Republic of Korea is well
experienced in, economic diplomacy. By making bilateral deals, the Republic
of Korea can hope to compete with Western countries, and erode their shares of
Third World markets. This in turn depends on the Korean ability to provide
long term credit to developing countries.
Some of the promises and pitfalls of this strategy will be examined in
Chapter V. All that needs to be observed at this point is that it may be a
potentially viable approach to keeping Korean exports growing in the 1980s in
the face of trade barriers in the Western world.
It should, however, be noted that this is an expensive strategy, in terms
of dollars per job created or sustained in the Republic of Korea. From the
Republic of Korea's point of view, the dangers of rising unemployment are
considerable. In this context the critique of Korean employment statistics
given above is important, since under the existing system, unemployment could
rise dramatically without the Government being aware that more than a marginal
increase had taken place.
Unemployment fell according to official statistics from 1961 to 1978. It
rose in 1979 and 1980, although the total number employed also rose. However
employment in manufacturing actually fell, and the new jobs were created in
the service sector. In 1982 unemployment continued to fall. However it is
expected to stay slightly above 1978 levels during the Fifth Five—Year Plan
with between 600,000 and 700,000 unemployed.
To achieve this, employment will have to expand at about 3 per cent per
annum, or at a rate of over 500,000 jobs per annum. E.P.B. estimates during
the planning process were that a growth rate of 7—8 per cent was necessary to
achieve employment creation on this scale. In the last two years growth has
only touched 6 per cent, and employment has been sustained by a growth of
marginal jobs in the service sector. To actually increase labour productivity
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in the economy, a faster rate of growth is required. This would allow the
continuing transfer from agriculture — a process the Fifth Plan sees as
slowing down, and also to cope with the new technology of the microchip which
poses a special challenge to a country like the Republic of Korea.
Essentially in an export—led economy, the largest firms cannot afford to
ignore the latest technology in order to remain competitive with their
international rivals. There is no doubt that the chaebol are large and rich
enough to import the latest technology, even if this is labour saving. This
problem is taken up in Chapter V.
The possibility of using the domestic economy as a "second engine of
growth" is an option canvassed in business circles and some government
departments. To a considerable degree the pre—1979 concept of national
self—sufficiency served as a stimulus to the domestic economy and as a counter
balance to export promotion. Since 1979 the second engine of growth has
largely been seen in classic terms as stimulating the economy through
investment in social overhead capital, rather than domestic purchasing power.
It is not a strategy endorsed by the Fifth Five—Year Plan, but implicit
Government policy in 1982 especially relaxing the money supply and lowering
interest rates support this strategy.
If a domestic growth strategy can be devised it will certainly boost
employment. Most export oriented industry now has surplus capacity and a
reluctance to take on mOre labour. Domestic industry does not operate under
the same constraints of international competitiveness.
But even with full employment, the distribution of income during the
1970s deteriorated. From its position in 1970 in the low inequality category
as defined by the joint IDS/World Bank study, the Republic of Korea slipped
into the moderate inequality category. The Fifth Five—Year Plan aims to raise
the share of income of the bottom 40 per cent from 15.5 per cent in 1980 to
17.5 per cent in 1986. But this remains well below the 19.9 per cent of
1970. Pre—tax income is not always the best measure of the prosperity of the
country and redistribution of income. The Fifth Plan sees an expansion of
social welfare facilities, at present either inadequate or non—existent.
Pension coverage for nearly 30 per cent of employees, at present confined to
civil servants from military to bureaucrats and a limited number of large
companies, will be introduced. The percentage of households with their own
dwelling units will rise from 75 per cent to 78.6 per cent and of houses with
main sewers from 8 per cent to 25 per cent.
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All these measures are likely to benefit those with regular permanent
employment, or the richer self—employed, not the lowest income groups. For
the bottom 25 per cent of households, the prospect of an unshared dwelling
120
unit is as bleak as ever. Under the 1979 poverty relief programme
486,000 households, comprising 1.99 million persons or 5.3 per cent of the
population, received relief. These were households defined as below the
absolute poverty line who received free middle schooling, free medical care
and for whom work was provided. It should however be noted that at the wage
rate paid under the work relief prograimne, a male worker with three dependents
or a woman worker with two dependents would still be below the absolute
poverty line.
The Republic of Korea's development has been impressive and compared with
the starting point twenty years before, the transformation has been
remarkable. But the problems of continuing growth during the next decade
remain. The Republic of Korea still has a per capita income below that of
most Latin American countries which have become "stuck" at a certain level of
development. Moreover poverty does not cease to exist with development, and
the Republic of Korea, at most half way to development in per capita terms,
has to begin to think out what strategy might assist the poorest 25 per cent
of households.
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CHAPTER III
or
1. The Government Sector
1.1 Introduction
A complete analysis of the Government's role in Korean development is
impossible within the limited space available. As actor, the Government has
been pervasive in every sector of the economy. This activity is enshrined in
the constitution itself, which declares "The State shall regulate and
coordinate economic affairs within the limit necessary for the realisation of
social justice and for the development of a balanced national economy to
fulfill the basic living requirements of all citizens". Furthermore all mines
and important resources were to be owned by the State, agricultural tenancy
was prohibited, while the State "shall encourge the foreign trade, and shall
regulate and coordinate it")
The present policy of the Government is designed to reduce the amount of
direct involvement, justifying the change in direction in terms of
neoclassical theory and the mistakes in investment in the 1970s. However a
case could also be made for regarding the high level of Government involvement
between 1960 and the mid—l970s as being highly beneficial, while justifying a
reduction in Government involvement on the grounds of the increasing
complexity of the economy. In the latest revision of the constitution in 1980
the additional duties of "properly" regulating and coordinating monopolistic
and oligopolistic practices, guaranteeing consumer protection and protecting
and fostering the business activities of small and medium industries have been
added.2
In framing the first economic plan it was explicitly stated that the
Republic of Korea should "develop guided capitalism" in which the Government
"shall either directly participate or indirectly render guidance to the basic
industries and other important fields".3 This was a natural choice for the
Republic of Korea since it was close to Korean's experience of the stance
- 130 -
taken by the Japanese Government both in the Republic of Korea and in Japan
during the Meiji and Showa eras. It was even closer to the experience of
Manchukuo 1931-1945 in which a number of influential Koreans had participated.
State participation was devoid of socialist implications in the South
Korean context. However, it might be argued that the State exceeded the
provision of the constitution that "private enterprise shall not be
transferred to the State or public ownership nor shall their management be
controlled or administered by the State except in cases determined by law to
meet urgent necessities of national defense or national economy".4
But neither the 1960 democratic Government, nor the 1961 military
Government had any time for those who filled their own pockets regardless of
the national interest. The First Plan roundly condemned the activities of
bureaucrats, bankers and businessmen under the Rhee Government, and "illicitly
gained wealth" was confiscated including ownership of the major banking
institutions. Throughout the period of development there has been a
distinction between "profit for private gain" and "profit made while acting in
the national interest".
The military origins of the Republic of Korea's new leaders obviously
made the choice of strategies simpler. Armies are not noted for being run on
laisser faire or private enterprise principles. Moreover the coup stemmed not
from political jockeying but from a fundamental nationalist desire to "get the
Republic of Korea moving".5 The result was the the Republic of Korea's new
leaders were probably not aware that they were making a conscious choice of
strategies; the alternatives never seemed viable.
1.2 Restructuring the Government for growth in the 1960s
Dr. Lee Hahn-been in his study of administration in the Republic of Korea
between 1948 and 1965 argues that in 1961 the military was the best trained
managerial group in the country. "After one decade of systematic training the
military had acquired a substantial store of managerial capability which was
not matched in scope or depth by other subsocieties and institutions ... the
army was one of the most intensively westernised sectors of the society in
terms of work tempo and work habits ... . In terms of skill level and
civilian exposure, the Military Revolution elevated the tactical operational
class (the colonels) to positions of power, placing the strategic-managerial
class under the control and direction of the former".
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By elevating the tactical operational class, the Military Revolution gave
the Governments implementation of the first plan its special characteristic.
For such a group, the plan set out a clear programme of goals which were to be
attained by whatever means were possible. It was natural too, that logistics
would play a vital role in such a plan. Some 49 per cent of investment was to
go on infrastructure, electric power, transport and communications and housing.
Equally important, the new military/managerial class owed nothing to the
existing civil service, and felt free to remodel it, promote and fire whom
they pleased. The result was that, in the civil service as in the military,
younger men were promoted over the heads of seniors. Central bureau directors
and new senior clerks were notably younger than their subordinates.
As with personnel, so with institutions an extensive remodelling took
place. Between 1961—1963 three overlord ministries were created which would
superintend all other economics ministries. The first was the Economic
Planning Board. The Ministry of Reconstruction, of which the Economic
Development Council had been a sub—agent was remodelled, along with the Bureau
of Budget from the Ministry of Finance, and the Bureau of Statistics of the
Home Ministry. This overlord ministry was to not only plan development, but
implement it through budget allocation, coordinate foreign aid activities,
promote foreign investment, and in later years evaluate all major public and
private projects for which public funds would be used. The structure would
allow close coordination with other Ministries working in the economic field.
Finally the Chairman was to be Deputy Prime Minister, with direct chairmanship
of the Council of Economic Ministers. Thus the Prime Minister was released
for figurehead functions and non—economic affairs. As a result, the Deputy
Prime Minister and the Presidential staff (after 1963) were in a direct line
of command stretching ultimately far down the economy.
As in all areas of Korean life, although the position of Deputy Prime
Minister was organisationally strong, much still depended on the personality
of the Minister himself in a country where in the 1950s it was said "every
Government ministry was a Government in itself".8 The mere creation of a
streamlined organisation does not ensure that the organisation will function.
In recent years the role of Chang Ki—yong, DPM 1964—1967 has come to be
stressed. Chang was the first civilian DPM, and was proprietor of one of the
leading daily newspapers the Hanguk—ilbo, and it was he who first managed to
wield all the powers of EPB in a concerted fashion. Only in this way were the
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exchange rate reform, interest rate reform and adoption of a genuine
export—led growth strategy, based on economic principles rather than dynamic
Governmental pressure, made possible and often only through high handed and
controversial action. Only the support of the President in the face of
hostility from other ministers and from the President's political party the
Democratic Republican Party (DRP) preserved Chang in office during the
creation of the Second Economic Development Plan.
Chang strengthened the tradition of staffing the economic ministry with
technocrats rather than candidates selected on any other basis than
competitive competence. From that date onwards a hierarchy within ministries
began to develop in which aspirants for Government service placed the Economic
Ministry alongside the Foreign Ministry in the top rank.
The second overlord ministry was the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Initially its role lay in the strategic importance of foreign trade and
industrialisation. In 1962 apart from the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was the smallest
ministry with only 233 employees, compared with 607 in the Ministry of
Agriculture and no less than 1,485 in the Ministry of Transport.9 By 1974
the number had grown to 373, at the same time as the Economic Planning Board
haa shrunk from 1,136, when first formed, to 375.
As the years went by and the promotion of industry and trade became more
important, not only did the number of bureaus increase, and ultimately entire
ministries such as the Ministry of Energy and Resources develop from MCI, but
also an increasing number of quasi—Government organisations directly
responsible to MCI came into being dealing with both trade and industry. Some
of these organisations are considered in greater detail in subsequent
10 .sections. An idea of the increase in detailed control is given by the
growth of bureaus within MCI.
Since the emphasis of the Government was on construction, a new ministry
was created in 1963 called the Ministry of Construction. This was to be
responsible for national physical planning, construction of all infrastructure
(except railways), including industrial estates, cities, housing, roads,
expressways, and ports. In view of the high amount of investment allocated to
infrastructure the ministry rapidly became one of the leading agents in
development.
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Table 3.1 Bureaus within MCI
1964 1968 1980 1982
Commerce Commerce Trade Trade and Commerce
Mining Mining International Trade International Trade
Power Power Promotion Promotion
First Industry First Industry Marketing and Basic Industry
Prices
Second Industry Second Industry Import Policy Textiles and
Consumer
Small and Medium Steel and Metal Goods Industry
Industry Industry
Machinery Industry Machinery Industry
Electronics and Electronics and
Appliances Appliances
Chemical Industry Medium Industry
Textile Industry Office of Planning
Defence Industry and Management
Small and Medium
Industry
Industrial Estates
Source: Korea Annuals 1964, 1968, 1980 and 1982.
1.3 The implementation of Government policy
The evolution of successive plans and the development experience have
been considered in the previous Chapter. Here emphasis is on the methods by
which the Government implemented its plans. Jones and SaKong's recent survey
of implementation considers that "... Koreans are even better at
implementation than at planning.thl Jones and SaKong argue that the
Republic of Korea is a "hard" state, the opposite of Myrdal's "soft" state in
which "policies decided on are often not enforced, if they are enacted at all,
and ... authorities, even when framing policies, are reluctant to place
obligations on people. ... More specifically, it is implied that policies
should not require compulsion, and this is often held to be a fundamental
difference from the practice in communist countries."12 Myrdal concludes
"our investigation has convinced us that success in planning for development
requires a readiness to place obligations on people in all social strata to a
much greater extent than is now done in any of the South Asian countries. It
requires in addition rigorous enforcement of obligations, in which compulsion
plays a strategic role."13
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There can be little doubt that the Republic of Korea is such a "hard"
state. At the same time there are clear limits to this "hardness". Jones and
SaKong in their entrepreneurship questionnaire produce interesting evidence to
suggest that under Syngman Rhee, the Republic of Korea was a soft
Before going into further detail it is important to take up a point made by
Myrdal which is not cited by Jones and SaKong, this is that "even an
authoritarian regime cannot record major achievement unless it can somehow
mobilise acceptance, participation and cooperation amongst the people."15
This comes back to the question of the national consensus for development
created in the l960s discussed in Chapter I. Park's measures could not have
been as successful as they were, had he not been working in a favourable
environment)6 SaKong and Jones divide their discussion of implementation
according to two criteria, intervention mechanisms divided into "instruments
of intervention (taxes, exchange rates, rationing, subsidies and so on)" and
"the kinds of pressures brought to bear on individual behaviour". Second the
behavioural compliance mechanisms may be divded into field manipulation
instruments and command. Field manipulations and commands may be
discretionary and non—discretionary.
"In theory non—discretional field manipulation is the preferred form of
intervention, since it achieves a desired deviation from pure market behaviour
taking maximum advantage of motivational and informational advantages of
the invisible hand. In Korean practice, it is not so pervasive as one would
gather from the writings of some economists".
Jones and SaKong do not allocate weighting to these various categories,
and indeed it would be impossible to do so. While analytically useful, these
distinctions are often blurred in practice. The obvious and most important
case is the supply of credit. There can be no questioning the statement that
"under the Park regime, allocation of under—priced credit has been far the
most important single instrument of Government micro—economic control")8
Some supplies of cheap credit were entirely non—discretionary, as for
instance credit advanced on letters of credit, and at the other end of the
spectrum, cheap credit was sometimes used as the carrot while formal
directives formed the stick. Thus it may be correct to categorise the supply
of credit as primarily within the field of discretionary field manipulation,
but it also fell within non—discretionary field manipulation and discretionary
command. Cheap credit may initially have been supplied under discretionary
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field manipulation, but the threat of loss of cheap credit becomes
discretionary formal command.
Likewise in the 1972 Law for Inducing Business Corporations to go Public
was certainly a formal command when first introduced, and implemented in a
very discretionary fashion including threats of loss of credit, but if a law
remains active on the statute book, then it surely ceases to be discretionary
and becomes part of non—discretionary field manipulation, since under most
regimes the framework of law and order must set the field for all economic
19
activity.
The fact is that, since no LDC government thinks in terms of such
analytic categories, any "hard" state will slide across from one analytical
category to another as it sees fit. Doing business in the Republic of Korea
could therefore be likened to playing a game in which one player, the
Government, makes up the rules as it goes along. When the game (called
"making a profit" according to business, and "national development" according
to the Government) appeared to be going well, the Government was happy to keep
direct manipulation to a minimum. It is held that between 1965 and 1971 was
one such period, although as will be shown, there was continual intervention
even in this period. When the game appeared to be going badly the Government
intervened in every way it could think of.
It will be remembered that growth rates were highly uneven from year to
year, (see figure 1.1). In years of high growth, the Government was trying
desperately to cope with the problems of overheating, in years of low growth
the Government was trying to ensure a high growth rate the next year. No
study has been conducted to measure the degree to which goverment intervention
actually created the instability it sought to correct, but the hypothesis
cannot be excluded.
In retrospect the Republic of Korea's achievement appears highly
satisfactory, and smoothed into five year averages relatively even. In fact
the Government often acted as though it was never sure whether growth would
continue from one quarter to the next. In this respect both the extent of the
Government's ability to reach all parts of the economy, and the rapid
reporting of data worked against the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea
is one of the most rapidly reporting countries in the world. Monthly
statistics were available to the President at his monthly economic briefing
which an English Prime Minister might have to wait two or three months to know.
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This allowed rapid and informed decisions to be made. At the same time
it created concern and false alarms. There can be no doubt that much
Government activity was a psychological paliative intended to assure the
President that action was being taken. Hence policies announced in the press
were frequently never implemented. However from the point of view of
business, the non—implementation of announced policies could not be relied
upon, leading to an indefinite period of uncertainty in the businesses
affected. The delay between announcement and potential implementation meant
that a period of intensive lobbying was possible in which businessmen sought
to modify adverse decisions.
There is an interesting inconsistency in the findings of Jones and SaKong
about Government intervention. They found that only 21.8 per cent of
respondees thought Government policies might sometimes be avoided, compared
with 96.8 per cent under Rhee's Government in the 1950s, but that 71.2 per
cent of businessmen in another to another question believed it was sometimes
possible to affect Government policies affecting their business.20 Of
course if the Government was determined to enact a policy it could always do
so, but in the evolution of that policy from inception to implementation,
business was closely involved and policies were frequently modified between
announcement and implementation.
The important qualification to note was that the influence of business
was frequently via an informal and unofficial network. The fundamental
ideology of the civil service was that should not influence
policy, and the civil service was superior, tapping into a five hundred year
heritage.21 Hence the formal framework put great emphasis on Government
decisions, and it was possible for the Government to make and implement
decisions which brought business to a halt. This was true on a national scale
in 1962—3 when business gave up trying to follow the rapid change of rules, a
second example was the August 3 measure of 1972, a third, some of the attempts
to reorganise the industrial structure by fiat in 1980. It was even more true
of foreign enterprise which had negligible access to the informal structure.
One major Hong Kong based trading concern has established a branch four times
in the past 19 years only to discontinue three times. Likewise since 1980
small number of very important foreign investors have closed down their
operations from a mixture of economic and protest reasons against unfavourable
changes in policy.
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Although data is difficult to quantify, it appears that the Government
has operated a much state since 1980 than between 1963 and 1979, with
the informal structure playing a significantly smaller part in policy decision
making.22 These changes give greater emphasis to the structure which
existed between 1963 and 1979. Nevertheless there is a certain irony in the
adoption of a declared policy of allowing market forces more play in the
Korean economy and reducing Government regulation, while increasing central
direction with less consultation. The central direction is all the firmer
because if is backed up by theoretical assumptions about the economy, rather
than the pragmatism which pervaded the economy under Park. This change is
important because it is backed up by theoretical assumptions about the
economy, rather than the pragmatism which pervaded the economy under Park.
This change is important because under the Park regime it was possible to
appeal to the immediate consequences. The essence of recent decisions is that
whatever the immediate consequences, the decision must be correct because it
is accorded with neoclassical economic theory which must, by definition,
produce the best results in the long term.23
Jones and SaKong's conclusions is that "effective implementation via
hardness has been a major causal factor in achieving the Republic of Korea's
phenomenal rate of economic growth from 1961 to 197511.24 Before deriving
rules and lessons for other countries, it is important to remember that an
inappropriate policy enforced through "hardness" will have a negative effect.
The question is therefore how the Government got its decisions right?
In order to answer this question it is necessary to ask the further
questions: "Who is the Government in the Republic of Korea?" "How are policy
decisions reached within the Government? And who implements the decisions?"
It will be argued that between 1963 and 1979 decision making was surprisingly
decentralised through both a high degree of autonomy granted to lower ranking
officials, and through the growth of quasi—Governmental organisations. These
organisations could be viewed as Government organisations (by the Government)
and for certain purposes as private economic associations. Hence Government
reached far down to the level of ordinary business, while private enterprise
could reach far up ministerial decisions.
It will be obvious that such a system could have led merely to a high
level of corruption and inefficiency. That it did not (as it had under
Synghman Rhee) was largely the result of •vigilance at the highest levels of
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Government. Both President Park and President Chon on coming into Office have
seen the purge of corrupt officials as a prime task. In 1963 an independent
watchdog organisation, the Board of Audit and Inspection was created, which
might descend on any Government or quasi—Governmental organisation without
warning and conduct a fine toothcomb inquiry into both financial and other
activiies. Even so in 1976, 51,468 corrupt officials were punished for
irregularities (or 10 per cent of total Government employees).25 This only
emphasises the fact that only constraint vigilance excludes serious corruption
under the Korean system, and the first quality of hardness is a willingness to
deal with Government corruption.
The second level of checks was through the Economic Planning Boards.
Since EPB controlled the budget at a very high level of detail, it conducted
an annual scrutiny of each Ministry's activities. EPB, which recruited some
of the most able candidates with a high esprit de corps motivated by a desire
to promote national development, therefore acted as an important watchdog
judging the level of economic efficiency.
Good decisions depend on good information. In 1958 the the Republic of
Korea signed a contract with Surveys and Research Corporation of the United
States to study how to improve the quality of statistics in the Republic of
Korea. By 1961 the report was complete and the military Government was able
to implement some of the suggestions, and moved the Bureau of Statistics from
the Home Ministry to E.P.B. The monthly economic briefings to the President
required rapid reporting, so that the present system evolved in the early
1960s.
However between 1967 and 1979 there seems to have been little improvement
in the types of data collected. Nor, has the number of central Government
employees increased, despite the enormous increase in the sophistication of
the economy. This means that an increasingly complex economy was being
controlled by a static number of ministerial employees. Nor can it be said
that average civil servant's abilities to handle sophisticated economic
analysis has necessarily increased.
A natural consequence of this has been an increase in the influence of
non—Government personnel whether in private enterprise, academia or other
areas. It was at this point that the quasi—Governmental organisations became
more influential, as the case studies given below suggest. These
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organisations reported primarily to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and
their growth has greatly strengthened the power of MCI vis—à—vis the Economic
Planning Board during the period 1969—1980. Nevertheless MCI never attained
the all powerful position of MITI in Japan.
The quasi—Governmental organisations offered a formal structure for
Government — business interaction. The nature of Korean society allowed a
second informal structure. Although often described as an intensely
hierarchial society, such a description is misleading if it implies that
orders and decisions flow smoothly from top to bottom and not in any other
way. Other influences intermingle, family, alumni, "age—set', length of
relationship, etc. Since a great deal of autonomy is given to low ranking
officials, informal networks between Government officials and businessmen form
an essential part of lobbying. The normal form of approaching a stranger is
to use a mutual friend to given an introduction. This is normally more
efficacious than to be introduced by a superior.26
Since elected politicians play such a small role in Korean Government
life, the paths of influence and interaction between Government and business
are labyrithine.27 Although cases can be found of the personal intervention
of the President and of ministeries, the majority of policies are formed, as
in western democracies, through intensive lobbying of decision—makers. In the
Republic of Korea however the decision—makers are the 12,000 central
Government officials. As in Japan, officials of various ministries also see
themselves as representing the interests of their constituents which often
leads to interministerial disputes.
During the pre—1980 period these inter—ministerial disputes were often
mediated, not by the cabinet, but by the press. Policies were leaked to
newspapers to test the reaction of other ministries and other interested
groups. This frequently misled foreign businesmen who took the press reports
at face value as policies already formulated.
A good example of this complicated interaction can be seen in 1979. In
January 1979 a tight money policy and other monetarist principles were
adopted. Although announced in January, it was not until April that a well
prepared implementation package was ready after four months of intensive
lobbying and arguing about exchange rates, interest rates, Government
investment policies etc. When the advisibility of using the usual extreme
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pressure to achieve the export goal for the year was questioned by EPB at the
same time as slowing down investment in the Heavy and Chemical Industry, the
proposals received little co—operation from MCI which made direct appeals to
the President over the Deputy Prime Minister's head.28
Likewise when food imports were liberalised in 1978 to cope with a
serious shortage of certain crops, the implementing agency was the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries which conceived that any food imports were damaging
to the farming interest and used every possible means to delay and prevent the
import of the commodities in question. In the event the Ministry of
Agriculture proved so recalcitant that the Office of Supply was ordered to
step in and import the needed goods directly.
While this was an extreme example it illustrates the ability of a
Government agency to defy the rest of the Government.29 How much more so
was this possible in areas less open to public attention. Indeed even within
Ministries this sort of obstruction is quite possible in which assistant
directors followed their own precepts quite independent of, or opposed to,
ministerial pronouncements. When the eye of publicity or of the President was
on a particular agency then rapid action could be taken, but in its normal day
to day business, the Government was far from monolithic.
This account goes a long way to contradict the initial impression of a
"hard" state. If it is accurate where then was the distinctiveness which made
the Government of the Republic of Korea such a powerful agent of development?
The distinctiveness lies in several different and even contradictory sources.
1) The national consensus that economic development is paramount, beyond the
interests of individual companies or power groups. If this creative
nationalism were not deeply rooted in the civil service, all the
potentially damaging aspects of the system described above would be
actualised.
2) The blurring of distinction between civil service and business so that at
one moment a civil servant may act as a spokesman for private business
and the next a private businessman may become an agent of Government
policy.
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3) The ability to change the nature of the structure where quick decisions
are required, and enforce decisions where a national consensus exists,
for instance to raise oil prices immediately and not shelter consumers.
4) Decentralisation of ordinary decision making. The fact that an assistant
director can make most decisions without reference to his immediate
superior permits rapid decision, preventing administrative delay.
5) The willingness of the Government to intervene whenever it felt national
development would be enhanced, without regard for theoretical or
ideological points.
Of all the Government measure, there is little dispute that the most
effective weapon was credit rationing. As will be seen, the Government was in
the unusual position of controlling nearly all the commercial banks through
ownership as well as indirect controls through the Bank of Korea and Ministry
of Finance. It could perhaps even be argued that the multiplicity of
administrative controls were excessive given the power of the Government to
control finance. Many of the administrative measures might have been greatly
simplified (and could be in a country trying to imitate the Republic of Korea)
as long as control of credit remained.
An example both of the foregoing discussion and of the strength of
Government control can be seen in the case of the Heavy and Chemical Industry
Promotion Council. In Japan a comparable plan had been pushed through by MITI
in conjunction with big business from 1958 onwards. In the Republic of Korea
such planning lay in the sphere of EPB which was doubtful about its viability
and desirability. Therefore a special committee was set up in the Blue House
directly under the President which could liase directly with the more
enthusiastic Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of
Construction. Because of its location in the Blue House it was beyond
criticism, and partly covered by emergency decrees issued under the Yushin
Constitution of 1972 preventing public criticism. This committee could thus
bring the strongest pressure to bear on all financial institutions.
Since the schemes were far more expensive than projected, by 1978—79 they
were absorbing 82 per cent of industrial investment. The Council was able to
use Presidential influence to perfection so that even the Korea Housing Bank,
a Government institution solely concerned with building public housing had
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lent a considerably sum of money for the purpose of building the Heavy and
Chemical Industrial Plant by 1979. Once the plan was underway, the high level
of support it received meant that it was not re—evluated after the 1973—74 oil
crisis, nor in the light of the obvious development of world wide overcapacity
in petrochemicals, shipbuilding and even consumer electronics in the late
1970s.3° It was only with the change of President in 1979 that it became
possible to challenge the whole plan successfully.
The Heavy and Chemical Industry Committee shows how the Korean system
could push through a plan which proved unchallengeable even as severe
disadvantages emerged, but only by by—passing the existing structure. The
system gave the President unlimited power, provided he choose to use it and
exert continual pressure. If the policy was handed over to the bureaucratic
structure a quite different system came into operation. Since President Park
was only interested in results, he did not interfere with the ordinary running
of the economy as long as it appeared to be running well.3'
With the death of President Park in October 1979, all Blue House pressure
disappeared, and the bureaucracy took over smoothly. In early January EPB and
MCI came to a compromise about interest rate and exchange rate changes, an
agreement which had been delayed as long as either side believed it could get
influence to change the policy mix. But on May 31, 1980, a
Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) was set up under the
Commander for Defense Security, later to become President. The economic
subcommittee of this committee was in the position to enforce decisions
afecting the whole economy, just as the Heavy and Chemical Promotion Committee
had been able to affect heavy industry.
A stream of major decisions streamed from this subcommittee which
radically altered Government—business relation. Mergers and changes in
direction of policy destablised the business community, thus arguably
prolonging the recession, and leading to a loss of confidence among many
businessmen in Government support and resumed growth. Since bolstering
business confidence in continued growth was, after providing preferential
credit, the most important function of Government from the business point of
view this proved serious.
Businessmen were not convinced by the monetarist and neoclassical
policies ennunciated by the SCNSM. Korean businessmen were used to a
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sympathetic Government that put growth before market forces or correcting
theoretical imbalances in the economy, and wanted a healthy home market as
well as support or exports. The new Government showed no interest in
stimulating the domestic market, although declaring utmost support for
exports. Their adoption of a sliding exchange rate helped exports but during
the consumer boom of 1976 — early 1979 even firms which had previously
concentrated on exports had begun to sell to the domestic market, and the new
Government was determined to widen the gap between domestic and export markets
just when market forces had pushed them close together than ever before.
During 1981 and 1982 an argument between those who believed the Republic
of Korea should wait for the world recovery to produce a second take—off
(largely in the Government sector) and those who argued that the domestic
market could lead growth (largely businessmen) persisted. By the end of 1982
the delay in world recovery convinced almost all Government officials that
ref lation of the domestic economy was required, though they still differed as
to whether this reflation should be through construction or through consumer
spending. However there is a strong case for arguing that the wrong choice of
policy mix from 1980—1982 retarded the Korean recovery.
2. Quasi—Government agencies
Of the many quasi—Government agencies selected for consideration to
illustrate the argument used above, three have been chosen. As part of the
restructuring of the economy in 1961 the Government ordered all incorporated
businesses to join business associations. This was set out in the Business
Association Act of 1961. Further associations were created later in the
1960s, often to incorporate smaller groups of associations, for instance
KOFOTI (Korean Federation of Textile Industries) was established in 1967 to
pull together the various associations representing branches of the
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industry.
2.1 Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA)
KOTRA was founded in 1962 as part of the Government export drive. KOTRA
has been an extremely important instrument in the early development of
exporting activities. KOTRA representatives, liasing closely with embassy and
consular officials, travelled round the world exploring the developing markets
for existing products. At the same time they advised Korean manufacturers on
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products which could be developed. In this process they were greatly helped
by the existing overcapacity in the textile and other industries in the early
l960s.
KOTRA provided training for Korean salesmen, instructing them of how to
present samples, giving advice on foreign import laws and assisting with both
legaland financial aspects of trade. In many ways it resembles JETRO in Japan
which predates it. The important distinction, a senior KOTRA Official
insisted, is that KOTRA is a Government agency, whereas JETRO is privately
funded and independent. Nevertheless it is admitted that in the early days
much was learned from studying JETRO. In fact this merely illustrates the
ignorance in contemporary Korea about Japanese organisation. JETRO has since
1958 been a public corporation with all of its capital coming from central
Government. Virtually all of JETROs overseas personnel are MITI
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transferees. In this respect KOTRA may be more independent of MCI.
KOTRA has a close relationship with the Korea Traders Association. In
1966 KTA took over the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board which deals with
disputes arising from international trade. It was KOTRA which organised the
first international trade fair in the Republic of Korea in 1968, but KTA Now
administers the Korea Exhibition Center, although recently it has been
proposed that KOEX should be transferred back to KOTRA.34 KOTRA's office in
New York has been in the KTA owned Korea Center since 1974 along with other
Government agencies, while KOTRA's headquarters in Seoul is in the World Trade
Center along with KTA, KOFOTI and a number of other quasi—Government agencies.
KOTRA now maintains 86 Korea Trade Centers throughout the world (as
against 4 of KTA). The first was opened in New York in 1964, and by 1968
there were already 25 branches. KOTRA is charged with monitoring all tariff
and non—tariff barriers on Korean goods on a month to month basis and advises
the relevant businesses of their application. This includes an early warning
system on goods which may soon become subject to trade barriers. This wealth
of information is available to MCI and when the latter Wishes to
modify trade policy, KOTRA advises information on the overseas impact of
policies. Thus information policies ideas often originate in KOTRA and are
channelled either to MCI or to private industry as appropriate.
KOTRA deserves a thorough study of its evolution through the years. It
has already attracted attention from developing countries. In recent years
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officials from Egypt, Haiti and Thailand have visited and studied KOTRA. The
organisation's role has clearly changed greatly in the 1970s. Large Korean
companies in the chaebul class now have their own world wide information
network, but KOTRA remains the best network of information for both Government
and small and medium companies. It also provides an important matching
service for foreign importers seeking advice on Korean manufacturers.
2.2 Korea Traders Association (KTA)
Whereas KOTRA is an acknowledged Government agency directly responsible
to MCI, KTA is officially the representative voice of private industry
concerned with exports. Indeed it was founded as a purely private
organisation in 1946 with just over 100 companies. It was too important an
organisation in view of the Government's development strategy to be left in
private hands and since 1961 personnel have flowed easily from MCI to KTA and
vice versa. Before the present Chairman took office he had been successively
governor of the Bank of Korea, MCI Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. The
long standing Chairman 1973—1980, Park Chong—hoon formerly a Major General in
the Air Force was MCI minister in 1963, and 64—67, then becoming DPM 1967—69.
In 1969 KTA was reorganised and greatly strengthened, being given the
right to collect .55 per cent of c.i.f. value of all imports. In return it
was to provide the funding for KOTRA, and to rapidly develop its presentation
abroad.35 This levy was to be reduced and phased out altogether by 1986
when KTA would have built up sufficient funds. Through the Korea Traders
Scholarship Foundation is also provided substantial sums of money, including 1
million dollars to Harvard University.
Naturally the ability to collect such large amounts of money gave the
Traders Association enormous power, and enabled it to provide for its members,
numbering about 3000 by 1981, extensive services in terms of information,
expertise, insurance and arbitration. It handles world wide publicity, puts
buyers and sellers in touch and has run the Korea Exhibition Center since
1979. It also sponsors various bilateral economic councils, of which the
first, the Korea—Japan Economic Committee was established in 1969.
On behalf of its members KTA organises meetings of member companies to
discuss mutual problems and then makes appropriate recommendations to MCI or
other agencies. In 1974 for instance it made 167 formal suggestions of which
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76 per cent were reported adopted.37 1974 was an exceptional year in which
the Government was soliciting ideas to increase exports after the oil price
increase of 1973, and the number of suggestions is not thought to have been so
large in recent years. On behalf of the Government, KTA was empowered to
issue trade related certificates, import/export licenses, trade performance
certificates and other functions. In 1980 KTA provided subsidies of W30
thousand million (46 million US dollars).
Most people even in the Republic of Korea would be inclined to regard KTA
as a private organisation. Officially it is a "non—profit, voluntary
organisation", but the head is vetted by MCI and during the 1981—82 drive to
cut the number of civil servants, the quota of Cuts for MCI and related
agencies included cuts ordered in KTA.38 There is a case for regarding KTA
as an independent organisation but it is very closely related to the
Government. Its budget comes from a Government authorised levy on trade
amounting to 100 million dollars per annum, described by one very senior
Government official as "all Government money anyway" and often spent at the
direction of the central administration.
The Government clearly regards it administratively as part of the
Government. However in representing the views of its consituents it acts as a
voice of private enterprise. As Jones and SaKong point out "there is a
crucial discontinuity between Government and private planning, and crossing
this interface is the critical bottleneck in implementation".
Organisations which straddle the divide between Government and business
clearly bridge that interface and have proved important in ensuring the
Government gets good advice and that Government plans are implemented in
private businesses.
2.3 Korea Society for the Promotion of the Machine Industry
(K0sANI)
KOSAMI is an example of industry associations, of which two more will be
considered in the sectoral studies. The associations founded in 1961 and 1962
were useful organisations at the 4 digit level of classification and formed
intermediaries between MCI and individual firms. However as interest in
strategic industries grew, groupings which covered all industries within a
three digit classification were called for. KOFOTI to cover all textiles was
formed in 1967, and KOSAMI in 1968. In 1967—68 it was decided to promote
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"strategic industries" and in the first half of 1968 to provide "maximum
administrative (author's italics) and financial support" for the manufacture
of 68 machinery items designated to replace imports and 18 categories of the
machinery industry.40 Credit on the scale of 1 thousand million won (3.5
million dollars) in commercial loans was made available for firms buying
Korean machinery and a similar amount in Treasury loans for firms investing in
the required sectors, alongside 10 million in long term low interest loans
for necessary imports.
To administer this plan, KOSAMI was created as "the specialised
association of mechanical engineering manufacturers, representing the Korean
engineering industry as a whole". By 1982 this organisation had 19
associations of manufacturers formed under the 1961 legislation and a number
of individual members. Preserving the face of a private association it was
funded through the contributions of members and not by Government.
However its role as a Government agency was clearly indicated in 1981—82
when MCI ordered it to reduce its staff, and it was subjected to an audit by
the Board of Audit and Inspection. It was also delegated various functions by
MCI including designing industrial policy. The official literature states
that KOSAMI, "promotes the mutual economic interest of the mechanical
engineering industry in public and particularly in dealing with public
authorities and other sectors of commerce and industry. KOSAMI is primarily
active in the field of economic policy and where advice and exchange of
experience will contribute towards improving the mechanical and engineering
industry's productivity".41
It administers the Machinery Industry Promotion Fund, and provides
warranties for domestic machinery purchased with this fund which is intended
to encourage Korean firms to buy Korean. It also researches into the efficacy
of various policies including those intended to upgrade Korean machines
through technical guidance and through R and D. Although originally conceived
as primarily an import substitution agent, KOSAMI provides an export service
in terms of providing product information,organisation, the circulation of
notices of overseas tenders and assessing the areas in which Korean industry
should develop export capacity. Since 1977 it has also organised Korean
machinery fairs, Table 3.2 lists the major accomplishments since its
foundation.
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In suggesting policy to MCI, KOSAMI acts as an interface for the
industries it represents, and as an administrative arm of MCI in other areas.
As the economy became more complicated the advice of KOSAMI became more
essential but at the same time the ability of the member firms to initiate
policy formally also increased.
Other organisations
These three organisations may be taken as representative examples of
quasi—Government organisations within the industrial sector. Such
associations, sometimes called co—operatives exist in every sector of the
economy through agriculture, fishing, mining, manufacturing and many service
sectors. They were almost all Government initiated, but now have an
independent life of their own. The smaller organisations also have a
Government role. Not only KOSAMI, but member organisations such as the Korea
Electric Association, the Korea Sewing Machine Association, the Korea
Regrigeration and Air Conditioning Association and the Korea Automobile
Cooperative have delegated responsibilities including deciding on permits for
imports of items on the restricted list.42
Each Ministry also has an associated research institute which also assists
in tne formulation of policy. The advantage of the research institutes was
that they were free from the very rigid constraints on pay prevalent in the
civil service. The salaries for civil servants at all levels remains extremely
low. In the past competition for places was extreme, perhaps a hundred
candidates for one place. Recently both the number of applicants and more
important their quality has deteriorated. The Korean system has depended on
attracting to the civil service recruits who were both of very high ability and
highly motivated towards public service. It appears that this is no longer
possible and very serious consequences could result from the system being
perpetuated with inferior quality staff with lower motivation.43
3. Financial Structure
If credit control was the major instrument of implementation, how was it
administered? Figure 3.3 sets out the financial system of the Republic of
Korea, while Table 3.3 gives the proportionate holdings of the various
financial institutions. First it should be noted that with the exception of
the local banks, the foreign bank branches, the life insurance companies and
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Table 3.2 Major Achievements of KOSANI
* Key Plant Construction Projection for Machinery
Industry (1971)
• Research on the Promotion of Machine Tool Pro-
duction (1972)
Long Term Machinery Industry Promotion Plan
(1973)
• Research on Export Potential of Machinery Products
(1973)
• National Machinery Industry Census (1973)
Research on the Promotion of Machinery Export
(1974)
* Research on the Promotion of Auto Parts Industry
(1974)
• Diesel Engine Demands and Production Capacity
Survey (1974)
* Research on Domestic Production of Shipbuilding
Machinery for Ship (1974)
Feasibility Study on Domestic Production of Key
Industrial Plants (1974)
• Survey for Domestic Possible Production Ratios of
Imported Plants (1975)
Research on Tariffs for Machinery Imports (1975)
• Research for Managerial Improvement of Machinery
Industry Promotion Fund (1975)
• National Machine Tools Census (1975)
• Research on Localization Posibilities of Industrial
(1976)
Estimation on Demand of Facilities Funds (1976)
Survey for Selection of Small & Medium size Spe-
cialized Machine Firms (1976)
• Publication of Korean Machinery Catalogue in
English (1976)
• & Operation of Export Cooperative
Council (1976)
• Mission for Survey of South-East Asia & Middle
East Plant Market (1976)
• Invitation of Japanese Machinery Industry Mission
for Meeting (1976)
Construction of KOSAMI HaIl (1976)
• 77 Korean Machinery Fair (1977)
• Mission for Survey of East-Asia Machinery Industry
Capabilities (1977)
• Contest of Korean Machinery Catalogue (1977)
• Symposium for Fostering Machinery Industry (1977)
• National Meeting of Machinery Industry Circles
(1977)
• Mission for Survey of Japanese Machinery Industry
Capabilities (1977)
• The 1st Korea-Japan Machinery Industry Cooperation
Subcommittee Conference (1977)
• Report on current Capabilities of Korean Machinery
Industry and Incentive Measures (1977)
• Research Report for Development of Machinery
Industry (1977)
• Survey & Research Report on Master Plan for the
Development of Machine Industry (1978)
* Reserach on Plant Export Law (1978)
• The 2nd & 3rd Korea-Japan Machinery Industry
Cooperation Subcommittee Conference (1978)
• Seminar on Technology & Quality Control for
Promoting Machine Industry (1978)
• Field Survey of Machine Industry Firms (1978)
• The 4th & 5th Joint Conference of Korea-Japan
Machinery Industry Cooperation Committees (1979)
• Korea Machinery Trade Fair (1979)
Machinery Catalogue Display in Tokyo & Singapole
(1979)
• Plant Trade Mission to South-East Asia (1979)
• Textile Machinery Trade Mission to South-East Asia
(1979)
• Establishment of Textile Machinery Advisory Com-
mittee (1979)
• Presentation of Master Plan for the Development of
Machine Industry to IBRD (1979)
Source: KOSANI, KOSAMI, Seoul, 1980, pp. 3—4.
city banks (5)
banks (10)
bank branches (35)
Exchange Bank
and Small Industry Bank
National Bank
Housing Bank
& banking sector of
Agricultural Cooperatives
redit & banking sector of Fisheries
Cooperatives
Development Bank
t-Import Bank of Korea
Long-Term Credit Bank
Trust accounts of the Bank of Seoul
and Trust Company
Eutual savings and finance companies
______________
(193)
UfllOflS
Financial 11 finance account of the
Institutions Agricultural Cooperatives
-Postal savings
—Life insurance companies (7)
and finance companies (18)
banking corporations (6)
Securities Finance
Corporation
—Securities investment trust
companies (2)
Securities Supervisory Board
Stock Exchange
—Securities companies (27)
Source: Rhee Nyung—jai:
in Korea, KIEL,
Note: Figures in parentheses denote the number of institutions.
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Figure 3.1 The financial system in the Republic of Korea
Central Bank The Bank of
{ Securities
Market
International Banks and Financial Markets
1981, p. 6.
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merchant banking organisations the Government either owned a share in the
commercial institutions, or the institution was a Government body. Hence in
1970 the Government directly controlled 96.4 per cent of financial assets. By
1978 this had shrunk to 84.4 per cent and 82 per cent by Of the
remaining 18 per cent, only the foreign banks were not exposed to direct
administrative pressure.
There would be some justification for regarding all the institutions
under Government control as being part of the same institution, and in many
ways the administrative effect has been just that. Rather the special banks
and the development institutions have been given specific functions to
perform, though in extreme cases these areas have been broken down as in the
case of diverting the funds of the KHB to industry. For administrative ease
they have specific target groups and preferential interest rates.
The commercial banks also have their interest rates controlled directly,
and most make funds available according to Government order, as in the case
cited above, where 10 thousand million won was to be set aside for commercial
loans for the machinery industry promotion in 1968. Beyond that the
Government could invest directly by buying equity or increasing the capital of
special banks, or by authorising the Bank of Korea to issue more currency or
give credits to other financial institutions.
One major source of capital lay outside Government control, this was the
informal money market or curb market. Highly structured, but outside
Government control, its assets at any one time can only be guessed. The
Government mounted successive attacks on the curb market to try to capture the
funds for economic development, in 1961—62 by fiat, in 1965 through the
operation of market forces by raising interest rates, in 1972 by fiat and
forcing dealers to register their dealings, and 1982 in the wake of a major
financial scandal due to abuses by a major group of curb market dealers. The
curb market offered high rates of interest for short—term loans and
constituted a well articulated, but complex, informal network which stretched
from housewives to businesses.45
It was an essential adjunct to the Korean system, allowing small
businesses, especially in the tertiary sector, access to capital at a price.
What emerged in the 1982 curb market crisis was the extent to which even large
industrial firms resorted to the curb market for funds to ease cash flow
- -
problems. The Government controlled network was so closely geared to
investment and export credits that any other need could only be satisfied
through curb market loans. With expanding markets and inflation, companies
could afford to pay the 36—50 per cent interest rates. With collapsing
markets and falling inflation the whole structure of company financing was
stood on its head, with consequent bankruptcies. Unfortunately the best rates
of return were often through speculation especially in the urban property
market and the curb market was frequently distorted by the demands of
speculators who could easily meet high interest rates when they might double
their money in a couple of months.
The relative ease of obtaining loans for new investment by large
companies almost certainly retarded the development of the Korean Stock
Exchange. Indeed had no stock exchanges existed in other countries no one
would have bothered to invent the joint stock company in Korea. The
Government has frequently fretted at the failure of the stock exchange to
develop, forcing companies with indifferent success to go public, encouraging
high dividends regardless of profits, and offering tax incentives.
The struggle to get companies to go public is a fair measure of the
inability of the Government to use even its credit sanction to affect a policy
wnich large companies were opposed to. Companies to which assets are
transferred to remove them from the public sphere. The failure of the stock
market to develop stems from the fact that large companies could get funds
cheaper elsewhere and investors acquired an asset that depreciated every year
with inflation. Short—term buying and selling was therefore the major
46
activity.
Unlike Japan, the major companies have not owned banks, with the
exception of Samsung which owns Dongbank Life Insurance Company. However
since 1980 the Government has attempted to sell off its holdings in the
commercial banks. Despite stringent measures to prevent the chaebul from
buying the shares, almost all the shares sold are believed to have eneded in
the hands of chaebul.47 This will almost certainly lead to a growth of
control of financial assets by major companies.
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4. Fiscal policies
The Government has normally aimed at a surplus on its current account,
but this has become a deficit when special expenditures, investments and loans
are taken into account. The problems of assessing Korean Government
expenditure were aptly summed up in the World Bank report Growth and Prospects
for the Korean Economy, "it is difficult to derive from Government budget data
a fully consistent and consolidated picture of public sector finances. One
reason is the existence of the extra—budgetary accounts (Grain Management Fund
and Fertiliser Fund). Another problem is the complex budget structure,
characterised by the existence of a large number of Special Accounts. At
present, the central Government budget consists of a General Account, Economic
Development Special Account (together termed the General Budget Sector) and 24
other Special Accounts. Characteristic for the system is a large number of
transfers between these accounts.48
A sceptic would be tempted to conclude that system with
incomplete published data was devised in the l95Os the IMF and
United States Aid donors, and allow large amounts of money to be laundered for
other uses. Why it has not been rationalised since is unclear. However in
1977 the structure was simplified effectively reducing the number of special
49
accounts by six.
Most revealing is Table 3.4 which contrasts tax revenue with the overall
budget, which shows that about 45 per cent of Government expenditure comes
from non—tax sources. Since Government bonds are hardly developed, deficit
financing is achieved largely through net borrowings from the Bank of Korea.
Since the normal civil and defense expenditure is more than covered by normal
revenue, the deficit financing is solely for the purpose of investment and
subsidies. After other deficits such as the grain management account and
fertiliser account are excluded, approximately all the investment made in the
l970s was achieved through deficit financing. This does not take into account
the refinancing and discounting of bills issued by commercial banks and
special banks and other financial institutions by the Bank of Korea.
The researches of Norton and Rhee suggest that because of high growth
rates and inflation, and because the new money is invested to produce new
capacity, the system has only a limited responsibility for inflation. BOK
studies suggest that a 10 per cent increase in M2 had only a 2 per cent
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influence on prices, lagged over two years. If it is correct that inflation
stemmed from other causes, and that the deficit financing was accelerating the
Republic of Korea's growth, one has an unfashionable explanation of the growth
of the Republic of Korea. This Keynesian view is supported not only
theoretically, but by the performance of the manufacturing sector after
monetarist policies came into force in Although the economy has
grown since, though at a slower rate, both industrial investment and
industrial output have fallen.
To maintain the levels of loans to industry in some other way, the
Government would either have to develop a treasury bill market (unlikely,
unless long—term expectations about inflation are extremely optimistic) or tax
Koreans more heavily. Korean tax policies have been a mixture of a
progressive income tax structure in which two thirds of workers normally fall
below the initial threshold, but which rises, with defense surcharge to one of
the highest rates in the world, and a highly regressive value—added tax levied
on nearly every item of consumption for even the poorest citizen.5'
The situation described above is very different from that prevailing in
the early l960s. At that time the Government was reliant on foreign aid to
meet normal expenditure. In 1962 the tax laws were completely revised, and
between 1965 and 1968 a reorganisation of tax administration greatly increased
52the yield, with the rooting out of long standing abuses. The fact that
this took so long to implement, despite its obvious necessity, is another
measure of the relative autonomy of subordinate bureaucracies. In both 1966
and 1968 tax rates were adjusted to reduce the burden on lower income groups
and increase business taxes and income tax for high income earners. On the
other hand indirect taxes were raised. These indirect taxes were consolidated
when VAT was introduced in 1977, but a number of luxury taxes remained on
items which were increasingly no longer luxuries, notably refrigerators.
A breakdown of Government expenditure on the general account in recent
years shows that after Defence and General Administration (including public
order and safety) and Economic Services Education is the principal item of
expenditure. Not included are the large number of private schools and the
contributions to all except primary schools by parents. Had the Korean public
been less willing to pay for educating their children, the Government
expenditure would have had to have been higher on this account. Expenditure
on social security and housing is notably low.53
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Table 3.4 General Iniications of government finance
'
-
(l.a
G. N
(At curr-
eut prices)
Budget of
General
Gov't
Investment
&
loans
Gross public burden for public sector
1
Local
GOVt
Central
General OtherQov £
account
2)
National
tales
&
Monopoly Local
profits tales
I 10 Amount : In billion won
963
964
965
966
355.5 ...
502.9 ...
116.3 ...
805.7 ...
1 037.0 ...
119.9 88.4 31.5
111.0 72.8 38.2
120.1 75.2 45.5
154..1 93.5 60.6
231.0 140.9 90.0
... 27.2 37.7
... 27.3 43.3
... 23.8 50.8
... 29.5 69.6
... 62,6 111.2
28.2
31.1
37.4
54.6
87.6
4.2 5.2
4.8 7.4
4.5 8.8
3.6 11.4
7.5 16.1
p967
969
970
971
1 281.2 ...
1 652.9 460.0
2 155.3 662.9
2 684.0 696.8
3 294.8 860.3
291.3 180.9 110.3
403.4 262.1 140.7
579.6 362.7 217.0599.0 428.0 171.0
735.8 516.1 219.7
... 79.0 153.3
56.6 117.6 230.0
88.3 175.6 313.797.7 184.3 401.1
124.5 213.3 494.3
129.2
194.3
262.8
337.8
411.1
10.0 14.1
16.4 19.4
24.3 26.6
30.1 33.2
45.4 39.8
972
973
974
915
976
977
978
979
980
9813)
4 028.9 1 112.2
5 238.3 1 146.7
7 332.5 1 707.89 792.9 2 480..1
13 272.6 3 362.6
17 OZI.4 4 424.5
22 917.6 6 057.8
29 072.1 8 564.5
34 321.6 10 972.6
43 155.3 14 534.4
966.4 696.3 270.1
960.2 655.4 304.8
1 428.3 & 013.9 414.4
2 123.6 1 535.3 588.3
2 895.2 2 142.2 153.0
3 717.8 2 739.9 977.8
4 755.3 3 5313.7 1 216.76 466.5 5 053.2 1 413.3
8 647.8 6 486.1 2 161.8
11 386.8 8 040.0 3 346.8
145.8 309.8 527.3
186.4 250.6 658.7
279.6 394.6 1 030.2
356.5 617.6 1 563.2
467.3 871.0 2 333.1
706.7 1 022.1 2 987.8
1 302.5 1 244.6 4 137.9
2 098.0 2 138.3 5 424.1
2 324.8 2 560.4 6 645.1
3 147.6 3 583.0 8 247.2
437.8
527.7
853.3
1 268.9
1 934.5
2 431.2
3 414.7
4 464.9
5 367.4
6 645.2
42.9 46.6
57.0 14.0
69.0 101.9
135.5 158.8
178.0 220.6
220.0 336.6
280.0 443.3
360.0 599.2
510.0 767.7
480.0 921.9
Source Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning Board,
Note : I) 1962- 1967 General tloy't Sector and Other Special A/C(Sulnsaary of Financial Statistics for Fy 1968)
2) Includes social security tax since 1970.
8) Budget
Source: EPB: Major Statistics of the Korean Economy, 1982,
1983, p. 175.
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The Republic of Korea has been fortunate during its period of rapid
growth that despite the critical military situation and the need to support
the world's sixth largest army, it has been greatly assisted by United States
aid.54 Had the United States support not existed, the Republic of Korea
would, of necessity, have had to raise taxes, and or divert funding from
economic development to military expenditure. In either case development
would have been retarded. On the other hand few developing countries face the
same level of direct military threat. Government fiscal policy has been
assisted both by the willingness to pay for private education and the low
public demand for social services. A change in either would have required
more public funds into areas which would not directly assist "blind economic
55
growth".
5. Conclusions
Jones and SaKong, after arguing that effective implementation via
hardness has been a major factor in growth, admit that "the possible costs of
the hard development model include negative effects on income ditribution,
concentration of economic power and civil liberties".56 It has been argued
above that the Korean development model Is not as hard as Jones and SaKong
suggest. This is largely because of the general consensus about priorities
which did not necessitate hardness, but also because in areas of
implementation which involved hundreds of civil servants and hundreds of
businessmen it is impossible for continuous hardness to be exerted. In direct
dealings between the top directors of banks and leading businessmen it can be
much more effective. Not mentioned above, but also important despite the
small size of the country, is the fact that Government hardness also softens
with distance from the capital.
These qualifications make disentangling the precise contribution of
Government to Korean development much less easy. There are analogies here
with the debate over the causes of Japanese success.57 The essential
features appear to
1. Leadership in the sense of setting clear national priorities, and
keeping economic development as the first priority, and holding together the
elements in Korean society which cohere much less easily than in Japan;
business, Government, labour, public opinion etc. Successive Korean leaders
have felt that democracy in a western sense would make this task less easy and
have correspondingly placed civil liberties lower than economic development.
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It is hard to argue that this has increased the national consensus, or that
leaders have always been able to distinguish between economic development and
their own continuation in power.58
2. Forward planning in the sense of smoothing the path for business to
follow, including providing finance, superstructure and often direction.
3. Controlling the financial system very tightly so that little money is
wasted on conspicuous consumption, and encouraging a frugal attitude amongst
the rich both in public and as far as possible in private, and directing
finance into industrial development. This has almost inevitably led either a
concentration of economic power in the hands of the state or large
corporations, a subject to be discussed in the next section.
4. An excess of regulations and bureaucratic interference to no purpose.
This has been moderated by the informal networks diverting potential damaging
policies and blunting others in particular cases. mistakes have
still been enforced, and undoubtedly a simpler attitude to regulations, a
clear demarcation of responsibilities and an ability to leave well enough
alone including reducing the number of forms and paperwork required for many
types of economic activity are called for. This, the Fifth Plan declares will
begin during the present plan period. The most useful contribution in the
past has been the Government campaign to keep the number of civil servants
down so that they have been too busy to do more than rubber stamp most
regulations, and thus reduce administrative procedures.
From the point of view of lessons for other countries, the creation of
consensus if it does not exist might be best achieved through extending
democracy away from the existing elite to those who have most to gain from
economic development, the ordinary people, coupled with planning and financial
measures based on simplified versions of Korean procedures.
6. Enterprises
6.1 Introduction
The Republic of Korea is unusual in undergoing a rapid change in business
structure as it developed. To a degree this has been a result of deliberate
policy. In the early 1960s the Republic of Korea began its period of rapid
development relying on indigenous companies. In this process big business,
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defined as establishments employing more than 300 employees, played an
important role. In the early 1960s these enterprise produced less than half
of the Republic of Korea's industrial output, but 77 per cent of the Republic
of Korea's exports.
Between 1965 and 1973 foreign investors played an increasing role, mainly
through joint ventures, but also through wholly owned subsidaries. But from
1973 onwards, partly assisted by the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan, large
Korean companies, the chaebul, grew rapidly, and foreign investment became
less and less important. By 1980 the Republic of Korea had more companies in
Fortune's list of the top 500 non—United States companies than any country
except the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan,
Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. The Republic of Korea's success in
holding multi—nationals at bay (if this is conceived as desirable) or at least
in creating world class companies is remarkable, and while controversial
inside the Republic of Korea, offers hope for future growth in the 1980s.
6.2 Enterprises and companies
There is a fundamental problem in studying Korean enterprises in that
almost all publicly available data is based on the industrial establishment,
not the enterprise.59 In many cases great care is taken to avoid the
identification of particular enterprises.60 As a result statistics tend to
present the fiction that each manufacturing establishment is a separately and
independently owned enterprise. Thus for example the Korean Federation of
Small Business produces the following figures to illustrate the division
between small and medium business and "big business". (figure 3.2).
For many purposes this distinction is not important. However in
assessing ownership patterns beyond the 45 chaebul, even within the 500
members of the Federation of Korean Industry to which all large Korean
companies belong is almost impossible except by starting at firm level.
Appendix Table 10 lists the division between joint stock comapnies, other
corporations and those owned by individuals. Of the 6,052 manufacturing joint
stock companies, less than 356 are public companies quoted on the Korea Stock
Exchange
In part of the account that follows the fiction that each manufacturing
establishment is a separate firm is preserved faute de mieux. Table 3.5 shows
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Figure 3.2 Small and medium business compared with big business.
-
- - —
- (Unit: RB.
98.5
I
Source: Small and Medium Business Federation: Small and Medium
Business in Korea, Seoul, 1981
100%
15 I3.0 3.8 4.1fl 4.()r
No. of AU
Enterprises
1963 - 1970 - 1975 - 1976 - 1977 — 1978 — 1979 19SO —
19.550 25,816 24.229 26,564 28,292 31,701 33.628
No. of Small
Business 19.253 25,037 23,304 25.487 27,156 30,518 32.459-
No. of Big
Business 297 779 925 1,077 1,136 1,183 1,169 1,092
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Table 3.5 Manufacturing establishments
Year Number Employees Average Size Employees inc
under 5
1955 8,628 221,200 25.6
1958 12,971 260,427 20
1960 15,204 275,254 18.1 436,000
1963 18,310 491,981 21.9 631,000
1966 22,718 566,665 25 833,000
1967 23,833 648,811 27.2 1,021,000
1968 24,109 748,307 31 1,170,000
1969 25,098 828,966 34 1,232,000
1970 24,114 861,041 36 1,284,000
1971 23,412 848,194 37 1,336,000
1972 23,729 973,415 41 1,445,000
1973 23,293 1,157,829 49 1,774,000
1974 22,832 1,298,384 57 2,012,000
1975 22,787 1,420,144 62 2,205,000
1976 24,957 1,717,308 69 2,678,000
1977 26,726 1,918,931 72 2,798,000
1978 29,864 2,111,925 75 3,016,000
1979 31,791 2,189,000 69 3,126,000
1980 30,720 2,089,000 68 2,972,000
1981 32,560 2,210,962 68
Source: EPB, Surveys and Censuses of Mining and Manufacturing
(various dates).
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the number of manufacturing establishments, the number of employees and the
average size. Excluded are manufacturing workers in establishments employing
fewer than five persons. Bai Noo—gi has argued that establishments employing
10 or fewer employees should be regarded as belonging to the traditional
sector.61 In his analysis he fails to include figures for workers in
establishments with fewer than five employees. Hence in 1960 he finds 8,426
enterprises in this category and 14 per cent of industrial workers in the
premodern sector. However including all industrial workers, 37 per cent
belonged to the traditional sector.
If big business was responsible for 70 per cent of manufactured exports
in the early l960s then in 1963, just over 300 establishments were responsible
for the Republic of Korea's take—off, in as far as it depended on the export of
manufactures. It could be argued that these select enterprises were those
rebuilt after the Korean war with the latest machinery, which comprised a
small modern industrial sector which was the leading edge of the Republic of
Korea's development. Could this be taken as of Milton Friedman's
contention that "he knows of a sure formula for promoting rapid growth.
Destroy the greater part of a nation's fixed capital in war activity and
dislocate the whole economic structure. Eventual recovery from this chaotic
state of affairs will be rapid, giving a growth rate of 8—10 per cent
63
annually
Unfortunately, as pointed out in Chapter II, section 2, early Korean
growth was not dependent on exports, and throughout the growth process, the
traditional sector has proved remarkably vital. After a slight decline from
37 per cent to 32 per cent, the share remained at 30 per cent even in
1978.64 However the share of establishments employing between 5 and 10
employees shrank to 3.3 per cent. The size of the very small traditional
sector requires further study, and is best treated under the labour market
65
heading.
The slow growth of the number of industrial establishments is a second
feature of Korean development. Although between 1961 and 1978 industrial
output rose 27 times, the number of establishments rose by 96 per cent, while
as Table 3.6 shows, all this increase occurred before 1966 or after 1975.
Between 1966 and 1969 the growth of establishments fell by nearly 3,000. In
1971 even the number of workers fell. Reference to Table 2.6 shows that in
1970 the annual rate of growth fell from 13.8 per cent to 7.6 per cent, and in
1972 domestic sources of growth were negative.
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Although the economy weathered the crisis, a large number of enterprises
were caught in a prolonged period of business uncertainty. This coincided
with a high level of labour unrest, the response of the Government to both
push heavy and chemical industries and accelerated rural development. Unlike
the recession of 1979—81, the average size of firm increased rapidly during
this period, from 34 in 1969 to 62 in 1975.
In the recession of 1979—81 however not only did the number of
establishments fall, but also the average size of establishment fell from 75
in 1978 to 68 in 1980. This fall can certainly partly be ascribed to an
increased awareness of the need for labour productivity to increase to reduce
costs during the recession.
At the present stage of knowledge it is impossible to prove a causal
connection between Government policy and the aggregate size of establishment
and number of companies. However it appears that between 1960 and 1969 the
trend of development encouraged the expansion of existing firms and expansion
of scale. Between 1976 and 1979 both new enterprises and an increase in
establishment size were encouraged.
Table 3.6 Establishment survival rate
Date of
foundation of
establishments
Still
existing
1976
Still
existing
1978
Still
existing
1979
Percentage of
establishments
closed by 1976
— 1945 565 552 487
1946—1950 487 390 439
1951—1955 717 633 614 6,859 (79%)
1956—1960 1,302 1,021 1,006 12,133 (80%)
1961—1965 2,446 1,814 1,740 12,879 (70%)
1966—1970 5,536 4,368 4,020 13,061 (54%)
1971—1975 12,478 10,310 9,701 5,928 (26%)
Source: EPB Census of Manufacturing (various years)
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The figures reproduced above are net rates, after new firms and failed
firms have been cancelled out. Figures for business failure are not available
in the Republic of Korea. Table 3.7 shows corporate entry and exit between
1966 and 1969.
This shows a very high failure rate of corporate enterprises between 1966
and 1969 of approximately 25 per cent per annum, a number only just matched by
new entrants. Jones and SaKong also suggest that during 1975, 12.9 per cent
of enterpriese failed.66 1975 was not the best year for business, but table
3.7 which is based on establishments, not enterprises, suggests that 54 per
cent of establishments founded between 1966 and 1970 had ceased operations by
1975. Forty—seven per cent of firms founded in 1971 were defunct by 1975, and
26 per cent of operations commenced in 1973. This suggests a somewhat higher
rate of business failure than Jones and SaKong's survey data.
Table 3.7 Corporate entry and exit 1966—1969
Stock Year—end Flow Entry Flow Exit
1966 2,367 601
1967 2,285 661 743
1968 2,310 644 619
1969 2,421 737 626
Source: Jones and SaKong, p. 174. Data for other years not
available.
The life expectancy of the average Korean enterprise is therefore rather
short, Korean enterprise being characterised by rapid entry and exit for about
half of all enterprise. In part, as will be explained below, this is the
result of entrepreneurial behaviour, and part is only to be expected in a
rapidly changing economy. What remains unexplained is the very high failure
rate of corporate enterprises shown in Table 3.7.
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Jones and SaKong offer estimates of the sources of growth of companies in
terms of gross value added and size of firm (Table 3.8). According to this,
nearly three quarters of annual growth between 1962 and 1974 came from
Table 1.8 Sources of Real Growth of Value Added 1962—73)
Growth of average size (old firms expanding to new size) 72%
Growth in number of firms (new firms at old size) 3%
Gross product (growth of new firms at incremental size) 25%
Source: Jones and SaKong, p. 170.
existing companies, and just over a quarter from new firms. These
calculations leave out the failure of existing firms. If smaller than average
firms fail, while new firms are larger, then an additional element is added.
Jones and SaKong pose the question of "why new firms were so much larger than
the old?", but do not offer a satisfactory answer.68 Further research is
required into what actually happens when an enterprise fails. Is there
extensive asset stripping, and a well developed market for secondhand
machinery?. Whole quarters of Seoul in Chongyechon and Yongdongpo are devoted
to the reconditioning of machines of every kind, are these then from failed
enterprise? Whereas in the United Kingdom a defunct plant may stay idle for a
year or more, is it rapidly put to a new use in the Republic of Korea? This
question is important because if correct, bankruptcy does not represent any
net loss to the economy, only to the individual, whereas if the plant is
merely scrapped the investment is wasted. This would have repercussions for
national accounting procedures for capital formation and depreciation.
Despite the erosion of very small firms with between 5 and 10 employees
and the importance of exports of mass produced manufactured items which might
be presupposed to favour large firms, the scale of the average Korean
enterprise remains small. Consider that in the early 1960s the average number
of employees in the Korean textile industry was only 31, compared with 266 in
Pakistan and 1,500 in India. Interestingly the average in Japan was even
lower at 29.69 Even in 1978 the average Korean size of 87 was smaller than
the Pakistan average in 1959. A further study of comparative size industry,
— —
by industry may suggest that the Korean firm structure is closer to that of
Japan than other developing countries.7
The final development to be noted in this section is that despite the
Government policy of developing heavy and chemical industries during the 1970s
which ought to have encouraged large enterpriese, Table 3.9 shows that small
enterprise increased their share of exports during the l970s, they also
retained share of output and employment. This argues for an extraordinary
dynamism in small and medium industry at a time when Government policy was
supposed to be focussed on other areas of the economy.
6.3 Sources of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial behaviour
Preserving the fiction that each establishment was a separate enterprise
(much less true at the advanced end of enterprise), in 1960 there were about
7,000 entrepreneurs, and in 1966 perhaps 12,000. Is this a remarkable rate of
growth? It suggests that there were 5,000 men waiting to become entrepreneurs
(0.001 per cent of adult males between the age of 25 and 54 in 1960), or 5.9
71per cent of male undergraduates in 1960. Additionally, between April 1960
and May 1961 there was ample demonstration of pent—up energy and talent. When
a National Construction Service was launched in January 1961 a highly
competitive examination had to be held to select 2,000 graduates who had also
completed military training as a cadre of this programme which when wound up
in December 1961 was said to have created 25 million man—days of
employment.72 As late as 1964 only 10 per cent of graduates were said to be
satisfactorily employed. At the same time over 2,000 army officers and
perhaps as many civil servants were dismissed providing a fund of managerial
73
talent.
Jones and SaKong conclude "there was no sudden shift in supply in the
early 1960s to explain the growth discontinuity. The initial change came from
the demand side, but the resulting higher level of growth released social
forces which together with Government approval, accelerated the rate of change
on the supply side".74 This is a very important issue from the point of
view of lessons for other countries. If Jones and SaKong were correct, then
in a country like the Republic of Korea, all that was lacking was a Government
prepared to take the "critical one—time shift in the early 1960s as stability
and belief in Government dedication to economic growth increased the expected
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I believe that this is a simplification which would not produce the
desired result if replicated in another country. First I would argue that the
supply of entrepreneurs was indeed increasing rapidly during the late 1950s,
and was augmented by a once—and—for—all input of ex—ariny officers and
bureaucrats and managers. Secondly by focussing on the small amount of change
between 1968 and 1974, Jones and SaKong miss the enormous growth between 1955
and 1969. In short, the Government in 1962 was pushing at an open door rather
than creating a shift in demand. Rather than use the analogy of supply and
demand, one might think of the Government operating a tap or series of taps
more fully allowing the flow of entrepeneurial talent to proceed more easily.
But entrepreneurial activity was implicit in the society that had evolved. It
would not necessarily be so in other LDCs.
If national characteristics exist, it may be said that Koreans take to
being entrepreneurs. This characteristic takes the form of a rapid over
supply of enterprise whenever the foundation lay within the limited means of
- 76
aspiring entrepreneurs, from the 1930s onwards. Since 1961 it has been
the continual mission of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to prevent what
is termed "reckless overcompetition". Small business co—operatives were
founded in 1961 partly with the aim of reducing overcompetition through
coordination, and as recently as 1978 a Small Business Co—ordination Act was
passed to "prevent excessive competition among small businesses".77
The characteristic of the Korean comes close to that
described by Keynes as "due to that characteristic of human nature that a
large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism
rather than a mathematical expectation whether moral or hedonistic or economic
individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calculation is
supplemented and supported by animal spirits, so that the thought of ultimate
loss which often overtakes pioneers, as experience undoubtedly tells us and
them, is put aside as a healthy man puts aside the expectation of death".7
This apt description of entrepreneurial behaviour explains both the
appearance of prospective entrepreneurs and the rapid demise of so many Korean
enterprises. There is strictly speaking no such thing as legal bankruptcy in
the Republic of Korea. The proprietor of an unincorporated enterprise has
unlimited liability extending beyond the entrepreneur (at least morally) to
his family. Accordingly as noted above there are not figures for failed
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enterprises.79 Yet most Koreans in business aspire to own their own
enterprise and every year a large number set up operations which from the
outset look unpromising.
A review of the behaviour of Korean entrepreneurs suggests that the major
problem is not a shortage of prospective businessmen, but a shortage of
exploitable opportunties, or rather opportunities perceived as exploitable.
In this view there are two very distinct sorts of
entrepreneur as defined by Schumpeter and others as one
80
introducing a new good method of production or other innovation.
b) The imitative entrepreneur, who follows the first type of
lead, or has often been a manager or employee of type (a).
Entrepreneurs of type (b) predominated in the Republic of Korea, and
perhaps predominate in any LDC or rapidly growing economy.81 The critical
constraint is not necessarily capital for many new enterpriese, but market
information and lack of awareness of the state of art of technology in a given
industry. The UNDP which has been running an advisory service for small and
medium industry in conjunction with MCI and the Korea Federation of Small and
Medium Business has frequently encountered obsolete practices where the most
modern would pay for themselves in three to six months.82 Other consultants
have discovered industries where obsolete machinery has been imported at no
less cost than more advanced models.
A further indication that it is not always access to credit which is the
problem, is that funds set aside by the Small and Medium Bank for specific
projects were not fully lent in 1978—79. The credit problem for small and
medium industry (and in times of downswing for large enterpriese too) is more
complex. Starting capital is not difficult to obtain for small enterprise
providing the entrepreneur comes from the right social class, separation pay,
family resources, credit from suppliers allow the initial investment, though
this is likely to be undercapitalised.
Success brings its own problems. If the enterprise is not in the
favoured sectors, no funds for expansion may be allocated via commercial
channels. Unless all the sales are for export, working capital cannot be
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obtained, let alone capital for further investment. Usually a customer is
slow in paying, while suppliers begin to refuse to supply without payment. In
fact the more the links in the chain of suppliers and customers, the more the
squeeze operates on individual enterprises. Resort to the curb market only
increases indebtedness, so the final squeeze is non—payment of wages. When a
company fails there may be a domino effect on creditors and debtors. These
are the problems of successful trading. To expand may mean selling or taking
in a new partner, so that the original entrepreneur becomes a manager, or the
new partner must be paid an executive salary.84
These problems are bad enough, but often the field of enterprise is
oversubscribed so that would—be entrants poach craftsmen, offer deliveries
below cost price in order to establish customers, and generally force down
prices and eliminate profits. The only rescue for such operations had been
inflation which runs down the real value of debts and allows monetary price
increases which may be ahead of costs. It is this business environment which
MCI has attempted to regulate in order to prevent "overcompetition". Thus at
certain periods entry into new industries has been refused because MCI
officials in conjunction with quasi—Government organisations and co—operatives
have deemed the market saturated.
Whence this fierce incentive to start a business? The source is twofold:
firstly the inadequacy of the investment market coupled with high inflation
which makes owners of capital fear a rentier position which will (apart from
the urban property market) erode their capital and not yield an adequate
income; and secondly the large number of executives who either lose their
jobs through company adjustments, compulsory retirement at 55 without a
pension, or because they are tired of working for a large organisation.
Since these factors are general to the whole economy and culture it is
not surprising that Jones and SaKong's entrepreneurial survey failed to reveal
any outstanding characteristics of the Korean entrepreneur. Briefly their
findings can be summarised as follows.85 Assuming that the sample is
representative, 26 per cent of entrepreneurs come from Kyongsang—do, the
province of two successive Presidents and large numbers of civil servants.
Twenty per cent come from provinces north of the DMZ, an origin felt to be
discriminated again in higher Government service, and only 16.2 per cent from
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Seoul. Cholla—do, the populous south—western province, provided only 6.7 per
cent.86 Even amongst chaebol. heads the same provinces dominate. The
average entrepreneur thought religion whether confucianism, buddhism or
christianity irrelevant. Amongst those who profess beliefs, Confucianism,
Buddhism and Christianity were equally represented, though given the
proportions of the population stating their allegiance, Buddhists were
markedly underrepresented and Confucians overrepresented.87
There is nothing particularly surprising about the family origins of
Korean entrepreneurs. Nearly 50 per cent came from farming stock and 16 per
cent were sons of manufacturers, and another 19 per cent were sons of other
traders. However 50 per cent of younger entrepreneurs had attended Seoul
National University and another 43 per cent other Seoul universities. Amongst
older entrepreneurs the percentage was 20.7 per cent and 33.8 per cent
respectively, though 17.8 per cent had attended a Japanese university.88
Their fathers tended to have been better educated than the average, and this
should be taken to mean that they came from families which were wealthier than
average. Only 12.6 per cent had had military service despite the fact that
the majority were of military age during the Korean war.89 50 per cent were
first sons, contrary to the Korean notion that it is second sons who do best
• • 90in business.
From the same survey the average entrepreneur believes that conscientious
hardwork is the most important quality of a successful entrepreneur, followed
by rational and scientific thinking, skill in handling subordinates and
on—the—job training and experience. Willingness to take risks, greater
personal or family capital, and least of all good luck seemed the least
important characteristics, and a good network of friends, education and skill
in handling Government officials were of moderate importance. These are the
results of internal evaluation and may not be the way those outside the
privileged group of successful entrepreneurs see them.
The ranking of entrepreneurial motivation come close to those of
Government policy—makers. Community responsibility, a desire to promote South
Korea North Korea and catching up with the Japanese all rank is more
important than family responsibility (Confucian) or pursuit of wealth, fame
and power or pursuit of excellence. This survey, if valid, is a striking
- 172 -
confirmation of the degree of consensus between Government and enterprise,
which explain precisely how the two coexist so closely and harmoniously.91
6.4 The financial structure of the Republic of Korea°s
While suggesting that finding capital was not an insurmountable problem
for setting up a new enterprise, finding credit to keep the firm afloat is
certainly the major preoccupation of all companies large and small. In
seizing control of the banks in 1961 without compensation (and without
protest, as the alternative was prosecution for corruption) the Government
ensured that until a new status quo had established itself, loans were
allocated on the basis of economic priorities, not personal relationships. By
all accounts commercial banking in the l950s was the least creditable part of
enterprise. In 1960 the Special Law for dealing with Illicit Wealth
Accumulation simply defined illicit wealth as having more than in
foreign loans or more than 10 million won (100 million hwan) in domestic bank
loans.
It was fortunate that Korean entrepreneurs rated national prosperity
above wealth and power, because otherwise the prospect of the Government
seizing so much wealth without compensation would have acted as a powerful
to investment. There remains amongst small businessmen, and even
more among students and others, a strong association of great wealth with
corruption, and little sympathy for a rich man who falls foul of the
Government.
In analysing the Republic of Korea's entrepreneurial finance one is
entering the darkest area of the Korean experience. Deliberate confusion and
illiterate accountancy are the major problems. One cannot therefore be sure
that any published figures reflect the true situation. The first fear is the
tax inspector. The Corporate Tax Law gives special incentives to companies
who can convince the Government that their returns have been substantially
correct over a number of years. In 1975 there were only 282 green return
corporations out of 12,532, including 142 which were Government—owned.
Other corporations could avoid investigation by obtaining the status of
sincere return corporations. In mid—1976 there were 59 "sincere return"
corporations and 857 "semi—sincere return" corporations.
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The second problem is in accountancy. The law now requires all major
enterprise to have their annual accounts audited by a firm of foreign
accountants. Indeed in 1978 there were only 100 chartered accountants in the
whole country. One major firm reports that by Western standards even the most
advanced enterprise keep very poor accounts. If this is the situation at
the situation lower down the scale of companies is truly problematic.
Accounting ignorance is not helped by rapid inflation which makes depreciation
hard to calculate, and inflates debt—equity ratios.
Inflation appears on both sides of the balance sheet. Much of Korean
entrepreneurial behaviour can be explained in terms of inflationary
expectations. Unlike the Korean Government, the Korean business is well
adapted to inflation. With both high growth and 10 per cent inflation, loans
can easily be paid off out of new loans or profits. Historical, let alone
indexed cost accounting becomes a somewhat academic exercise for most firms
who are merely concerned about cash flows.93 As long as growth was
proceeding the appearance of a profit could be acceptable. Indeed under such
circumstances the return on the original capital would appear high. When
interest rates fell back to a very low real rate from the early l970s, then
borrowing rather than investing became attractive.
However the absence of a satisfactory capital or securities market and
the elimination of the non—urban land market for speculative capital meant
that apart from reinvesting profits, the opportunities for alternative
investment were very few. Because inflationary expectations were high, it was
difficult to retire by selling the going concern and invest money as a
pension. Where enterprises were sold, they were normally sold on a profit
sharing basis. This reduced the cost to the new purchaser, and sometimes the
old owner was continued as an advisor.
Thus as a result of inflation, businessmen were encouraged to continue in
business and encouraged to borrow and deterred from giving good accounts. The
figures about to be discussed therefore require considerable caution. Table
3.10 shows the sources of corporate funds between 1963 and 1974. It can be
seen that Government credit amounted to approximately 74.2 per cent in the
l960s (given that the Government owned all but the small commercial banks, the
special banks controlled foreign loans and nearly all the items appearing as
- 174 —
others. Equity and reinvested profits amounted to only 25.8 per cent in this
period.
Despite the impression of greater Government investment and control of
credit after 1970, between 1970 and 1974, privately generated assets rose to
39 per cent These figures only apply to incorporated enterprise, and as we
have seen these constituted only a small prportion of manufacturing firms.
Moreover these are aggregate figures for all corporations, not merely
manufacturing.
From the early 1970s under the influence of American advisors and
American trained Korean economists, great concern has been expressed about the
high debt—equity ratios of Korean companies. In fact it is probably mistaken
to compare Korean companies performance to American companies in any respect
as though American companies were the norm. As figure 3.3 shows, Korean
companies had a structure very unlike American companies, but almost exactly
like Japanese companies except for a lower disposable profit to capital ratio,
Japanese industry grew in the 1950s through the system of "overloans"
from commercial banks and loans from special banks such as the Japan
Development Bank. Such a process was not only an alternative route for
industrial growth, it is actually inimical to the growth of stock
markets.94 While no detailed study of overloaning in the Republic of Korea
has been made, there seems little doubt that the practice has been
essentially the same as in Japan.95 In both the Republic of Korea and Japan
this has proved a highly successful method of buildup industrial capacity. It
scarcely needs to be pointed out that it can only be done where the Government
gives a clear direction to the banks as to which enterprise is to be supported
(since the central bank underwrites the debt) and which not.
By the standards of United States financing, the Korean debt ratio is
appalling growing from 151.2 in 1967 to 487.9 in 1980. Banks should not after
all make unsecured loans. However, by West German standards Korean practice
96looks more acceptable, and by Japanese standards quite normal. The
profitability of Korean enterprises also looks unsafe by United States
standards. As table 3.10 shows the net profit to gross capital and to net
sales fell sharply at the end of the l960s, as a result a number of firms went
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bankrupt and the total number of manufacturing enterprises in the country
actually fell (see Table 3.5).
Accordingly the Government took strong measures, the so—called August 3
measures of 1972 which were supposed to put company finances on a more
"American" footing. This was one of the most dramatic interventions of the
Government and preceeded the even more dramatic moves of October 1972 in the
political sphere with the introduction of the Yushin system. As pointed out
in Chapter II, it appeared that the Korean miracle was running out of steam
with growth in the domestic economy flagging, which was also reflected in
falling profits since 1969.
As a response the number of enterprises began to fall as profits slumped
from an average of just under 7 per cent in the l96Os to 3.27 per cent in 1970
and only 1.18 per cent in 1971. When it is recalled that exporting firms were
still flourishing, the domestic firms must have been performing considerably
less well than the average figure suggests.
The Government's analysis was that "business firms could not slough off a
vicious circle of starting with brisk investment in facilities, going through
dependence on outside capital, high costs of borrowing, low rates of return,
inadequacy of plowed back capital, fund shortage, increased borrowings,
deterioration of the financial structure, the rise in financing costs and low
rates of return".97 The danger in this situation was a failure to reinvest
and replace under—maintained machinery.
The Government used this opportunity to attack the curb market by
freezing all curb market loans, by floating industrial securities which were
used to pay back 30 per cent of short term loans to private firms and by
founding an Industrial Rationalisation Deliberation Committee which was "to
increase productivity and to build up international competitiveness by means
of business merger, the renovation and expansion of existing facilities. Tax
concessions were given to firms which merged, to those who converted disguised
curb market loans into stocks, undertook technological research, undertook
,,98import substitution investment, and accelerated rates of depreciation
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Table 3.10 Profitability of the Korean firm 1962—1972
Trend of Busmess Firms Profits (Manufacturing Industry)
0//0
3962 3964 1966 1968 1970 1971 1972
Net Profit to Gross Capital 1) 9.09 7.48 7.78 5.33 2.49 0.89 3.44
Net profit to Net Worth 2) 23.05 15.01 16.93 16.05 10.67 4.41 14.21
Net Profit to Net Sales 3) 7.26 8.58 7.90 5.96 3.27 1.18 3.94
Payable Interest & Net Profit to -
to Gross Capital 4) 13.33 11.75 13.48 10.60 9.49 8.37 9.61
Source: The Bank of Korea
Note: I) Net profit to gross capital = net profit/gross capital
2) Net profit to net worth = net profit/net worth
3) Net profit to net worth = net profit/net sales
4) Payable interest & net profit to gross ciptal = payable interest + net profit!
gross capital
Source: EPB: Economic Survey of the Korean 1972,
Seoul, 1973, p. 178.
Source: EPB: Economic Survey of the Korean Economy, 1972,
Seoul, 1973, p. 182.
Not Profit to Gross Capitil
Gross
— 177 —
Figure 3.3 International comparisons of manufacturing firms
Net Worth Ratk
Wnrth
Surplds Ratio
Net Profit to Sa'es
Net Pretit
Corrent Ratio
* C,.reont Am.t.
C.r,aat
Rcmazics
— lnèicatorz Jor the Korean industries are
cala,Iated on the base of manufacturing as 100.
indicators for the Korean Manufacturing Industries are
on the base of Japanese manufacturing as 100.
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Table 3.11 Debt ratios ratio of interest payments to net sales
and net profit before tax by sector 1978 and 1980
Net profit Interest to net sales Debt ratio
1978 1980 1978 1980 1980 1980
Manufacturing (3) 3.9 —0.2 4.5 6.7 366.8 487.9
Food (31) 6.3 1.8 3.3 5.2 359.5 471.9
Textiles (32) 1.8 —0.8 5.5 7.0 548.6 820.1
Wood and
furniture (33) 4.0 —6.8 2.8 8.3 560.4 2051.4
Paper and
publishing (34) 2.3 0.0 4.3 6.7 330.9 382.8
Chemicals (45) 5.3 1.9 3.2 4.5 228.2 414.7
Non—metallic (36) 4—6 2—8 5.6 8.2 406.9 227.9
Basic metals (37) 5.2 —1.3 5.1 8.7 301.9 496.5
Machinery (38) 2.3 —3.4 5.3 9.2 477.7 403.0
Others (39) 1.8 1.5 3.5 5.9 408.0 310.0
Source: BOK: Financial Statements Analysis, 1979, 1980.
-The effect of all these measures is difficult to assess, given that 1973
was an unprecedented year for economic growth, which raised the average net
profit from 3.94 per cent in 1972 to 1960s levels of 7.49 per cent.
Nevertheless the net number of establishments actually fell0 Efforts to
promote the stock market at the same time led to the listing of an additional
38 companies (from 66 to 104), but this development was cut short by the
collapse of the stock market when the October 1973 oil price increases were
announced.
The measures did not permanently improve debt equity ratio, rather it
grew steadily worse. Profitability was already recovering in 1972 before the
Government took action (though this information would not be available to
policy—makers at the time), a good illustration of Government over
intervention. Table 3.12 shows the debt ratio, ratio of interest payments to
net sales and net profit before tax by sector for 1978 and 1980. As the debt
equity ratio has increased, net profit to capital offers a rate of return of
17—21 per cent. But in terms of the profit and loss statement, the net profit
is very low, even in a boom year like 1978. The profitability of the key
sectors, textiles, clothing and leather (32) and, machinery is much lower than
that of other sectors. Electronics has a per cent, but
shipbuilding experienced a pretax loss of —9.3 per cent. The debt ratio was
one of the highest at 1073, in 1978 and 10 per cent of net sales went on
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interest charges.
These profits have to be compared with those in other sectors of the
economy. Retail trade (62) had net profits of 6.4 per cent, higher than any
two digit manufacturing sector, hotels (63) 8 per cent, real estate (81) 12.3
per cent, business services (82), 10.6 per cent, motion picture production and
distribution (91) 19.5 per cent, other services (99), 13.8 per cent. If these
profits have the same level of accuracy as those of manufacturing, then a
rationally calculating entrepreneur or a commercially—oriented bank would be
directing investment into the tertiary sector. There are indications that in
recent years, entrepreneurs have done precisely this notably in the rising
share of services in GNP. The only new chaebol to emerge in the last three
years, Myongsong, has its major companies in the tertiary sector.
The Government continued to cajole companies into going public, so that
by 1978 there were 355 listed companies. Companies did so with ill grace, and
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in the case of chaebol only one or two of the sister companies were offered
for sale. As pointed out above, an active equity market implies a large
number of people with high incomes, but no wish to be active in enterprise, or
a large number of institutions building up portfolios. Neither have existed
in the Republic of Korea in the l970s. Where savings are held in an
institutional form, savers wish to have speedy access to both capital and
interest, and despite the high dividends given by listed companies, savers
have preferred banks.
This situation may change in the 1980s. If inflation stays low and
dividends high, the equity and bond market may look much more attractive.
Likewise heavy borrowing from the banks will be less attractive if real
interest rates seem permanently high. The current Government policy aims in
this direction, but it should not be concluded that more orthodox financing
will provide a similar rate of industrial investment.100
The Industrial Rationalisation Deliberation Committee turned to other
aspects of company structure, and the main beneficiaries have been the
chaebol. Indeed in accounting for the change in Government attitudes towards
industrial c6nglomerates, the sense of crisis in enterprise management between
1969 and 1973 may be the most important facet. MCI began to believe that
enterprise was less 'reliable' and capable of achieving the chosen goals
of national development which now included the creation of world league
companies which could compete with multinationals on their own terms.
This highlights one of the major problems of the Korean model at the
present stage. The Government acknowledges the importance of small and medium
enterprise, but is anxious to achieve international competitiveness which
means new investment in plants which equal the most efficient in the world,
which on the whole means very large scale enterprises. Only in this way can
Korean exports be competitive without Government subsidies and export led
growth continue. Given constraints on resources in the Korean context this
means channeling funds in the direction of already large enterprises, or
expanding the public sector. Why the former alternative was chosen when in
the l960s the latter had been pursued remains to be discussed.
The Government injected a further ingredient into this already complex
picture since it decided to give small and medium industry a role in its new
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rural development policy, the Saemaul Undong. Along with measures to build up
co—operatives and the vertical affiliation of business, it was decided that
small and medium industry should 'transfer their production base to rural
areas'. Very large amounts of money were injected into small and medium
industry with the aim of setting up Saemaul industries which would also become
101 .viable export industries. This had only limited success in this policy
with 15 per cent of Saemaul factories having suspended operations by 1980.
Theoretically the two halves of Government policy were supposed to
balance. In practice, because the support for large enterprises was working
in closer harmony with the direction the market was pushing Korean industry,
than the policy of rooting out undercapitalised small enterprise and
dispersing them into the countryside, where they were deprived of the benefits
of agglomeration, the growth of large businesses was assured. Under the
circumstances it is not perhaps surprising that in late 1972 the Korean
Chamber of Commerce and Industry found 80 per cent of big business in favour
of the August 1972 measures and subsequent measures, but only 50 per cent of
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small business.
6.5 Public enterprise
In seeking economies of scale the Government has a clear choice of policy
mix as to whether it should give equal support to public enterprise, big
business and foreign investment or whether it should intervene to sway the
balance. Given that in the Republic of Korea the Government was directing
between 60 and 70 per cent of investment, either directly or indirectly, it is
obvious that the mix of these three would reflect the aggregate of Government
decisions, though not necessarily a coherent conscious policy.
The role of public enterprise has already been discussed in Chapter II.
Here it is sufficient to note that there was not standard form for public
enterprises, consistent with the thesis that the Republic of Korea's use of
public enterprise was largely pragmatic. Seventeen in 1974 were departmental
agencies, 18 public corporations and 65 joint stock companies and eight
structure in miscellaneous ways)°3 The type of structure appears to have
had little effect on the degree of autonomy of the various types of enterprise.
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The abandonment of the policy of developing public enterprise has already
been discussed. The origins appear to be in the prejudice of the majority of
foreign consultants used by the Republic of Korea against public enterprise on
the grounds that it can never perform as efficiently as private enterprise.
Hence Jones and SaKong write defensively "we have argued that the public
sector is relatively efficient by international standards. This is
not to deny that it is often less efficient than private enterprise, leaving
aruple room for improvement through reforms of the control structure mentioned
above. Nonetheless, from the international point of view, the surprising
feature of the sector is not its inefficiency relative to the private sector,
but that the gap is as small as we believe it to be")°4 Nevertheless as
Appendix Table 5 shows public enterprises share of GNP remained constant
throughout the 1970s.
The problem lies not in public enterprise, but in the neoclassical notion
that a large private firm is solely a profit maximising enterprise. Given
that managers are usually more concerned with personal promotion prospects
than the global view of profit maximisation of the whole firm, in pragmatic
terms, there is no reason why a public enterprise cannot be as efficient as
private enterprise. In the Korean context there are two reasons why public
enterprise might be more efficient than many private enterprises. The first
is the budgeting problem. As Jones points out, General Park, President of
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) may be able to bypass the bureaucracy in
many ways, but when it comes to "minor matters (say the acquisition of a
non—budgeted truck) the signature of relatively low—ranking ministerial
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officials is required
The nature of this problem has led public enterprise to be much more cost
conscious than many private enterprises. Because of the scrutiny with which
their annual budgets are investigated they develop far more effective
accounting systems which can identify profit centres and loss—making
activities. Moreover because budgets were inevitably scaled down by
Government officials, the ability to squeeze extra profits out was highly
advantageous. Secondly given the share national goal of national development,
lower grade officials may be more scrupulous about their jobs than in private
companies where the company may be seen as alien.106
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Finally public companies were forced to think in longer terms, with more
efficient planning. Advanced market intelligence needed to be superior to
that of many companies, bargaining with suppliers for the best terms and
forward buying all marked the public company out from most Korean enterprise.
In short, the special skills which large Korean companies were only just
acquiring in the later l970s were forced on public enterprises from the
mid—1960s onwards. Foreign businessmen and commercial attachées in 1978—79
invariable singled out POSCO and KECO (the State—run electricity company) as
the most modern and efficient enterprises.
Despite the build up of private companies under the Heavy and Chemical
Industry Plan as was shown in Appendix Table 5, public enterprise retained its
share of manufacturing value—added. This achievement, in the face of a loss
favourable Government attitude, is significant since the literary evidence
suggests otherwise. In 1980 as part of the industrial reorganisation, a giant
new public enterprise, Korea Heavy Industry Co., was created to take over the
Changwon Complex from Hyundai
6.6 Foreign investment
The role of foreign investment is discussed in more detail in the
sectoral study on electronics. The full statistical picture of foreign
investment is not easy to obtain. The commonly reproduced figures give only
the number of firms authorised. However no figures are available on how many
of the 863 firms authorised between 1962 and 1979 actually arrived, and of
those how many are still active. In 1972—3, 445 Japanese firms were
authorised to make joint investments, or half the total number of foreign
enterprises authorised. However a large number of these did not complete
their investment as a result of oil crises. Further the figures are not
deflated to allow an assessment of total real investment. Even if they were,
as Cohen points out "much of the machinery used by foreign firms in the
Republic of Korea was used elsewhere before being brought to the Republic of
Korea. Its value on the book of the firm in the Republic of Korea is heavily
influenced by the tax laws of the Republic of Korea and of the country of the
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parent firm
Table 3.12 shows the distribution of companies by sector. At the end of
1978, 726 manufacturing projects had been approved. The largest sector is
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electronics, to be discussed below. Machinery and chemicals come second and
third, but the fact that there are 79 joint ventures in textiles and clothing
is more surprising. 100 of these companies were located in the two free trade
zones, Masan and lri. Of the 88 at Masan, 78 were The remaining
626 are scattered throughout the country. They ranged from very large and
known concerns such as General Motors, Dow Chemicals, Control Data, or
KOCO (Korean Government and Gulf Oil) or Honam Oil, a private joint venture
with Caltex, and Kyoung—in Energy with Union Oil, to very small joint ventures
like Spirax—Sarco and Foseco Korea Ltd which employ less than 50 employees.
The contribution of foreign firms in terms of the introduction of new
products, new managerial skills and organisation methods is a commonplace of
development literature. This process can certainly be observed in the
electronics industry, but the surveys of Cohen in the early l97Os suggest that
109the benefits of Joint ventures are far from uniform. His findings show
that the efficiency of joint ventures varies greatly, and is not necessarily
better than the best Korean practice and serve as a cautionary warning that
not all joint ventures bring benefits.
This is a warning few Koreans would need, and one of the successes of the
Korean model has been the degree to which foreign investors have been screened
bj and the degree to which Korean industry has learned from joint
ventures and then wholly owned Korean companies have surpassed them in
technology and efficiency. On paper the terms for foreign investment look
attractive in terms of provision of site and services, generous tax breaks and
procedures. Since the Republic of Korea is in competition with other
developing countries the terms must be broadly competitive with other NICs.
Unlike Singapore or Hong Kong, Korean reality has been much less
attractive. Joint ventures are regarded with suspicion in most of the lower
ranks of the bureaucracy. This is partly explained by the fact that 78 per
cent of authorised ventures are Japanese, and hostility against the former
coloniser remains strong in most sectors of Korean society. Schemes were
rigorously scrutinised during the l970s. Whereas, under the Second Plan
1966—71 foreign investment during most of the 70s it was limited to 100,000
million dollars per annum.
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Table 3.12 Foreign investment approval by industry
(As of Dec. 31. 1978)
(in Thousand US Dollars)
No. of projects Amount Composition (%)
Agri. For, and Fishery 51 14,291 1.4
Agriculture and Foresty 27 7,548 0.7
Fishery 24 6,743 0.7
Mining and Manufacturing 738 743,461 73.7
Mining 12 2,548 0.2
Manufacturing 726 740,913 73.5
Food and Beverages 10 3,135 0.3
Textile and Wearings 79 99,663 9.9
Wood Products 4 663 0.1
Chemicals 95 193,540 19.2
Medicine 10 5,049 0.5
Fertiliser 4 41,825 4.1
Petrochemicals 6 70,845 7.0
Ceramics 25 13,067 1.3
Iron and Steel, Metalics 62 48,050 4.8
Machinery and its spare parts 115 76,273 7.6
Electrical and Electronics 197 131,010 13.0
Transportation equipment 12 37,397 3.7
Others 107 20,396 2.0
Services 68 250,676 24.9
Banking 9 38,249 3.8
Construction and Services 21 34,682 3.4
Transportation and Storage 11 14,542 1.5
Hotel 27 163,203 16.2
TOTAL 857 1,008,428 100
Source; EPB, Guide to Investment in Korea, Seoul 1979, p. 113.
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Foreign companies not involved in the export zone estates were not
permitted to own more than 50 per cent of equity.11° Moreover although
unionisation was not encouraged, "foreign institution workers union" has
existed with Government blessing. By 1979 there were branches in 238 foreign
The "Provisionsi Exceptional Law concerning Labour Unions
and the Settlement of Labour Disputes in Foreign Invested Firms" of January
1970 sets out a disputes procedures which "is characterised by direct
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Government intervention through mediation and compulsory arbitration".
As opinion hardened against foreign companies, Government decisions in this
sector were far from favourable to many foreign enterprises.
Policy changed abruptly in 1980, with the declaration that even 100 per
cent equity would be permitted for new investment and most areas of the
economy would be opened. However potential investors still had to get past
MCI which remained determined to see that no investment which did not yield
the maximum benefit to the Republic of Korea was passed. Indeed in the last
three years several major investors have been given a tough time, being
treated as through they were Korean firms. Gulf Oil and Control Data withdrew
from their Korean operations, and Dow Chemical took the Government of the
Republic of Korea to court and lost its case.'14 A number of Japanese firms
withdrew for more mercenary reasons, their investments of the early l970s had
yleided the expected return and had never been intended to last more than ten
years.
The case of Dow Chemicals highlights an important facet of joint ventures
in the Republic of Korea. As part of the industrial restructuring moves from
1980 onwards Dow was ordered to merge two operations. Is a joint venture
regarded by the Government of the Republic of Korea as a Korean firm, or as a
special case? There is considerable evidence to suggest both Government and
the Korean partner regard it as a Korean operation with foreign capital. The
degree to which this is true depends on the original agreement, the number of
foreign technicians and the character of the foreign vice—president, and the
Korean partner. Relations in some Japanese joint—ventures are now so bad that
the Japanese head office will not supply the latest machines because of fear
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of competition.
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During the Fourth Five—Year Plan, the Government encouraged technology
licensing as an alternative to joint ventures. Enterprises licensing
technology have not necessarily fared better as the following quotations from
an unpublished report on the metalworking industries written in 1978 suggest.
"Some Korean manufacturers point with pride in their company catalogues to the
names of famous American and West European manufacturers with whom they have
license agreements... When I noted that they had listed several famous
American companies who are direct competitors; it was obvious that they could
not have acquired current vintage high quality products to build in the
Republic of Korea, from such dedicated competitors"; and secondly "I was
disappointed to note the number of better companies who have opted to build
'Plane Jane' industrial equipment of obsolete Japanese design. I do not
consider this to be a wise product selection".
Throughout Korean industry it has been suggested that joint ventures have
provided much better inputs than technology licensing, and if the metal
working industry is anything to go by, a great deal of investment has been
wasted on obsolete capital goods. As to enterprises the same report
criticises the poor standard of plan layout, the inefficient way in which
modern plant is operated and the fact that superannuated machinery is still
being operated without regard to the economic cost, compared with reinvesting.
Although no thorough study has ever been conducted, there are strong
qualitative indications from all quarters that this situation was common to a
large swathe of Korean firms prior to 1979. It is partly related to the
problems of poor accounting techniques and the vicious cycle of investment
referred to above. It is also a reflection of the low level of managerial
skills in the averge Korean enterprise. That Korean business continues is
therefore a reflection of low wages and very long hours by both production and
managerial staff.
Both the Korea Employers Federation and the Korea Chamber of Commerce
believe that the recession of 1979—81 has led to a marked improvement in the
management of Korean companies at all levels, with more attention being paid
to manning levels and production organisation. The consequences for labour
will be considered in the next Chapter.
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6.7 Conglomerates (cheebol)
The general view of management consultants is that the current state of
Korean enterprises is very uneven. If the average company has been described
above, there are outstandingly efficient companies both among small and medium
enterprises and especially iongst the chaebol.
The rise of the chaebol is a controversial issue, and while a matter of
great popular concern in the Republic of Korea has not been adequately
studied.116 For the present summary one is mainly dependent on the studies
by Leroy Jones and SaKong II. The problem is accurately diagnosed by Jones in
his recent paper into a left—hand and right—hand view, as to how business
concentration has come about and whether it is good or bad. The increasing
concentration has come largely:
as the result of a circular as a natural result of the economic
political—economic process in growth process itself. The rapid
which big companies get more rise in business concentration is
credit and can influence thus merely one inescapable facet
Government more. This leads of Korea's transformation from a
to resource inefficiency and primitive economic structure to one
measure to control the nega— which is modern and internationally
tive consequences of existing competitive.117
concentrations of economic
power.
Two aspects do not emerge from this summary. The first is that according
to Table 3.9 small and medium enterprises have not suffered as a result of
this concentration of power. In terms of exports, share of employment and
number of enterprises remain much the same as in 1970, while the share of
industrial output has risen from 27.5 per cent in 1970 to 32.7 per cent in
1979. Conglomerates have therefore done no more than grow with the same speed
as the rest of Korean industry. If there is increasing concentration then it
is within ownership of big business.
Secondly there can be little doubt that the switch from passive exporting
to active exporting in the 1970s favoured large companies. Concentration on
export—led growth must inevitably lead to integration with the world market.
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This can be done through the increasing penetration of a domestic industrial
structure by multinationals or by the growth of companies of sufficient scale
to sustain large numbers of branch offices, maintain plant with the economies
of scale necessary to compete with multinationals and ultimately an R and D
capacity to develop new products. It might be argued that a third strategy in
which the state performs all these functions was actually pursued successfully
in the Republic of Korea in the l960s, but since 1973 the State has formally
been retreating from such activities.
Jones points out that whereas in the Western world concentration tends to
take the form of monopoly control of a single product type, in Asia generally
whether in Hong Kong, Japan, India or Pakistan, the tendency is for "business
concentration", in which companies spread their interests across a wide range
of economic activities. The most common frame of reference is with the
Japanese zaibatsu. However it is probably more accurate to regard the Korean
chaebul as being in a class of their own. There are 46 chaebol according to
Jones and SaKong's classification. Of these 11 large enough turnovers to
be classified in Fortune's list of top 500 non—United States companies in
1980, see Table 3.13.118 In 1978 these 46 enterprises produced 43 per cent
of value added in manufacturing, 37 per cent of value added in construction
and 32 per cent in finance, insurance and real estate. The nine companies
which qualified for Fortune's list in 1978 constituted 26 per cent of all LDC
oil and non—oil firms. Five of these companies, Samsung, Lucky, Hyundae,
Daewoo and International Chemicals nearly 20 per cent of Korean
manufacturing value added. These companies produced 31.7 per cent of value
added in heavy and chemical industries and 5.7 per cent of light industries,
companies with 59.7 per cent of heavy industry for the whole group of 46 and
27 per cent of light
Until the end of the l970s all chaebol were still headed by their
original founders. They are therefore in what might be termed their immature
stage, comparable with the zaibatsu in the Meiji period. Early indicators
are that the second generation will be more "management and efficiency"
oriented and less growth—oriented. Unlike the zaibatsu, until the sale of the
commercial banks, none of the chaebol owned financial institutions except
Sainsung which owned Dongbang Life Insurance Company, one of the big five
Korean life insurance companies.
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All the companies were therefore heavily dependent on the Government
controlled banking system. This does not mean that the Government necessarily
set out to create the chaebol. MCI clearly intended to create companies which
could produce with economies of scale which would compete with the larger
competitors in the rest of the world. To do so they had to either persuade
existing entrepreneurs to invest in new industries, or allow new companies to
rise quickly. The best demonstration of the power of the Government can be
seen in the collapse of two chaebol, Yulsan and Jese.
Yulsan was founded with an initial capital of only 2,000 dollars in
1975. By 1977 it handled 165 million dollars worth of exports (1976, 42
million). By 1979 when it collapsed it had 14 companies in exporting,
construction, aluminium, shipping, engineering, electronics, foodstuffs,
construction materis etc., and a capital of $230 million. Its collapse was
not so much due to over—expansion as to a deliberate decision by the banks not
to provide further credit to overcome a liquidity crisis. The collapse of
Yulsan also brought the dismissal of the heads of four of the five commercial
banks, but it is inconceivable that the heads of four banks would all be
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susceptible to illegal actions. Jese, though smaller, was in the same
mould, collapsing for similar reasons. Both founders were in their 30s, and
much disliked by the older chaebol leaders. It is noteworthy that the one big
bank not to lend to Ulsan was that controlled by the Korea Traders
Association.
Jese and Yulsan Were the last two chaeboi to emerge in the Republic of
Korea, apart from Myongsang which has risen since 1979. Nevertheless in
theory the emergence of these three show that it is still possible for new
chaebol to come into being.The rise of Yulsanand Jese gives an indication of
the way in which the chaebol have grown. It has been noted that small and
medium industry was retaining its share of production, value added and exports
during the same period. While part of the chaebol's growth (from 32 per cent
of manufacturing value added to 49 per cent during the decade) with the resul
of new investment, this would only provide for incremental growth, the rest
came from buying up other existing large enterprises at bargain prices.
Examples taken over by Yulsan were Kyong hung fashions, founded in 1963, and
Miwon a smaller conglomerate founded in 1956.122 The chaebol became larger
by preying on other larger companies.
— 191 —
Table 3.13 Korean companies ranked in Fortune's largest
500 non—United States companies — Sales in l,000s
1979
Ranking
1978
Ranking
Company Sales
80 78 Hyundai 4,303,841
109 154 Samsung 3,409,700
— 155 Daewoo
165 199 Korea Oil 2,315,841
227 134 Lucky Group 1,760,362
258 — Hyosung 1,558,439
•321 407 POSCO 1,249,777
334 368 ICC 1,188,684
393 — Korea Explosives Group 936,000
425 484 Ssangyong Cement 869,823
432 434 Sunkyong 852,137
Source: Fortune Magazine.
*
Excluded because figures not available.
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Table 3.14 Corporate structure of Samsung in 1980
Year Company Type of Activity
Samsung Co. Ltd.
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.
Samsung Electron Devices Co. Ltd.
Samsung Corning Co. Ltd.
Samsung Electronics Parts Co. Ltd.
Korea Telecommunications Co. Ltd.
Cheil Sugar Co. Ltd.
Cheil Wool Textile Co. Ltd.
Cheil Synthetic Textiles Co. Ltd.
Chonju Paper Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Samsung Foundation of Art and Culture
Samsung Employees Aid Foundation
Samsung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.
Samsung Shipbuilding Co. Ltd.
Samsung Precision Industries Co. Ltd.
Samsung Petrochemical Co. Ltd.
Taesung Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.
Korea Engineering Co. Ltd.
1968 Samsung Construction Co. Ltd.
Joong—ang Development Co. Ltd.
Yong—in Farm Land
Trading
Electronics Industry
It
II It
I, II
_I,_ _II_
Manufacturing Industry
II II
I, II
I, II
Culture and Welfare
_,,_ _,,__
Heavy and Chemical Industry
II II
It
ti It
II II
II I,
Construction & Dev. Industry
_II_ It
_I,_ _II_
Service
I,
I,
It
II
'I
II
Industry
'I
II
I,
II
II
'I
1975
1975
1979
1973
1975
1977
1972
Hotel Shilla Co. Ltd.
Shinsegae Dept. Store Co. Ltd.
Ankuk Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.
Dongbang Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
Anyang Country Club
Dongnae Country Club
Korea General Hospital Inc.
Source: Samsung.
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The question which remains to be asked, but cannot be answered, is how
far the chaebol were assisted by banks and political influence in bringing the
older companies to the point of selling up. Many were undoubtedly less
efficiently managed. However others might have survived short—term liquidity
crises.
The sources of growth of the chaebol answer in part the question posed
earlier about the effects of business failure. Any company that failed was
likely to be taken over by a more secure company, if there was any business
prospect at all. Likewise many constituent parts of Yulsan are still trading
under their pre—Yulsan names.
Table 3.14 shows the business organisation of Samsung, once the largest
chaebol in 1975, though since overtaken by Lucky and Hyundai)23 The
founder Lee Byong—chull began in business in Daegu in 1938 in retailing, but
like most chaebol founders started in import substitution in the 1950s with
the three Cheil (first/best) companies. In the later l950s he acquired
numerous enterprises and purchased nearly half the shares in the commercial
banks at the end of the Rhee regime. He narrowly avoided prosecution and
confiscation to emerge as the business leader under the early Park regime,
being in a position to buy Seoul's second department store in 1962, Shinsegye.
To avoid prosecution he was to have built a fertiliser plant as part of
the "compensatory entrepreneurship" scheme worked out between himself as
President of the Federation of Korean Industry and the Military regime.
Although this scheme was cancelled, he built the Han Kook fertiliser company
in 1964 one of the largest enterprises of the period. When the saccharin
smuggling scandal broke in 1966 (the great corruption scandal of the l960s),
the fertiliser company was implicated and as a penance Lee donated 51 per cent
of the shares to the Government in whose hands it has remained to this day.
Samsung continued however to expand moving into electronics in 1969,
synthetic textiles in 1972, petrochemicals and heavy industry in 1974—77. The
developments of the l970s were typical of the chaebol, in which MCI and the
chaebol carved up the market for different types of equipment to allow a
duopoly structure, and then MCI arranged the credit. According to his memoirs
Lee was the most reluctant of the chaebol leaders to invest in untried fields,
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and so far his companies have avoided the forced mergers of the 1980—81 period
which began when it was realised that the scale of the market would not
support a duopoly.
The history of samsung resembles a number of other chaebol in that most
trade their origins back to the pre—Park era, and many would have been the
market leaders at a much 'earlier date but for Government constraints in the
1960s. All benefitted from the Heavy and Chemical Industrial Plan and the
decision that although the Government would directly or indirectly provide the
credit, it would not take any part of the equity of these new enterprises.
On balance the relationship between chaebol and Government has been an
uneasy one. Sometimes the Government could get its way, notably over the
creation of heavy and chemical industry, though it was not inevitable. A
dispute arose between the founder of Hyundai and his younger brother over the
project at Changwon complex to build electrical generators, boilers and other
equipment for power plants. When the founder believed it was unviable or too
capital—intensive, his brother created a new concern, based on Hyundai
International, which severed all connection with his brother. As a bonus, the
younger brother received a license from the Government to build a caprolactam
plant, a cement plant and other subsidiaries.124
Events vindicatd the older Hyundai in that in 1980, the Government seized
the Changwon Complex which was undergoing considerable teething problems,
although foreign consultants report that these had been solved, and formed a
new state company Korea Heavy Industry Corporation)25 This however was
part of an attempt to force the chaebol to adjust their position both by
Government directed mergers which the Government believed would produce larger
and more efficient companies, and to get the chaebol to deinvest. In December
1980, 26 business groups were ordered to dispose of 166 affiliated companies
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on a "self regulatory basis by 1984.
This was not only the most remarkable intervention in company affairs,
far exceeding any comparable measure during the preceeding 19 years, it was
also ill thought of. Hyundai Motor Company was ordered to merge with Saehan,
without consulting General Motors, Daewoo's partner in Saehan Motor Company,
as though General Motors would not have any opinion in the matter. Likewise
another merger brought the lawsuit by Dow Chemicals against the Korean
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Government. Many of the companies which were to be disposed of were small
companies which had voluntarily associated themselves with the chaebol in
order to get access to credit and marketing and technical information. The
end results of this measure cannot yet be evaluated, but it was a strange way
for a Government declaring itself to be withdrawing from intervention in the
economy to begin its administration.
One earlier important measure was the creation of general trading
companies in 1975. In 1975 when the need to create new markets away from the
traditional ones of Japan and the United States was most urgent, the
Government created the concept of general trading companies (or borrowed it
from Japan). These were to be companies specifically handling exports not
only of their own products but of other products, which would set up agents
throughout the world and pioneer new markets, not as KOTRA had done through
information, but by actually selling the products.
In order to do this these G.T.Cs were privileges, chiefly
the ability for branch offices to issue letters credit and credit in
advance of sales.127 These companies were intended to spearhead the
breakthrough in the Latin American and African markets. In practice they
discovered the Middle East and Europe, and took a commanding position in the
traditional markets. By 1977, the 13 Korean G.T.Cs, one of them owned by the
State, handled 24.6 per cent of Korean exports. By 1979, 12 G.T.Cs handled 35
per cent, and by 1981 over 40 per cent. When it is remembered that a sizeable
porportion of exports are handled by foreign firms, chiefly those for the
Japanese and United States markets, the true proportions of this achievement
appear.
In several respects the Korean G.T.Cs differ from the shoga shoshaof
Japan. When the s shosha were created by MITI in the l950s, the several
thousand trading companies were forced to merge to form 4Oshogashosha.
Companies were then told if they did not choose a trading company they would
be forced to become associated with one. In the Republic of Korea the normal
trading companies remained in existence, as competitors with the G.T.Cs.
Nor has the formation of G.T.Cs led to a growth of sub—contracting as it
appears to have done in Japan. If the figures reported in Table 3.15 are
correct, then there has been no increase in sub—contracting between 1967 and
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1978. This may well be correct. With access to credit, chaebol have been in
the position either to take over companies directly, or to found new ones with
more up—to—date equipment and more efficient management. Indeed there seems
to be something in the Korean character which dislikes sub—contracting,
regarding it as a loss of independence. Complaints abound of non—payment for
contracted goods and of late delivery and inferior products on the other.
Since 1980 the Government has embarked on an ambitious ten year plan to
develop small and medium industry.129 This includes reserving certain
industries purely for small and medium industries. This decision was taken
after an exhaustive analysis of Korean industry by the three digit
classification system. In addition adequate funds are to be made available,
not only by the Small and Medium Industry Bank and the Citizens National Bank,
but commercial banks are to make 35 per cent of their lending to small and
medium industries. Officials at MCI recognise that many features of the Small
and Medium Industry plan are at variance with the desire to withdraw from
direct intervention in the economy and let the market make the decisions, but
it is widely felt that this is necessary for the future of Korean economic
development.
Are the Koreans correct to be so worried about the chaebol? The need to
compete with major internationals remains, and to a considerable extent the
larger chaebol are now in a position to move Korean industry into the
forefront of current technology, indeed are already doing so in the electronic
industry. The concern is rather political. The companies are owned by single
families, increasingly intermarrying. The Korean Government for all its power
has been far from successful in persuading the chaebol to make their companies
public. As can be seen from figure 3.4 it is the older companies in the
Samsung group and the electronics group which are listed, whereas none of the
heavy and chemical companies are on the stock market.
There is only limited evidence to suggest that workers might suffer from
being employed in large company, rather than the reverse. Thus from the point
of view of employees, the encourgement of small and medium industry is not
necessarily a good thing. The reference to the importance of small and medium
industry in Japan as a yardstick for the Republic of Korea is hardly consoling
either, since in Japan, conditions of labour in small industry is far inferior
to that in large companies.
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Table 3.15 Sub—contracting in manufacturing:
the Republic of Korea and Japan
Establishment Percentage of Establishments Engaged in
Size Korea Japan
19671 19782 19661
1—3 53.6 6.0 11.5
4—9 52.3 33.9
5—9 8.3 14.9 21.2
10—19 17.9 54.8 37.5 48.4
20—29 29.8 22.8 54.5 50.1 58.9
30—49 24.7 55.6 56.5 64.0
50.99 27.4 28.4 50.9 65.6 69.3
100—199 25.1 31.0 56.6 70.0 75.8
200—299 23.7 55.5 72.4 77.6
300—499 71.3 80.3
500—999 76.2 82.3
1000+ 78.9 83.
All 18.2 18.6 53.6 22.6
Susumu Watanabe, "International Sub—contracting, Employment and Skill
Promotion", International Labour Review, C ,1972), p. 421.
2Kim Jae Won, "Capital Imports and Economic Growth", (Seoul: Korea
Development Institute draft report, June 1980), p. 33.
3Susumu Watanabe, "Sub—contracting, Industrialisation and Employment
Creation", International Labour Review, ( ,l971), p. 60.
4Caves and Uekusa, p. 112.
Source: Leroy, P. Jones: "Jae—bul and the concentration of economic
power in Korean development: Issues, evidence and alternatives", Consultant
Paper Series No. 12, KDI, 1980, p. 141.
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6.8 Business organisations
In the section on Government the role of quasi—Government organisations,
might in this section be called quasi—private organisations
The two most powerful purely private organisations are the Korea
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Korean Industry. The
dating back to the 1880s came into its present form in 1952. There
are 42 local chambers of commerce, and it is claimed that it represents over
500,000 firms in all lines of business. The 1952 law states that the KCCI is
uto develop a well coordinated commerce and industry; to protect and promote
the interests of those who are engaged in business and to strengthen
international economic relations. The FKI represents the 500 largest firms in
the Republic of Korea and puts the case of big business. Both are fully
private institutions, conducting their own policy research and capable of
speaking out against the Government policy on occasion.
Small and Medium Industry is represented by the Korean Federation of
Small Business with 16,000 member firms grouped into nearly 200 cooperatives.
KFSB has far fewer resources, located in a small buiding in a backstreet in
Seoul. It is much more closely linked to MCI with an interchange of personnel.
i'he future of Korean enterprise
Korean enterprise in the early 1980s presents a variety which is hard to
evaluate. It is universally dependent on credit, with most sectors reporting
low profits. There is a considerable potential for improved managements
accounting and cost—cutting. There is good evidence to suppose that companies
have been pursuing these lines during the recession, though smaller and less
well managed firms urgently need technical and managerial advice.
Foreign businessmen point to extremely efficient operations by any
standard in both small and medium industry and particularly in large
industry. In an increasingly complicated world, with tight markets, the
chaebol offer a great opportunity for the Republic of Korea to advance its
technology. But they also present a problem in that they may need to import
technology which reduces labour requirements rapidly leading to technological
unemployment. This is an issue to which a section of Chapter V will be
devoted. The second problem is that they are on the verge of becoming true
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multinationals. First Korean factories are being built abroad in the United
States and Portugal and Korean companies are beginning to subcontract in other
countries where labour costs are lower. They may also prefer to operate in
countries where Government intervention is less all—pervasive. Can the motive
force of the creative nationalistic desire to see the Republic of Korea
developed rather than mere profit be transmitted in such companies? And if it
can, for how long?
7. Workers and labour markets
On no issues are both Koreans and foreigners more divided than the
condition of manufacturing workers. For the conventional view of Korean
development in which labour is merely a factor of production, the Republic of
Korea's human capital is the key to the favourable conditions which permitted
successful labour—intensive export—led growth. Moreover because of the high
value placed on education "the large' investment in'human capital has yielded a
highly skilled labour force obtained without great expenditure of public
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resources
For those critics for whom the entire Korean experience has been a sham
"it is clear, however, that the sufferings of the working (and unemployed)
are mounting and that repression is increasingly necessary to contain
this discontent.'31 If the latter view did not have so much support amongst
Korean students and workers, it would be possible to dismiss it as a cry of
Marxist anguish that the world was not proceeding in a dialectical and
materialist fashion.
Particularly from the point of view of countries wishing to adopt some
part of the Korean strategy it is urgently necessary to know whether there is
any objective truth in this view, and if not, why it is so widely believed in
the Republic of Korea.
There can be little doubt that most workers have benefitted immensely
from the growth of the Korean economy since 1961. The question is whether
workers in the export sectors have been exploited, and the rest of the country
has grown rich as a result? A review of the overall statistics helps to
pinpoint the issues. Critics of the Republic of Korea tend to forget the
general context in which the Korean economy
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country whose population was rising at approaching 3 per cent annually and
although the rate of population growth has now fallen to around 1.5 per cent
1.6 per cent per annum, the supply of labour is still growing as the
children of the early sixties enter the labour market reaching 3 per cent per
annum in the 1980s. Therefore merely to contain unemployment at its existing
level, jobs have had to grow historically at about 300,000 per annum, and in
the 1980s must grow at the rate of 500,000 per annum.
As Table 3.16 shows in 1963, 16.2 per cent of the population were un—, or
underemployed. Moreover a further 20.7 per cent of the population were
unwaged family workers.133 By the end of the First Plan unemployment had
dropped only slightly to 15.3 per cent, although the economically active
population had risen by 18 per cent. In 1965 it was estimated that Seoul
unemployment still stood at 23 per cent)34 At this stage the incremental
increase in industry was still too small to have any significant effect on
unemployment. However despite the rural depression during the second plan
period, by 1971, the un— and underemployed rate had fallen to 9.2 per cent,
although the labour force had increased by 13.4 per cent.
During the Third Plan as the post—war baby boom :began to affect the
labour market, the labour force increased by 18.9 per cent, but un— and
unceremployment dropped to 5.2 per cent. Moreover the workings of the labour
market suggest that by 1976 most of those working 18 hours and less included
many who worked part—time by choice, such as housewives and students. However
the share of family workers in the labour force had actually increased, to 25
per cent, and as Table 3.17 shows, only 23.6 per cent of the labour force was
in regular employment with long term contracts.
The question therefore arises as to whether the process was "labour
absorption" rather than employment creation, with so called "spongy" sectors,
agriculture and certain services absorbing surplus labour often in the form of
unwaged family labour. In 1973 Ranis cited the Republic of Korea as an
example of a developing country in which the industrial sector had the ability
"to efficiently absorb unemployment or underemployed labour in the course of
the development process". He argued that the Republic of Korea's choice of
,, .
134
technology was "capital stretching and highly labour intensive. Neither
econometric exercises nor empirical surveys validated
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this hypothesis. Oshima's survey of Asian capital/labour coefficients showed
that the Republic of Korea differed little during the l960s from other Asian
countries, and that Thailand had a more efficient use of capital and West
Malaysia the same.135 Singapore however had a significantly higher capital
labour ratio. Were figures available for export and domestic sector labour
intensive industries, the Korean export sector would almost certainly have
more capital per capita than domestic sectors.
The export sectors certainly used labour more efficiently than the
domestic sector as the Republic of Korea developed, because the export sector
was a price taker, whereas much of domestic industry was a price giver. To
stay competitive export industries had to use labour more economically as real
wages rose, while the domestic industries could pass the price on to the
consumer, and indeed had so little access to capital that even if a
capital/labour isoquant existed, domestic industry could rarely substitute
capital for labour.136 There is considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest
that while initial exports may have been made by companies using a lot of
labour, efficient enterprises within each export sector rapidly modernised
their operations with capital available for export industries, and became less
labour intensive.
Since 1976 the maturity of the labour market has increased. By 1979, 29
per cent of the labour force were regularly employed. But 52.3% of all
economically active Koreans were still either self—employed or family
workers. Unemployment fell to 3.2 per cent in the boom year of 1978 (4.2 per
cent including underemployment), but rose slightly to 3.8 per cent (5.0 per
cent) in 1979 and to 5.2 per cent (5.7 per cent) in 1980, or in real terms
749,000 people.137 Throughout the period of rapid growth to 1978
unemployment as a percentage of the economically active population has never
reversed its fall (underemployment rose slightly in 1972 and in 1975 and 1977).
This in itself is a major achievement. Moreover the economic
participation rate has risen slightly from 55.3 per cent to 58 per cent in
1978, no mean achievement when it is considered that employment was rapidly
changing its character from a predominantly rural one, which in a country
based on peasant holdings will always produce a high participation rate, to
one in which urban dwellers predominate.138 In recent years the farm
household participation rate has been about 63 per cent of adults 14 and over,
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Table 3.16 Economically active population
-
- In thounnod
—
FopuLaUon
(%)
M years old Ecououucafly active population A U
Non-ecoaoa- Less than Labor force
and over
hours participation
Employed Unemployed population employed rate rate
— — — — — — —
1963 15 085 8 343 7 662 681 6 742 667 55.3
1964 15 5*2 8 449 1 199 650 7 osa 725 54.5
15 931 6 256 8 206 653 1 078 645 55.6
1966 16 367 9 071 8 423 648 7 296 740 55.4
1967 16 764 9 8 717 518 7 466 617 55.4 6.2'
1968 11 too s c 155 492 1 515 497 56.2 5.1
1569 17 639 S 888 9 414 474 7 751 321 56.1 4.8
1910 18 253 10 ISS 9 745 454 8 054 483 55.9 4.5IS7I 18 984 10 542 10066 416 8 442 490 55.5 4.5
1972 19 724 11 058 10 559 499 8 666 56.1 4.5
1573 20 438 11 OCO 11 139
- 461 8 838 425 56.8 4.01574 21 148 12 080 11 586 494 9 063 235 57.1 4.11915 21 833 12 340 11 830 510 5 493 299 56.5 4.11974 22 549 13 061 12 556 505 9 488 423 37.9 3.9
1977 23 336 13 440 12 SZS 511 5 896 281 51.6 3.81916 24 024 13 932 13 490 444 10092 140 58.0 3.21979 24 678 14 13 624 542 10 472 163 57.6 3.81980 25 335 14 454 13 706 749 10 881 81 57.1 3.2198' 25 969 14 110 14 048 661 11 260 56.6 4.5
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of' the Korean Economy 1982Seoul, 1983, p. 17.
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Table 3.17 Employment by classification
I
1
1
8 ,T II
8.156
9.414
9,145
10,086
Self - Employed
2.854
2 .887
3.019
3.047
3 • 158
3,216
3,284
3,331
3,440
F4mily Worker
2.395
2.523
2 ,552
2.587
2 ,480
2.508
2,544
2 ,628
2 .580
Regular Employed
942
926
1,100
1.266
1.502
1.190
2.035
2.236
2.323
Thipxaxy
493
694
682
625
815
596
622
520
517
Daily Wrker
974
870
553
918
952
I .046
1,029
1.030
1.057
1872
1 113
1 514
1 875
1978
1 @1?
1 6 TO
1919
1980
10.569
11.139
11.686
11.830
12,558
12.929
13.400
13.684
3.617
3,848
4.010
4,012
4,263
4.291
4,445
4,573
2,883
3,080
3,069
3.016
3,006
2,874
2,749
2.572
2.238
2,089
2,450
2.697
2.966
3,302
3.802
3,983
.
652
943
.045
1.074
1,086
1,030
1,033
1,111
—
1.169
1.170
1,112
1,132
1.146
1.432
1,458
1,426
Source: NOL: Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1981, Seoul 1981.
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73 per cent for males and 53 per cent for women. The non—farm household
participation rate is about 54 per cent, 74 per cent for males and 35 per cent
for women.
With 32.5 per cent of the labour force still in agriculture in 1981, the
Republic of Korea is still far from having a developed country's labour
structure, although the percentage of GNP derived from agriculture is
approaching that of several developed countries in the early 1960s. The
agricultural sector is a major factor in the fluctuations in the labour supply
noted in Chapter II. Within the agricultural sector, family labour is
responsible for most of the fluctuation as would be expected. Indeed because
of the growing labour shortages in the countryside, hired labour has declined
and more family labour used.
The degree of interaction between the agricultural sector and the rest of
the economy has been underinvestigated. The peak in non—farm household
employment in many years coincided with the peak in farm household
employment. Whereas the peak in farm households is in family labour, that in
non—farm households is in daily labour. Cases of urban workers taking
temporary agricultural jobs can certainly be found, but does this explain the
whole fluctuation in non—farm households? Self—employment and family labour
remained high in both manufacturing (still 20 per cent in 1977) and in the
service sector where the percentage of self—employed remained almost
139
constant.
If there are doubts about the rate of unemployment, and if the
participation rate fluctuates more each year than it has between 1963 and
1979, there is no doubt that there has been a change in the age composition of
the labour force out of proportion to the changing demographic structure of
the population.
Fourteen year olds have declined from 1.3 per cent of the labour force to
0.45 per cent, and 15—19 year olds from 12.9 per cent to 8.6 per cent,
reflecting a much higher proportion of adolescents at school. On the other
hand, those in the age between 20 and 24 has risen from 11.9 per cent to 12.9
per cent (14 per cent for women in 1967 to 17.9 per cent in 1980), while those
between 25 and 29 has dropped, those between 30 and 34 remained almost
constant, 35 to 49 increased slightly and those between 55 and 59 and above 60
have increased from 4.5 per cent and 5.6 per cent, reflecting larger cohorts
in these age groups.
-In general the balance has shifted slightly, but decisively towards an
older, better educated and presumably more experienced and therefore more
productive, labour force. The change appears to have been most apparent
between 1972 and 1976 when working 14—19 year olds began to fall in absolute,
as well as proportionate numbers. Whereas in 1966 54.1 per cent of primary
school graduates went on to middle school, as table 3.22 shows, by 1979, 93.4
per cent of those leaving primary school went on to middle school. Of middle
school graduates 65.7 per cent went on to high school in 1966, and 81 per cent
in 1979. Thus by 1979 a lower percentage of the age group were leaving school
at 15 than in the U.K.
As a result the Korean labour force has continued to enhance its major
characteristic, its general level of education. However it has been pointed
out by Hans Singer that while the quantity of education supplied has risen,
there has been little improvement in the quality, and in terms of class size
and pupil teacher ratios, middle schools in particular have deteriorated.
Table 3.18 gives the critical statistics. In the context of good
education, a class size of 59 is far too large at high school level, and
reinforces the traditional nature of Korean education which is learning by
rote, and actually discourages the use of initiative and creative thinking.
The type of education which Korean children receive is undoubtedly
conducive to the production of an efficient and well qualified labour force,
but it is questionable whether it is the most efficient way of producing such
docile labour force, which is generally produced by military training in about
three to six months. Nor do such conformists necessarily make good managers
or higher grade workers.
Nor do these figures reflect the strain which the necessity of financing
children through the education system places on families at the lower income
groups, since all education after primary school is fee paying. It is obvious
from estimates of the cost of education that a household with an income half
the average and two children at high school would be spending 42 per cent of
its income on education. National Korean data suggests that households are
spending more on education in the countryside, but that urban households may
not be able to afford to pay for as much education)40
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Table 3.18 Entry rates to various trends of education
62.5 6C.G
65.2 41.3
66.2 62.6
55.1 65.4 62.1.
9'i.5 65.2 6C.8
46.1 64.8 60.3
56.3 46.6 60.0
56.7
57.0 62.1 56.9
57.6 61.3 56.0
47.5 59.8 54.7
46.1 58.2 53.1
47.5
47.3 56.7 51.8
91.0 50.2
41.6 46.6
58.1 51.0 '.6.6
52.2 42.1
91.9 51.5 47.5
98.4 49.6 '.5.5
Student Entrance
/ teacher rate (%)
60.1 40.5
60.0 39.3
60.0 38.4
oC.? 34.4
01.4 41.5
70.4 59.1 31.6 51.2 264
68.2 59.6 32.2
60.0 3.4 54.0
65.1 32.2 53.5
o.7 59.6 32.4 52.4
Source: EPB: Major Statistice of the Korean Economy, 1982,
Seoul, 1983. p. 252.
Entrance
Priciary school Middle school
Student
rate (%) / class
Student
/ teacher
High school
Entrance
rate (%)
A General
Student
/ class
Student Student
)class /teacher
Student
/clasa
1962
1963
1964
1565
1966
1961
1968
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1915
1576
197?
1576
1979
1980
1981
49.9
44 • S
54.3
54.1
58.0
58.6
61.2
66.0
69.6
71.0
70.7
73.9
17.2
79.5
64.5
85.7
93.4
95.1
96.5
61.3 4i.1
60.9 41.4
61.2 41.8
62.1 42.3
*3.8 42.6
63.5 42.3
64.0 42.5
64.5 43..L
64.5 43.2
64.8 44.0
65.2 44.6
65.5 45.0
65.7 45.3
65.5 '.5.1
64.9 46.9
JC.1 60.0 52.2 254
68.6 59.4 32.3 53.3 25.3
70.1 59.4 54.6
7C.1 60.1 32.0 So.1 27.5
65.4 60.2 31.5 56.1 26.7
67.2 60.1 32.C 51.0 27.8
*8.1 60.9 31.8 51.3 28.7
67.6 60.0 3G.2 57.3
14.7 55.8 31.7 51.0 31.0
75.5 59.2 33.2 56.9 30.1
76.8 55.0 51.3 31.3
59.5 33.'. 58.5 31.5
81.0 59.8 33.6 59.1 32.0
64.5 59.9 59.6 32.6
86.5 59.6 58.4 31.5
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In terms of this burden, the proposal to provide free education to all
middle school children by 1985, and the various measures which have relieved
low income groups from education fees in the past four years have been a major
step towards equity in a country so conscious of education qualifications.141
However it may be said that the Republic of Korea has a classic case of
the diploma disease, in which education qualification has replaced
ability.142 Where the two are coterminous no harm has been done, but Korean
industry and services are full of men of talent whose promotion is blocked
because they were born too early or of too poor a family to permit further
advancement, while young men with no practical experience are pushed into high
levels of management.
It is commonplace also to find university graduates performing menial
clerical jobs which in other countries would be performed by 16 year old
girls. Koreans themselves have been forced to recognise this, and during the
recent recession many employers have begun to hire female high school
graduates for white collar jobs where previously they had employed male
college graduates. There is little doubt that employment opportunities have
replaced the Confucian desire as a major impulse to learning in many areas of
Korean life. For instance, the opening of a new factory in rural Kyonggi—do
by a major company which would only employ middle school graduates led to an
immediate increase in enrollments in the local middle school. Such
instances could be multiplied.
The rising demand for education assisted Korean development considerably
from the point of view of unemployment. Prolonged education, especially for
men, meant that the impact of the population explosion after the Korean war on
the labour market was delayed. Consequently increased employment
opportunities were available when the post—war generations reached the
employment market. However this was a once and for all shift which meant that
the supply of labour actually increased in the latter 1970s, just as the
economy was slowing down. Considerable doubt must hang over the unemployment
data for the last four years as regards young people who have never had jobs
being classed as economically inactive and not as unemployed.
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Imperfections of the labour market also mean that many well educated
people do not get a job commensurate with their educational standard, as well
as many intelligent undereducated people not getting jobs commensurate with
their talent. In 1978, 30 per cent (44.3 per cent, 1979) of high school
graduates went on to further education, 11.7 per cent (16.9 per cent, 1979)
entered employment, but 26 per cent (37.8 per cent, 1979) were unemployed (the
remaining 32 per cent's position was unknown by the school). High school
graduates from vocational high schools found employment more easily. Only
11.3 per cent went on to further education, but 71.3 per cent found employment
and only 16.5 per cent were unemployed.144
This in itself suggests that vocational training was more acceptable to
employers. Amongst high school graduates, only 25 per cent from general high
schools went into manufacturing, compared with 45.3 per cent from vocational
high schools. Of those entering industry, 79 per cent of general high school
graduates and 84 per cent of vocational high school graduates became
production workers, a position one would have thought their education made
them over qualified for.145 From the point of view of reward the most
glaring problem is that of sex differentials in which:a junior college female
graduate in production work will receive an average wage 20 per cent below
that received by a male worker with only a middle school education.
On the whole it might even be argued that there was over—investment in
more than basic education. This can be deduced from studies of estimated
rates of return to investment in education as in Table 3.19 or from a study of
wage differentials, as shown in Table 3.20 where it can be seen that
production workers wages have consistently risen faster than those of
professional, technical and managerial workers on a five yearly basis, though
in individual years the trend has been reversed.146 This suggests that it
has actually been harder to recruit unskilled workers than skilled workers.
This tends to confirm the rates of return as being much lower for education
above middle school, and certainly below the rate of return on physical
capital, or returns on education in other countries.147
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Table 3.19 Estimated rates of return
to investment in education
Kwang Suk
Kim (1968)
John Chang
Adjusted for
Chang Young
Jeong
(for
Source: Bai Moo—gi: "The Turning Point in the Korean Economy", Table A3.
(for 1967)
Unadjusted
. 1971)
Middle School 12.0 20.0
High School 9.0 11.0
College 5.0 9.5
26.5 8.2
13.5 14.6
9.5 9.3
Source; From McGinn etc. al, Education and
Table 3.20 Wage Increase Rates
Production worker
Income Distribution, p. 178
Professional, Technical
Managerial worker
1965—1970 12.8% 6.6%
1970—1974 7.1% 6.1%
1975—1979 16.8% 15.3%
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7.1 The structure of the labour market
This failure of differentials to widen in a society which places such a
high value on education requires some explanation. While in part this might
be explained by an oversupply of graduates, itself produced social values,
this does not explain why, in an economy where a surplus of labour existed at
least until 1975, production workers' wages kept pace with not only managerial
wages, but actually narrowed the differential.
One explanation may be found in the interplay between the service sector
and manufacturing and the fact that labour is a highly differentiated product
for which different demand schedules exist. For most labour intensive
industries the employers prefer a homogenous and docile labour force, best
suited to mass production. These were unmarried girls with at least middle
school education in the 16—25 age group. This is a finite cohort of less than
1.5 million.148 By 1976 the demands of the textile and electronics
industries alone accounted for two thirds of this figure, and from the early
1970s had begun to reach the effective limits of this cohort.
But this was also the type of worker required by, the service sector where
wages and higher education were less important. Although many jobs in the
service sector, while paying twice the industrial wage, were considered
degrading, for instance bus girls and bar girls, many others paid 50 per cent
149
more and were socially acceptable. This demand had social
repercussions. As Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of girls under 25 who are
unmarried is the highest in the world, followed closely by several other east
Asian countries with a similar social/industrial structure.
Girls are preferred not only because this discipline is better, but
because female production wages are on average almost exactly 50 per cent of
male wages.150 There is little evidence that women workers are less
productive than men, and it is therefore much more profitable to employ
151
women.
Bai Moo—gi's analysis of the differential movement of wages reproduced
shows that the differential between textile wages and male agricultural wages
fell while wages in traditional manufacturing (manufacturers with 5—9
employees) and womens' agricultural wages suffered from an increasing
differential.
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Figure 3.4 Percent single among women
20 to 24 years old
Region, Country
end Year
____________ ____________ _____________ ____________ _____________
AFRICA
Corneroon (1976)
Ghana (1970)
K,nya (1969) I
Morocco (1971)
Senegal (1970-71)
Tanzania (1967)
ASIA
Sanqladesh (1974)
India (1971)
indonesia (1971)
Korea, Rep. of (1975)
Malaysia (1970)
Nepal (1971) i I
PakIstan (1972) II
Sri Lanka (1971) L -
Thailand (1970) r — — I
turkey (1975)
StaiR (1970) —.
Collé (1970)
.CoIantbie (1973)
Costa (1972)
GUatiniali (1973)
a
(1970) a
0 -. ... 50 60 70
Percent -
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of Census: Illustrative
of Women in Selected Countries, Washington D.C. 1977.
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This was possible because agriculture and traditional manufacturing was
turning to less preferred labour, older married women who would previously not
have been employed. Gijsbert van Liemt traces this process of a downward
shift from the most preferred labour to less preferred labour in the fruit
processing industry)52 On the other hand other employers could still
afford to switch from male to prime female labour because of the male—female
differential. One class of employer to do this universally in the late 1960s
was the bus companies replacing bus boys with bus girls.
The same process is illustrated by the way the gap between very small
companies' wages and other textile companies widened more and more in the
1970s, while the gap between medium and large companies closed. Small
companies could no longer afford to employ prime female workers, whereas
medium companies were forced to raise their wages to keep up with larger
companies. But as long as a gap existed between large and medium companies
why did large enterprises continue to raise wages? Chiefly because wages
153
remained higher for easier work in the service sector.
These pressures forced companies to use labour more efficiently and raise
labour productivity, as had been noted earlier. They could then in turn
afford higher wages.
The above description assumes perfect market information on the part of
Korean workers. Nothing could be further from the truth, and this brings in a
secondary structure in the labour market. A survey of 2,485 workers conducted
by the Korea Employers Federation revealed that 70 per cent of workers found
their jobs through friends or relatives)54 Although a primitive public
employment service exists only about 1.1 per cent of employees in 1980 found
their jobs in this way. According to the Ministry of Labour 51 per cent of
new workers in industry found their jobs through friends.'55
Interviews of workers suggested strongly that in the case of both
migrants and Seoul residents, the choice of first job was largely haphazard,
depending on contacts and might be in manufacturing or in any part of the
service sector.157 However once established they would learn of better jobs
and move rapidly upwards, often one worker from a firm moving and then telling
his or her workmate of the new position. This upward mobility within a given
sector was confirmed by Bai Moo—ki's study of 1977.157
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It is notable that manufacturing industry has the highest labour turnover
rate of any employment group, although it must be noted from the differential
between employment and separation rate that employers use this high turnover
to adjust to business conditions. Thus if the survey is accurate in 1970, 71,
74 and 1980, workers leaving were not all replaced. Nevertheless the notion
of the manufacturing industry of a nation being run with an annual turnover of
between 52 and 72 per cent of the workforce is quite remarkable (Appendix
Table 11). Ministry of Labour figures for duration of service suggest that
the same 33 per cent of workers turn over every year and the remaining 66 per
cent are much more stable.
A second factor in high mobility is the Confucian injunction against
arguing with a superior. While attitudes may be changing slowly, they are
reinforced by the educational system, and most employees would rather leave
the company than argue. This process, which has also been observed in Hong
Kong, of arguing with one's feet causes a very high mobility)58 A major
cause is the absolute prohibition of directly asking the employer what the
wage will be before signing on. Incredible as this may be to a Westerner it
is standard practice, resulting in a high mobility after the first month's
employment. Obviously if over half the employees get their job through
friends they will already have discovered the wage being paid, though outside
well run or unionised establishments it allows employers to adjust wages
downwards if business is bad.
Given the structured wage system between firms of different sizes, why do
large companies pay more than medium sized companies? A profit maximising
management might pay no more than the marginal product of the medium sized
firm. It is important to understand that most Korean employers are also bound
by non—economic behaviour of both status and paternalism implicit in Confucian
society. Although the founder of Samsung, Lee Byong—chull is reported to have
said that no union will ever be established in one of his factories "until the
earth stops his eyes", wages paid in many Samsung enterprises are among the
best in the industry and general worker facilities are good.159 There are
considerations of prestige in wishing to appear the best employer and thus
enhance the public reputation of Samsung as well as develop a special loyalty
among Samsung employees.
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All major companies attempt to foster a corporate image with a high
degree of loyalty to the company. Executives of Samsung firms believe that
they have built up a much more stable workforce than most enterprises
particularly at the managerial level. But those interviewed emphasised that
loyalty to the immediate superior was stronger than to the company, and that
if he left the company they might well follow)60 Both the Government
though the Factory Saemaul Movement and the Korean Employers Federation have
tried to foster this paternalistic concept of the Confucian employer with
apparent success. This leads to a wide range of employee fringe benefits
which make calculation of the real wage more difficult, these include
dormitories, meals, bonuses, night classes etc. Many of these are however of
maximum benefit to unmarried employees.
The remarkable thing about the Korean system has been that according to
official figures, without the ability of labour to organise freely since the
Declaration of a State of Emergency on December 6, 1971 suspending the Labour
Dispute Adjustment Law, real wages on average have risen by about the same
level as labour productivity in electricity, gas and water. Table 3.21 shows
that decadal averages do not reflect annual growth, and wages have tended to
grow very unevenly, whereas productivity has grown smoothly. Presumably this
gives employers windfall gains at the bottom of a wage cycle, which are then
redistributed in years of fast wage growth.
This is undoubtedly the result of high labour mobility and the whole
system of labour mobility depends for its success on the coexistence of a wide
range of employment opportunities in one geographical location. Obviously
this is most true of Seoul and surrounding region, and Pusan. Only in very
large and very dense cities can the face to face job information network still
give a large enough range of options.
In smaller cities, the situation concerning employment is much less
favourable. Appendix Table 12, although at a high level of aggregation shows
that wages were 16 per cent above the national average in Seoul, and
frequently even higher in Kangwon—do (because of the concentration of miners
who are higher paid and industries employing primarily males) and lower than
the national average in every other province except Cheju—do (after 1977,
pre sumab 1 e
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Table 3.21 Productivity, money and real wages
19T5 IOU
Man uring
Nominal Wages Real Wades -
Index
Growth
Rate Index
Growth
Rate Index GrowthRate
0
I 97 1
1 9 7 2
1 97 3
1 9 7 4
1 9 7 5
1 97 6
1 9 77
1 9 7 8
1 9 7 9
T0-T9
62.0
68.0
73.9
80.4
89.6
100.5
107.5
118.7
132.9
153.9
9.7
8.7
8.8
11.4
11.6
7.5
10.4
12.0
15.8
10.6
37.3
43.3
49.3
58.2
78.7
100.0
134.7
180.2
242.1
311.4
16.1
13.9
18.1
35.2
27.1
34.7
33.8
34.4
28.6
26.6
75.9
77.7
79.3
90.6
98.6
100.0
116.8
141.9
166.6
181.2
2.4
2.1
14.2
8.8
1.4
16.8
21.5
17.4
8.7
10.2
Source: EPB: Handbook of the Korean Economy 1980, Seoul 1960
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because of the growth of tourism) and Kyongsang Namdo (between 1974 and 1978
presumably due to heavy industries predominating). However in major estate
areas such as Kumi and Pohang the growth of industry had exceeded the local
labour market, and consequently have to offer higher wages to induce workers
to come and work.'6' Among executives salaries are normally higher than for
the same job in Seoul.162
In the national wage statistics which are used to compare with
productivity and price increases one might assume a normal distribution
curve. In the absence of any evidence to suppose that the curve is skewed to
the right, then 49 per cent of workers could have failed to keep up with the
official price index. Secondly there are good reasons to suppose the curve
may be skewed to the left, with higher than average wage increases in large
and medium industries and those requiring skilled labour such as shipbuilding,
and various heavy and chemical industries where major labour shortages for
male workers began to emerge after 1976.
There are also good reasons for questioning whether the consumer price
index reflects the basket of commodities bought by workers. In 1978 both
employees and employers were convinced that inflation was actually running at
30—40 per cent and the average round of wage increases (without industrial
disputes) was 34 per cent.164
7.2 Legislation and organisation
Modern labour legislation dates from the period of the American Military
Government which introduced measures (based on those imposed on Japan) which
were in turn based on Western standards. There are four basic laws, all
enacted in 1953 based on ordinances of the American Military Government.
They may be briefly summarised as follows.
a) The Labour Standards Law which provides a bill of rights for all
workers, specifying wages, work hours, special protection for women and
minors, industrial safety and labour inspection. The degree to which these
laws are observed is perhaps best indicated by the frequent attempts in
political circles and by business organisations to modify the laws to "comply
with the actual economic conditions of the country". The impartiality of the
Government is best seen in its refusal before 1980 to modify these laws.
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b) The Labour Union Law which sets the conditions under which unions
shall operate, amended in 1974 and totally revised in 1980. The law defined
unions, gave them a measure of legal protection and gave the Government
considerable powers in policing the unions. The law requires for instance
"the union to report all official decisions of the union to the Government.
As in the case of the union constitution, also in case a decision of a labour
union violates a law of order concerning labour, or is considered likely to
harm public interests, the Government has the right to order the union to
• . • ,, 165
change its decision or make the decision null and void . The law sets
down the conditions under which collective bargaining may take place, and
offers protection to workers who cannot be dismissed for belonging to a union.
c) Labour Disputes Adjustment Law which sets out how disputes shall be
settled if collective bargaining fails. Essentially this is administered by
the Labour Committees operating at central and local levels. If a labour
dispute occurs the local committee will investigate, but either side may
appeal to the national committee. The committee consists of three labour
officials, three employers and three to five representing the public interest
who have most of the power. In the case of a dispute the Labour Committee
must rule on its legality within five days, and then a cooling off period of
20 days in which the union must take a vote of confidence while the Labour
Committee mediates. After 20 days a strike or lock out may proceed. But
party may request arbitration which prevents a strike for another 20
days. If however the industry is classed as in the public interest, the
Director General of the Office of Labour Affairs may intervene. The President
may designate any industry as vital to the public interest and under the
Yushin system all export industries were so classed. In this case Government
arbitration was compulsory. As Professor Park states "even in private
industry, therefore, the Labour Dispute Adjustment Law bars the parties
involved in the dispute from going into actual dispute actions (strike or
lockout) for nearly 100 days from the date the dispute has been verified by
the Labour Committee")66
d) The Labour Committee Law which set up the Labour Committee.
e) Other legislation, includes the Employment Security Law of 1961 which
set up an employment service and standards for recruitment and hiring. Since
1981 this has become a much more important service. The Industrial Accident
Compensation Insurance Law most recently amended in 1973 provides for
comprehensive compensation for injury in firms with more than 30 employees.
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f) New Labour Legislation of 1980—81. In 1980—81 there were major
changes in the labour laws. These were partly a response to several strikes
given great prominence in 1979—80, partly a concession to the employers'
federation who wanted the law to make some concessions to "Korean conditions",
partly a conceived necessity with the lifting of emergency decrees. Their
shape was determined largely by a group of academics trained in labour
economics in the U.S. The revised Labour Union Law prohibits individual
unions at enterprise level from entrusting the right of collective bargaining
to industrial labour organisations or other third parties. At the same time
new legislation, the Labour—Management Council Law of December 1980 ordained
that every enterprise employing more than 100 employees should have a labour
management council.
The Labour Management Councils will also be represented by a Central
Labour Management Council which "shall consist of members representing
workers, employers and the public interests. Matters necessary for
organisation and operation of the Central Committee shall be prescribed by the
Presidential Decree".167 Although in enterprises where a union branch is
organised, the union will select the worker representatives (Article 6). This
new structure is seen as a threat by the Labour Unions to undermine the entire
Union structure.
it is too early to say how the new councils will function in practice.
Government and employers appear to hope that the links between the national
union organisations and their branches will be weakened, thus creating the
Japanese situation with plant or house unions with only nominal affiliation to
national organisations. The ability of different part of the administration
to take quite opposing points of view described in the first section of this
Chapter has heightened this uncertainty. The new Ministry of Labour Affairs
(elevated to ministerial level in 1981 as a mark of how important the
Government believes labour relations to be) has repeatedly assured Labour
Unions that links between the branches and centre will not be weakened, but in
the provinces the police and other Government agencies have apparently
regarded union officers from the national organisation as "third parties"
prescribed from intervening in industrial negotiations at plant level.
Other major amendments are to the Labour Standards Law prescribing a
uniform rate of lump sum retirement allowance regardless of job type, and that
the standard work hours of 8 hours per day and 48 hours per week may be
extended by prior labour management agreement provided that the average in a
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four week period does not exceed the limit. The Labour Committee Law states
that the Ministry of Labour now has sole responsibility for operating and
appointing the members of local labour committees.
7.3 Unions
The early history of Korean trade unionism is closely linked with the
resistance movement to the Japanese. To counter the dominant left—wing
tendency of post—liberation unions a right wing confederation of workers
associations was formed in March 1946 under the title Federation of Korean
Trade Unions. The older Chun Pyong (General Council of Korean Trade Unions)
was banned by the American Military Government in March 1947. The FKTU
gradually took on a more representative role through a period of division and
fierce factional in—fighting. However from 1955, the FKTU was officially an
organ of the ruling Liberal Party. The period was marked by the growth of
small unions, so that by 1960 there were 321,097 workers in 914 unions. After
the students revolution of April 1960 a new FKTU was formed, but in May 1961
all existing parties and unions were dissolved)68
In August 1961 a new structure was created based largely on the West
German model. The major change was that the number of national unions
remained very small, 14 in 1962 and 17 after 1970. Likewise the total
membership did not surpass the level of 1960 until 1966 (see Table 3.22). By
1971 one million and ninety three thousand workers were members of unions, but
this dropped in 1980 to 948,000. In 1979, approximately 20.8 per cent of
workers in mining and manufacturing were members of unions, though this rises
to 37 per cent of employees in establishments employing more than 20 workers.
7.5 per cent of service sector workers were unionised.
The Union influence lies largely through Government uncertainty about how
workers perceive the Korean development process. While union leaders are easy
to observe and persuade or disuade and individual activists can be
blacklisted, labour unrest can errupt at any time in any plant. The chief
causes of labour unrest stem from employers' practices. Therefore most of the
Ministry of Labour's time is taken with putting pressure on employers to
behave in a way which is to lead to labour disputes. This has led
the Korea Employer's Association to see the Government as tending to side with
labour. Unions naturally see things differently since they experience
mediation in disputes which rarely meets all their claims, and continual
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interference from police and security organisations leading one distinguished
foreign labour specialist to remark that the 1980 labour legislation would be
a great advance if the Police were classed as a "third party" to a labour
dispute. However Park Young—ki points out that policy or KCIA mediation was
often preferred by both sides to the local labour committees.
In January to April 1980, 719 cases of labour disputes were recorded. Of
these 534 were caused by overdue wages, 26 by wage increase demands, 25 by
opposition to suspension or closure of plant, and 33 by problems relating to
labour unions. Some 511 cases reached the point of requests for official
intervention, though 238 of these were settled before intervention began, 69
cases were mediated by the labour committees and 190 cases remained
unsolved)70 As the Korea Annual for 1980 noted, "only half of the business
that suffered from labour disputes during the period (January to April 1980)
was known to have organised labour unions, indicating that most of the
disputes tended to erupt spontaneously rather than through any collective
171
action
Between 1975 and 1979 over 50 per cent of labour disputes resulted from
overdue wages. Uncertainty about the reliability of statistics for labour
disputes makes it difficult to detect trends. Under the Emergency Decree of
1971 the Office of Labour ceased to publish figures on labour disputes, but
continued to print the statistics of strikes prior to 1971. Since strikes
were supposed not to exist statistics could not be compiled. However as the
Chosun Ilbo noted in 1980 "In particular, the national security laws have
already been losing their effectiveness., According to these laws, the labour
unions can in no case resort to collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the
Bureau of Labour is urging collective bargaining between labour and management
and is displaying this kind of action as a fixed policy of labour
administration. Therefore it appears that the Government is itself negating
some of the effectiveness of these laws. And everywhere now workers are
banding together in sitdown strikes and using force in strikes as was done in
the Sabuk incident. These actions are taking place outside the reach of these
laws and are evidence of their (the laws) limitations".172
However, when it is remembered that many employees choose to leave a
company rather than pursue grievances, the position of labour relations
remains an area in which all sides show concern.
—be in and
the Labour Standards Law employees leaving are
entitled to separation pay amounting to a month's pay for every year worked.
However if they are dismissed for misconduct then the employer is excused from
making this payment. Hence in official statistics most of the labour turnover
is classified as dismissal for
The Sabuk incident was one of the most violent in the eruption of labour
unrest in 1980. The cause was the collusion of a labour leader with the mine
owner. The Chosun Ilbo reflected that this represented a more general decline
in the union movement "the Democratic Republican Park Government's suppression
of labour unions under its "economic—development—first programme", and its
suspension of two of the labour unions rights (collective bargaining and
collective action) on the basis of national security laws, together with its
enforcement of labour—management relations. What has happened
is that through such political and economic circumstances our present labour
unions and labour movement have not been able to avoid a decline in their
original significance and function. In such circumstances, moreover, would—be
aristocrats among the labour management have put the miscalculated and
weakened labour—union organisation to contrary uses and have patronised
industry in their quest for personal gain and luxury.. This doubt exploitation
of the workers is the exceedingly sorry state of affairs created by such
,, 174
developments
During 1980 there was a widespread purging of union leaders at national
and local level who were considered to either be in collusion with the
Government or employers. In the case of the Sabuk mine union leader, his
wages were paid by the mine owner without having to work, and the Chosun Ilbo
believed that this was common practice throughout much of Korean industry and
argued that labour leaders should either work or be supported by the
contributions of union members. The extent to which the situation has altered
under the new labour laws is unclear.
8. Employment, living standards and exports
Most important of all, and challenging the premise around which the whole
ILO study is based is the fact that of all the occupational groups, the
manufacturing average wage was consistently below the average wage for all
occupations (Table 3.23), and was the only group below the national average.
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Table 3.23 Average wage by occupation
—
AU Workers
-
Pro. Tech.
Workers
Managerial
Workers
.
CI erial
Workers Sales Workers
———————————
Services
I
Farmers
Wood-Outters
Fishery
Hunter and
Related Worker
Prod
md related
Workers
1 9 7 1
I 9 7 2
1 9 7 3
1 9 T 4
•
1 9 7 5
1976
I 9 7 7
1 9 T8
1 9 7 9
22,441
22 834
('1.8)
27 299(1'9.6)
36 034(3'2.0)
46 654
(2'9.5)
64308(3'1.8)
17,375
(20.3)
104,132
(34.6)
146,442(40.3)
40,362
44 258
51 202(1'5.1)
59 699(I'6.6)
92 400(5'4.8)
136 004((7.2)
157 230(15.6)
211 487
(3'4.5)
285 504(3'5.0)
60,192
67 755(I'i.S)
83,486
(23.2)
98,511(18.0)
159 399
(6'1.8)
220 958
254,301(16.1)
338,227
(33.0)
485 826
(43.6)
34,017
32 515
(—'4.4)
40,988(26.1)
54,095(32.0)
14 619(3'8.l)
103 668(3'8.8)
119 312(1'S-I)
142 219(l'9.2)
196 199(3'8.0)
20,242
24,113(19.1)
31,514(30.1)
34 845(i'o.o)
42,964(23.3)
62,319(21.8)
16,774(44.8)
98 375
(29.8)
119,560(21.5)
15,523
16,603(7.0)
20 517
26 343(2'8.3)
36,052(36.1)
47865(3'2.8)
57 890
71,259(33.5)
108,425
(40.3)
15,445
17 031(l'o.3)
18 517(b.1)
23 497
30(2b.1)
40 123
71 792(7'8.9)
81,972(14.2)
121 304((8.0)
11,516
18 386(5.0)
20 129(1'2.7)
28,874(31.3)
34 820(2'0.0)
46639
(3'3.9)
67 979(2'4.3)
18,434(35.3)
Ill 476(4'2.l)
Source: EPB: Handbook of the Korean Economy 1980
1983, p. 267.
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Admittedly manufacturing improved from 79.7 per cent of the national average,
to 84.9 per cent, but this was largely due to a levelling higher up.
Manufacturing workers wages remained 26 per cent below the next occupational
group in 1979, compared with 26 per cent in 1971.
How can this be explained? Largely because 40 per cent of the
manufacturing labour force are female in 1980 (44.5 per cent according to the
Ministry of Labour). Moreover in leading export products the percentage is
much higher, 68 per cent in textiles, 77 per cent in clothing, 50 per cent in
rubber shoes, 55 per cent in electronics and 55 per cent in other
manufacturing. Female production workers receiving between 50 and 70 per cent
of the wages of men performing the same job.
If equal wages had been paid for equal work, then either male wages would
have had to drop drastically, or a substantial portion of the Republic of
Korea's export industries might have ground to a halt. It is assumed that
while women earned less than their marginal product, men probably earned more
than their marginal product so that the aggregate wage bill was close to the
marginal product of all employers in those industries where women formed a
substantial part of the labour force, and not all of the benefits went to the
employer. Certainly estimates of profits in such industries do not suggest a
high profit ratio)75 In new industries where men predominated such as
shipbuilding, iron and steel, petro—chemical industries and vehicle
manufacture the high wages paid to men in textiles and electronics encouraged
a higher degree of efficiency in the use of labour, as noted in chapter II,
than might otherwise have been the case.176 Likewise the growing shortage
of young women in preferred age cohorts encourged traditional export
industries to improve their labour efficiency in the l970s.
The precise workings of the labour market and their relationship with
Korean economic development deserve closer study and international comparison
with other economies with a similar industrial structure. The disorganised
nature of the economy means that there are still many sectoral and regional
pockets of high inefficiency. There are other firms whose survival depends on
ignorant employees coming from the countryside, who will then move on after
three to six months to higher wage sectors of the same industry.
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It must be argued however that until reaching the Heavy and Chemical
stage of development, the Republic of Korea's development in as far as it has
relied on export led growth has been based not on an adequate supply of well
educated labour, but on an adequate supply of well educated young females.
However since eduation fees are identical for men and women, the rate of
return to families educating a female has been approximately half that for a
man. This going on the basis of figures in Table 3,24 is a very poor rate of
return. What it represents is a considerable transfer from poorer households
(since middle and upper class girls do not enter industry) to the nation in
general.
Now it may not be unreasonable to ask for a sacrifice on behalf of
national development by girls in the age group 16—25, but it is highly
regressive to tax poorer families who pay to educate them. An extension of
free eduation and perhaps an extension of non—pecuniary honours in recognition
of this contribution of the young female labour force seems called for.
The Republic of Korea is widely recognised as being a country in which
the distribution of income is reasonably equitably disputed. All calculations
rest on the rural income survey and the urban income and expenditure survey.
However non—farming households in the countryside, households in small towns,
single person households and the very rich and the very poor in urban areas
are excluded. As a consequence important sectors are left outside any survey
from the point of view of income. Hence from the point of view of income
distribution any estimates using the expenditure surveys will exclude segments
of the population at thei high end of the scale and lower than average)77
Careful study by Dr. Choo of KDI has produced the following estimates of
income distribution:
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Table 3.24 Income distribution
1965 1970 1975 1976 1978 1980
(i) (1) (2) (i) (3) (4)
Top 20% 41.81 41.62 47.2 45.34 46.7
Middle 40% 38.84 38.75 38.3 37.81 37.9
Bottom 40% 19.34 19.63 14.5 16.85 15.4 16.1
Source:
(1) Choo Hak—chung, Economic Growth and Income Distribution, 1978
Appendix 1;
(2) the data for 1975 is given by B. Renaud in his discussion paper
Income Size Distribution by Province and City of Korea, but were never
published;
(3) World Bank, World Development Report 1981;
(4) Fifth Five Year Economic Development Plan.
Whatever caution surrounds these figures, there is general agreement that
during the 1960s Korean income distribution remained remarkably equitable, and
indeed the share of the bottom decile increased from 1.32 to 2.13 per cent,
presumably the result of unemployed or underemployed finding full time jobs.
The 1970 result places the Republic of Korea in the category of low inequality
in the framework of the authors of Redistribution with Growth..178 Since
1970, the number of industrial workers has risen by 132 per cent, and the
economy has become much more dependent on manufactured exports, but the
country has slipped from low inequality to the bottom of the moderate
inequality category.
What are the implications of this experience for export led growth? Most
industrial workers lie within the bottom 40 per cent, and it will be noted
that the middle 40 per cent have merely held their ground, while the top 20
per cent, and in particular the top 10 per cent, the senior managers and
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owners of major enterprises who have increased their share of income.
National income accounts and the failure of wage differentials to widen
suggest that this loss of ground stems not from a failure of the labour
market, but from a marked increase in income from property, chiefly from
interest. The share of all forms of property (rents, interest and dividends)
in national income has risen from 12.7 per cent in 1975 to 18.6 per cent in
1981. That this should occur after the so—called turning point in the labour
market is disturbing.
However, the steepest rise in income from property has occurred 1979—81,
indicating that the slowdown in the economy has affected real wages more than
other incomes. Many Korean economists argue that an average growth rate of 6
per cent may be inadequate to reverse this trend without major redistributive
measures. The Fifth Plan announces policies which will raise the share of the
bottom 40 per cent to 17.5 per cent, admitting that "in spite of such
development (the relative equality of income) the Republic of Korea's
export—led, high growth development strategy of the past two decades has been
attended by acute social problems including unfair economic opportunities,
increasing inequality, income distribution, and the lack of provisions for the
basic needs of the people. They have given rise to a sense of relative
poverty among a large segment of the people and thus hindered the sustained
growth of soclo—economic development".179
The question is whether the policies announced will be adequate to alter
the distribution of income. Dwight Perkins considered "Adelman and Robinson's
study reinforces the view that the distribution of income is firmly rooted in
the structure of the economy, and its path over time depends on the
fundamental development strategy chosen by the society".. ."Only a massive
effort by the Government involving a wide variety of interventions in the
economy would be likely to move Korean society signicantly further towards
less inequality, at least in the short run".
A second measure of Korean development is presented in figure 3.5 which
shows the Engel coefficients of urban households by occupation)81 The most
notable improvement in standard of living occurred between 1965 and 1969,
before the massive growth of export employment in the early 1970s. During the
first half of the 1970s the Engel coefficient actually rose, as agricultural
terms of trade improved, representing a transfer from urban dwellers to rural
dwellers. Indeed in a recent article Choo Hakchung has argued that rural
dwellers are better off than urban dwellers (a reversal of Korean
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perception))82 Unfortunately Figure 3.6 does not extend through 1977 and
1978, but appears to suggest the beginnings of a further period of improved
standard of living for urban workers 1976—1979, which other evidence would
suggest took place.
To conclude, about 50 per cent of the labour force are not yet part of
formal labour market because they are unwaged or self—employed. Those in
regular employment at present number only 29 per cent, creating great
difficulties for the enforcement of labour standards, and for the creation of
social benefits based on employment.
The labour market operates in a peculiar way, apparently with a large
reserve of labour which is only acceptable to employers at the bottom of the
employment ladder, and with a high preference for girls between 16 and 25 in
many industries. In general labour is probably over—qualified for the tasks
it performs, though there are obvious shortages of certain skills, for
instance welders.
Most groups in society have gained greatly from the development process,
but there must remain a question mark over the condition of a large number of
households, and this is confirmed by the worsening distribution of income.
There is certainly no evidence that workers in export—oriented industries have
off than the average, and it would appear that workers in most
other occupations have gained more. One major reason for this is that exports
are dominated by world prices and the competitiveness of Korean products,
whereas most workers in the Republic of Korea are not in competitive
occupations. To some extent this imbalance may call in question the exchange
rate policies of the Government during the 1970s since it is export workers
who must suffer most if the won is
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Figure 3.5 The Engel coefficients of the urban employee households
by the occupation of household head
Daily worker
Regular worker in
non-Gov't.
Gov't. employee
Clerical worker In
non-Gov't.
Source: t?poverty in Asia I", The Philippine Economic Journal
No. 43, Vol XIX, No. 1, 1980.
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183. This was my conclusion based on feamle electronics workers wages.
However textile workers receive one of the highest wages for females.
CHAPTER IV
SECTORAL STUDIES
1. Introduction
It has been argued that there are two types of Korean export industry,
labour—intensive industries, employing predominantly women, and industries such
as iron and steel and shipbuilding where the Republic of Korea's advantage is
not so much cheap labour, indeed they may be less labour—intensive than their
longer established rivals in the West, but due to cheaper capital equipment and
modern design. The chosen sectors, textiles and electronics both belong to the
former category.
Tables 4.1. and 4.2. summarise the importance of the two chosen sectors,
textiles and electronics. Textiles which provided nearly 50 per cent of the
value of exports in the 1960s has been a relatively slow—growing industrial
sector, although the rate of increase has actually accelerated in the 1970s,
despite a shrinking share in total exports. Electronics, by contrast, despite
having represented the fastest growth rate of any industrial sector in both the
1960s and 1970s still accounted for only 13.6 per cent of exports in 1979
(about 40 per cent of the value of textile exports). Of the two sectors, a
much higher proportion of textile production is exported (about 65 per cent)
than of electronics (45 per cent). By number of projects, foreign investment
in electronics is much higher than in textiles, 197 investments against 79 in
textiles, by value the difference is much smaller, 13 per cent as against 9.9
1
per cent.
Although the literature on Korean development abounds in general surveys
of the overall process, sectoral studies in either Korean or English are
relatively rare. At the time of writing only two major studies in English are
known, Kim Yung—bong's "The Growth and Structural Change of Textile Industry",
a summary of his Korean language book The Growth and Structure of Korea's
Textile Industry, and SUh Sang—chul's "Development of a New Industry through
Exports: The Electronics Industry of Korea".
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Both industries are highly labour—intensive employing predominantly
women. In 1980, women predominated in all areas of textiles and clothing as
well as in consumer electronics as shown in Table 4.3.
Both sectors chosen are therefore unusual compared with the rest of
Korean industry in that the percentage of female workers in the rest of
manufacturing (excluding the four sectors above) is only 28 per cent.
Together by 1979 they employed 42.9 per cent of manufacturing workers, and
produced 46.8 per cent of exports. Thus they are 17 per cent more export
oriented than the aggregate of the rest of Korean industry, with a ratio of
exports to worker of 1:1.09 compared with 1:0.93 for the rest.2
Collectively the four sectors also employed 62.6 per cent of all women
employed in manufacturing and only 25.4 per cent of all men. To this extent
it may be argued that if the Republic of Korea's export industries follow its
comparative advantage, that comparative advantage lies in the employment of
women. What has proved impossible so far is to obtain some measure of the
productivity of capital in these export industries.
Table 4.3 Percentage of female workers in electronics and textiles
321 Textiles 68% (70%)
322 Clothing 77% (76%)
324 Footwear 58% (56%)
383 Electrical Machinery 55% (56%)
3831 B. Machinery 23% (23%)
3832 Cons. Electronics 65% (65%)
3833 Domestic Appliances 34% (34%)
Source: 1980 Labour Statistics Yearbook. Figures in
parenthesis come from EPB Manufacturing and Mining
Census, 1978.
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2. The textile industry
2.1 Overview
Of the two sectors studied, textiles are undoubtedly the most important.
Whereas in Singapore electronics employ about 20 per cent of manufacturing
workers, and textiles 14 per cent, by 1978, 31.3 per cent of manufacturing
workers were in textiles in the Republic of Korea, and only 7.7 per cent in
electronics.3 This is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that
since about 1970, the Government has given relatively little attention to
textiles, and that by the mid—1970s the textile sector was suffering from a
shortage of funds to modernise the industry. Although this was recognised in
1979 and further funds made available, the result is not yet apparent in the
industry.
Despite this as Table 4.1. shows, textile and garment output actually
accelerated in the 1970s compared with the l960s, though in neither case
growing as fast as the average for the whole manufacturing sector. Under
these circumstances textiles lost their position in the nationts
exports, of 49.2 per cent in 1971, falling to around one third by the end of
the decade (see Table
In as far as Korean growth was export—led growth, textiles were therefore
most important sector. Moreover it should be recognised that the textile
industry has an unusually predominant position in the Korean economy.
Table 4.4 shows international comparisons for 1968. While it is not unusual
for the value—added in textiles to be very high in less developed countries,
where it may be the only modern sector (as in Pakistan, U.A.R. and Syria in
1968) as industrialisation proceeds the share of value—added normally falls,
in rapidly growing economies at an even faster rate. Thus in Japan, the share
of the textile industry fell from 17 per cent in 1955 to 12.4 per cent in 1960
and to 11.4 per cent in In the Republic of Korea the share of
value—added stayed remarkably high from 1968 when it was 19.5 per cent to 1978
when it was 18.3 per cent.6
What has happened in the Republic of Korea has therefore been unusual.
Although the share of textiles in exports has fallen by 15 per cent over the
period 1968—1978, and output increased more slowly than the manufacturing
average, the share of total value—added has fallen by just over 1 per cent.
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Table 4,4 Shares of textile industries in the value added of
manufacturing industries of selected countries, 1968
Shares (%) Country
Over 30 United Arab Rep. (39.7) Syria (26.7) Pakistan (31.4)
20—30 Iran (24.5)* Ethiopia (28.9) Portugal (23.3)
15—20 Greece (19.9) Rep. of Korea (19.5) Nigeria (17.9)
Chile (17.8)*
*
Ceylon (17.5)* Italy (15.3)
Iceland (15.2)
10—15 Turkey (14.4) Brazil (13.8)
Yugoslavia (13.2) Peru (12.5) Spain (12.5)
Hungary (10.2)
Less than 10 New Zealand (9.4) Czechoslovakia (9.2) Switzerland (9.2)*
Netherlands (9.l)* W. Germany (9•Ø)* Australia (8.5)
United Kingdom (8.4) Japan (8.4) Finland /7.8)
Canada (7.4) U.S.A. (7.2) Norway /7.0)
Denmark (7.6)* Panama (6.2) Sweden (5.9)
Singapore (4.6) Dominican Rep. (3.9) Luxembourg (0.6)
Notes: Includes production of wearing apparel.
* indicates the share in 1967
Source: U.N., The Growth of World Industry, 1971, as quoted in Park
Chong—kee, Macroeconomic and Industrial Development in Korea,
KDI, 1980, p. 222.
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Behind this figure lies a remarkable story in increasing productivity in a
sector not receiving the full paraphenalia of Government incentives and
cajolery. The success ot the industry under such circumstances must put in
question the necessity of some of the Government's measures which call for
extreme intervention in the market.
The development of the textile industry has a long history. Traditional
textiles were cotton, silk and vegetable fibre products such as ramie produced
primarily for household consumption. There are still certain traditional
textiles produced on this basis, notably sambe which is used for winding
sheets in Korean funerals. The first modern sector factory, the Chosun
Spinning and Weaving Company was built in Pusan in 1916 by a Japanese company,
but under the stimulus of Japanese expansion in Manchuria in the l930s every
part of the textile industry expanded rapidly through investment of both
Japanese and Korean capital. By 1937, capacity exceeded domestic demand in a
number of products and textiles constituted 60 per cent of manufactured
exports. Rayon was introduced into the Republic of Korea as early as 1910 and
rapidly gained a substantial place in the Korean market.
Despite the problems of the Second World War, the independence era and
the Korean war, by 1953 output of rayon cloth was almost twice that of the
pre—war peak of 1937, although silk production remained below pre—war levels
until the l960s. In the wool sector the 10 major plants were located in the
South and suffered minimal damage. Investment through UNKRA and ICA produced
a rapid expansion of woollen and worsted textiles. By 1956, reconstruction of
the cotton industry was complete and the Government embarked on a vigorous
expansion programme.
But by 1960 the industry was suffering from serious problems.
Overcapacity was considerable and domestic demand had not grown as expected.
By August 1961, in the 15 largest cotton mills (employing 20,000 workers, or a
quarter of the industry's labour force) only 86 per cent of spindles and 56
per cent of looms were in operation. Similarly rayon and silk production had
been falling since 1958. Moreover despite overcapacity in Korean industry,
imports of textiles remained at a high level. Exports in 1963 were less than
a quarter of imports. Much of the imports were in the form of fibres, the
Republic of Korea importing 99 per cent of its cotton (largely through P.L.
480 imports), and all of its wool, synthetic and man—made fibres.7 Not
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until 1969 did the value of textile exports exceed the value of textile and
related imports.
Nor was the possibility of exporting surplus production a simple matter.
It is conventional to think of Korean exports developing in the 1960s in an
atmosphere of free trade. However, almost at once Korean textiles ran into
serious barriers to trade. These took the form of restrictive covenants on
the export of cotton textiles produced with P.L.480 cotton and quotas placed
on Korean textiles by the Kennedy Administration in 1962.8 The main
restrictive covenant was that any export earnings should be used to purchase
further United States cotton. Prospects for increasing exports were
considered extremely unlikely in
Even where restrictions did not exist, as in the case of Korean silk,
there were major problems. The first trade mission to Europe in August 1962
organised by the Korea Trade Association reported that there was a
considerable market for silk fabrics in the Vest, but only if the price could
be lowered)0 It was not therefore merely a question of attracting
businessmen's attention to export markets, it required a readjustment to
competitive markets abroad by increasing productivity, learning new management
techniques and lowering other costs involved in manufacturing. Nor did
exchange rate policies necessarily help where the raw material was imported.
industry found that the 1961 devaluation failed to make the export
market any more attractive than the domestic market (where prices could be
11
raised).
The chief development of the l960s was the rise of garment exports to a
position far beyond their place in the industry as a whole. By 1968, garments
exceeded yarn and fabric exports by 50 per cent, and soon occupied a position
a little less than two thirds. While it might be argued that much of the
output of yarn and fabrics went into exports of garments, this does not appear
to be the case. Rather imported fabrics were used for garment exports, and
this accounts for the continued high level of fabric imports which under the
Korean trade regime must be almost entirely for export.
The second trend is the decline of the cotton industry from 43.2 per cent
of value—added in the industry in 1963 to 12.2 per cent in 1978.
Correspondingly, synthetic yarns have increased their position, although
synthetic fabrics have shown much smaller gains, partly because of the
development of exports of yarns.
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Table 4.5 Imports and exports of textiles and wearing apparel
(millions of current US dollars)
Import of Textiles
and Wearing Apparel
Export
and Wea
of Textiles
ring Apparel
Year Fibres Textiles
and
Fibres
Wearing
Apparel
Total
(B)
Textiles Wearing
Apparel
Total
(D)
1962 79.1 0.2 79.3 6.6 1.1 7.8
1963 85.9 0.3 86.2 13.1 4.6 17.7
1964 52.8 72.5 0.2 72.7 26.7 6.6 33.4
1965 59.1 86.7 0.5 87.1 34.1 20.9 54.8
1966 66.6 111.7 0.5 112.2 47.3 33.4 80.7
1967 80.3 150.0 0.2 150.1 66.0 59.2 125.2
1968 90.3 193.0 0.4 193.4 81.3 112.2 193.5
1969 96.7 206.3 0.4 206.8 92.8 160.8 253.6
1970 119.8 247.6 0.5 248.1 127.3 213.6 341.1
1971 139.2 276.2 8.1 284.3 182.4 304.3 486.7
1972 131.3 288.3 18.8 307.1 239.1 442.2 681.3
:973 307.0 560.4 10.9 571.3 528.5 749.9 1,278.3
1974 271.8 578.6 5.9 584.5 569.1 957.0 1,526.0
1975 288.3 589.5 3.8 593.2 691.9 1,148.2 1,840.1
1976 339.9 679.6 9.7 689.3 964.4 1,856.0 2,820.4
1977 356.8 713.7 8.7 722.4 1,093.4 2,369.0 3,162.4
1978 407.9 815.9 13.5 829.4 1,544.4 2,580.0 4,124.4
1979 626.8 1.075.0 17.4 1092.4 1,827.9 2,870 4,697.9
1980 778.7 1.195 14.1 1209.1 2,210.0 2,949.0 5,159.0
Source; Data supplied by UNCTAD.
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Table 4.6 Changes in the value—added in textile production
Textile 1963 1966 1970 1973 1978
Cotton 23.2 11.0 5.6 7.5 7.8
Others 11.0 16.1 18.6 27.9 21.2
Fabrics
Cotton 20.1 14.3 9.4 7.9 4.4
Others 20.9 18.9 23.2 20.4 22.4
Knitted Goods and Other Textiles
Manufacturing 14.9 22.1 26.7 19.3 16.7
Wearing apparel 9.8 17.6 16.5 17.0 24.7
Note; Based on the value—added in current prices.
Source; Economic Planning Board, Report of the Interpolated Time Series Bases
on the Mining and Manufacturing Census Results, 1963—1973, Seoul
1974, 1978 data from BOK, Input Output Tables for 1978, Seoul, 1980.
The fortunes of the various branches of the textile industry, cotton,
wollen, silk, synthetic and man—made fibres, knitting and garments underline
the process of Korean development outlined in Chapter II in that domestic
demand remained the major pillar of the industry until the early 1970s,
although, of course, exports were much more dynamic in the 1960s than domestic
demand. Exports overtook domestic demand in woollen and cotton textiles in
the early 1970s, but in the case of silk, viscose and synthetic fabrics
production for export did not quite equal production for domestic consumption
by 1975. On the other hand chemical fibre production for export overtook
domestic consumption as early as 1971 despite the fact that production had
only begun in the second half of the l960s. In the case of the knitting
industry productive capacity rose from 10,000 machines in 1962 to 33,000
machines in 1970 largely through an increase in domestic demand, but the
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Table 4.7 Exports as a percentage of total output
Fibre
Spinning
Textile
Fabrics (11)
Garments
(12)
Knitted Goods
1966 9.7 14.9 18.4
1973 28.9 35.7 66. 49.7
1975 52.4 60.3
1978 15.0 32.9 60. 66.
I—0
Source: BOK 1—0 Tables: Interindustry transactions at producer prices
competitive import model.
number of machines doubled between 1970 and 1974 to serve increased exports.
By the early 1970s knitted goods accounted for 25 per cent of all textile and
clothing exports. In the case of garments, exports accounted for more than 50
per cent of production for the first time in 1973.
In theory it might be argued that the two markets were mutually
beneficial allowing both the benefits of economies of scale, or alternatively
either giving domestic or overseas consumers the benefit of lower costs. For
this to be true it would merely be necessary to show that large firms achieved
higher labour productivity than small firms. Unfortunately as surveys of
labour productivity in 1973 show, large firms were not necessarily achieving
higher labour productivity than those employing 199 and less. Indeed firms
between 200 and 499 experienced a markedly lower level of productivity)2
If this is correct then the growth of export markets often added extra
units of production rather than improving the efficiency of the industry
through economies of scale.13 From this point of view the characteristics
of Korean development which favoured the creation of large scale plants,
through selective allocation of credit and Government preference did not
always advance the efficiency of the textile industry. In fact the
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ratio of small to large industries remained constant between 1963 and 1966
with the 76 establishments employing more than 200 employees producing 52.8
per cent of output.
Large firms increased their share rapidly to 1973 when 121 firms employed
more than 500 persons, and produced 61.4 per cent of gross output. After 1973
the fact that large scale firms were not always more efficient than smaller
firms and that Government attention was diverted to other areas of industry
meant that small scale companies marginally increased their share of output by
2 per cent, although the number of finns employing more than 500 employees
increased from 121 to 200. In this increment, joint investment with Japanese
companies was a major factor (with 52 joint ventures in 1973_74).14
However, by 1978 the anticipated economies of scale were evident in terms
of labour productivity, confirming the assertion that the industry underwent a
period of major readjustment in the 1970s increasing productivity and
percentage of value—added at an impressive rate.'5 Before attempting to
assess how this was achieved, it is necessary to give a brief outline of the
development of various sectors within the industry. In doing so it is
important to note that the nature of the manufacturing census, on which such a
study is partly based, forces distortions since the Korea Standard Industrial
Classification tries to separate spinning and weaving and dyeing operations
which are integrated in large enterprises)6
2.2 The cotton industry
As noted above the cotton industry accounted for 43 per cent of
value—added in 1963, but failed to grow at a rate comparable to other sectors,
so that by 1966 its share had fallen to 25 per cent. The 15 large companies
which were the Cotton Spinners and Weavers Association, one of the most
powerful industrial organisations in the Republic of Korea at the beginning of
the 1960s, either diversified, or suffered from the relative decline of the
industry. By 1980, only four of the original 15 companies survived under
their own names and the total number of companies within the association had
only risen to 21.17
The production statistics for cotton yarn and cloth show a five—fold
increase in yarn and a three—fold increase in cloth output since 1966, and the
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relative importance of the export market. Domestic consumption has failed to
grow largely because of a switch to synthetic fabrics which were unavailable
in the mid—1960s. What such figures cannot show is the steady increase, in
the quality of the cotton yarn and textiles produced (reflecting increasing
skill and value). In 1961, the type of fabric exported was made with 12 or 13
ply yarn (mainly for upholstery). The count has grown steadily finer,
reaching an average of 25.98 in 1975 and 26.57 in 1978.
Manufacturers have therefore differentiated their product even in what
might appear to be a relatively unsophisticated product, and exports of coarse
cloths have almost disappeared. Moreover since the Republic of Korea has
become a major producer of synthetic fibres, mixed textiles have grown
rapidly, with synthetic fibres accounting for almost one quarter of raw
materials by 1979, compared with only about 5 per cent in 1971.
Cotton and mixed fibres are an important input into the garment industry,
both knitted and otherwise. Moreover the share has been increasing despite
the world trend towards synthetic fibres. In 1971, cotton products
constituted 16.4 per cent of textile exports, and in 1979 24 per cent. Of
these about half is exported directly, and half used in garments. To some
extent this is misleading since about 50 per cent of the materials included in
this calculation by Korean figures are 35/65 cotton/polyesters of which of
course only 35 per cent is cotton. To the extent that about 40 per cent of
all cotton textile exports fall into this category it is a measure of how far
the industry has changed in character from the one that existed in the early
1960s.
Koreans attribute the increase in yarn exports in the face of the various
non—tariff barriers to the decline in spinning capacity in advanced countries,
most notably Japan where the number of spindles has dropped by 27 per cent.
By comparison, in the Republic of Korea the number of spindles increased from
1.9 million to 2.8 million, between 1975 and 1979. Of non—garment cotton
exports almost 50 per cent go to Japan and Hongkong.
Thus contradiction of the spinning industry in Japan and in other
advanced countries has assisted the Korean industry, and despite non—tariff
barriers to trade, exports have increased. The Republic of Korea's ability to
continue this growth depends chiefly on the ability to continue to
— 254 -
differentiate the product, on holding down the price of the finished product,
and the level of demand in advanced countries.
The price of the finished product is particularly difficult for the
Republic of Korea in view of a higher rate of inflation than most
competitors. Any compensating devaluation also raises the price of cotton
imported from the United States. Despite determined Government efforts to
encourage Korean farmers to grow cotton in the 1960s there has never been a
serious chance that the Republic of Korea, with its severe shortage of
agricultural land, could compete with the United States Mixing domestically
produced synthetic fibres offers a better course.
The chief option is to increase productivity per employee, although
labour costs are less than 14 per cent of manufacturing costs. This is mainly
because wages are rising throughout industry and hence labour costs as a
percentage of manufacturing costs are increasing, in the case of cotton
spinning from 10.34 to 12.76 between 1977 and 1978 and cotton fabrics from
12.08 to 14.63. The incentive to increase labour productivity is therefore
high and there has been a three—fold increase in productivity per eight—hour
shift over the past decade, with a climb in recent years of over 5 per cent
per annum.
Despite this the cotton industry is on the margin of unprofitability. On
aggregate the spinning industry made a serious loss in 1977 and total revenues
exceeded total expenses by only 0.2 per cent in 1978. The weaving industry on
the same criteria made a 1.1 per cent profit in 1977 and 3.7 per cent in
1978.19 These figures suggest that with a normal distribution curve a
number of enterprises must be headed for liquidation.20 Concern about this
within the Government has led to a new emphasis on modernisation of facilities
but the incentive to invest is severely dampened by the limited prospects of
high profitability. The whole aim may also be frustrated by the Government's
desire to promote domestic textile machinery which in the past has been of a
slightly obsolete character made under license from a Western company.
Textile companies resist as best they can, which means that small companies
must buy Korean and large companies can import.21
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2.3 wool textiles
If productivity has risen in the cotton sector, it has risen much faster
in the woollen and worsted industry. It is of course a much smaller sector
than cotton, but productivity rose by 434 per cent between 1970 and 1978, a
growth rate which far surpassed the rate of growth of fixed assets per
employee.
In the last decade no new establishments for worsted production have been
opened, and only 16 in woollens. At the same time spindles have increased by
119.6 per cent and weaving facilities by 44 per cent. As in the case of the
cotton industry just over 50 per cent of the value of exports is used to make
garments, blankets and towelling, and just under half exported as yarn or
fabric. This is a remarkable achievement for an industry which until 1970 was
selling more than two—thirds of its product on the domestic market.
The surge came in the period 1971—73 and was closely associated with an
increase in production of acrylics. By 1979 only 36 per cent of production
was consumed locally. By 1972 synthetic yarn already constituted 75 per cent
of yarns produced by the industry (by weight) rising to 87 per cent in 1975.
Since that date there has been a steady rise in woollen yarns so that
synthetic yarns are back to 75 per cent. The tripling of production of
woollen yarn is largely a response to the garment industry moving up market
into pure wool products. A sizeable proportion of the demand for these
products is, however, in the domestic market.
The spinning side of the industry is only marginally more profitable than
cotton with only 1 per cent more revenues than expenses in 1978. Fabrics
were, however, more profitable with a 4.6 per cent margin over total expenses,
slightly higher than the average for all manufacturers.
2.4 Silk
The most traditional of the Korean industries is the silk industry. Silk
is the textile that has the strongest backward linkages with the rest of the
economy. Raw silk was the third most important export in 1961 and still the
sixth in 1971, a measure of the growth of silk production. In 1960, about a
quarter of all textile establishments and textile employees worked in the silk
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industry. Silk yarns' share of value-added rose from 3.1 per cent to 6 per
cent, but the share of fabrics declined rapidly to 1.6 per cent in 1973. By
1978, only 2-3 per cent of textile workers were in the silk industry.
The dualism within the sector is striking. Vincent Brandt's thumbnail
sketch of a "handwoven-silk factory" of 1976 shows how conservative small
industry can be.22 After initial problems with quality control in using
older silk weavers who had never experienced consumer demand for perfect
cloth, the factory progressed satisfactorily, except that one large Korean
filature dominated the industry and was able to export all its yarn to Japan,
(hence the discrepancy between value-added in yarn and fabric).
The owner, Mr. Ham was referred to as "the reluctant entrepreneur" in
that even when markets were guaranteed he refused to expand his business. It
would seem that there is little accident that he can only survive in the silk
industry. The general impression is that there has been limited change in this
section of the textile industry. Kangwha eup still clacks with the sound of
silk looms as described by the guide books of the 1960s.
At the modern end of the industry is Dong A Silk Company founded in 1953
and employing perhaps 10 per cent of all silk industry workers. A well run
integrated plant in Seoul, and two in the countryside, though using second
hand machinery imported from Japan "about ten years ago" which was probably
originally made in the 1930s, as well as more modern Japanese and Korean
machinery, it has adjusted smoothly to changing markets, from selling about 80
per cent to Japan in 1970 to 50 per cent in 1981, turning from Japanese style
fabrics to silk ties, scarves and other silk garments. Only about 20 per cent
of the firms' products are sold domestically.
The Japanese market is subject to quota restrictions which may well
preserve less efficient Korean firms in business, since the quotas are handed
down on a firm basis. One interesting feature of the silk industry is the
survival of weaving shibori (Japanese obi) in certain rural high schools for
sale in Japanese department stores. Using minimal costs for labour, pupils
earn enough to pay for their maintenance and to pay school fees.
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2.5 Chemical and synthetic fibres
Although viscose (rayon) has been used in the Republic of Korea since
1910, the first chemical fibre plant to be opened in the Republic of Korea was
the Michin Chemical Fibre Co. plant with a capacity for 2 tons per day of
P.V.A. line synthetic fibres in 1966. This was of course on a minute scale
compared with the 30 tons per day considered to be the minimum economic scale
of production in 1979. Indeed a major problem for the Korean textile industry
has been the price of domestically produced fibres.
A central part of the first Five—Year Plan was the construction of a
rayon (viscose) plant which was completed in 1966 (Heung Nam Synthetic Fiber
Company — capacity 15 tons per day). This was a public enterprise controlled
through an indirect majority with the Korea Development Bank acting as
stockholder. Heung Nam was sold in 1972. Nylon was first produced in 1963 by
the Tong Yang Nylon Co. (2.5 tons per day), polypropylene in 1966 by Nichin
Synthetic Fiber Co. (0.72 tons per day), and acrylic in 1968 by Han—Il
Synthetic Fiber Co. (25 tons per day). Polyester was also first produced in
1968 by a much larger plant owned by Dae Han Synthetic Fiber Co. (60 tons per
day) and acetate by Sun Kyung Chemicals.
Prior to 1968 most of the raw materials for these plants had to be
imported from Japan. The creation of a refining and petrochemical industry
was a major part of the second plan and the ratio of imports to total demand
fell from 83.8 per cent in 1967 to 35.1 per cent in 1972 and 9.1 per cent in
1979. Production of chemical fibres, however, failed to keep pace with rising
demand in the textile industry until 1974, the first year in which total
imports fell.
Figure 4.1 shows the development of output, imports and exports. This is
a variant on the famous "Gankoo—Keitai" (flying geese) pattern of product
development identified by Kaname Akamatsu.23 What is interesting in the
Korean context is the early shape of the curves. Whereas in Akamatsu's theory
sufficient imports of a commodity provoke domestic production, in the Republic
of Korea imports of chemical fibres were negligible until domestic production
began. This was the result of the absence of an industry using such fibres
until the deliberate creation of one largely through Government planning. The
second unusual feature is that the domestic production is more expensive than
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the imported product and exports could only take place under subsidised
24
conditions. Imports continue of those products for which domestic demand
is small: cupra, special filament and wig modacrylic. Viscose S.F. imports
were replaced by the Wonjin Rayon Co.'s new plant in 1976.
The major problem for the industry is the price of Korean made raw
materials which remain higher than world prices because of the small scale of
production facilities. The average Korean chemical fibre plant has a capacity
of 55.5 tons per day, with acrylic plants producing an average of 173 tons,
but polyester producing only 48 tons per day.(See Fig. 4.2)
The size of plant poses an interesting problem for countries following a
Korean style strategy. Korea was anxious to accelerate industrial development
and to reduce foreign exchange pressures. However, the scale of domestic and
projected export requirements was too small to permit large plants to be built
and operated immediately. Should the early plants have been build at all ?
Throughout the 1960s a continual debate about new industries and the scale of
new plants persisted. POSCO Iron and Steel Plant was finally constructed on a
scale twice as large as originally envisaged. But in the case of the chemical
fibre plants, although foreign loans were involved, there seems to have been
only limited pressure to increase the scale of each investment.
Nor was economic success guaranteed. Neither Michin, nor Heung Nam were
in existence as companies by 1980.25 What appears to have been a failure in
planning is that too many plants were built. By 1980 there were 11 polyester
plants and 6 nylon plants, compared with 22 and 11 for the whole of Japan and
5 and 6 for the United Kingdom Since scale is important, then a reduction
in the number of plants would have been desirable. But a further problem is
the scale of Korean refineries which make oil downstream products expensive,
so that the raw material is more expensive than for the Republic of Korea' s
competitors.
One reason for the large number of polyester plants seems to have been a
desire by the textile giants not to be dependent on a rival for supplies. As
it was in 1968 the operation ratio of the chemical fibre plants was only 47.7
per cent and rose to 99.1 per cent in 1973. By 1978 they were operating at
above their rated capacity, 126.7 per cent and 120.5 per cent in 1979.27 At
this rate man—made fibres were the most profitable of any spinning sector with
a 5 per cent margin above total expenses, although the weaving sector was
slightly less profitable than for woollen fabrics.28
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Figure 4.1
Growth pattern of chemical fibre production
Notes: Export indicates
between domestic
supply for export.
net amount of export, that is the difference
production and consumption. Export includes local
Sources: Korea Federation of Textile Textile Yearbook, 1976;
Korea Federation of Textile Textile Industry
Statistics, 1976;
Korea Chemical Fiber Association, The Chemical Fiber, Various
sources.
As quoted in Park Chong—ki, Macroeconomic and Industrial
Development in Korea, p. 225.
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Figure 4.2
Economies of Scale in chemical fiber production
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Source; The Synthetic Textile Industry in Japan.
As quoted in KDI, Long Term Prospect for Economic and
Social Development,, p. 286.
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2.6 Garments
DcGpite its the garment industry has been much less
intensively studied than the rest of the textile industry. Yet garments
constitute about 2/3 of textile and garment exports by value29 Table 4.7
shows that by 1975 50 per cent of non—knitted clothing and 60 per cent of
knitted wear produced in the Republic of Korea was exported. It should be
remembered that these figures are by value at producers' prices and not a
reflection of consumer spending.3°
Figures for early clothing exports suggest that until 1965 there was a
typical hunt for "winners", with small quantities being exported in all
directions. This process was much more difficult in the case of garments than
yarn and fabrics since clothes are dependent on fashion, style, average size
of the consumer etc. in the importing country. The early winner was in the
form of undergarments, principally to Japan and through Hongkong. In this
process, the role of Japanese and Hongkong trading companies was extremely
important, although the early establishment of trading offices in Japan by a
number of Korean companies showed signs of Korean initiative.3'
By 1967 knitwear and underwear constituted 68 per cent of clothing
exports. The demonstration effect now a rapid increase in garment
factories operating on the largest scale. In 1966 there was only one factory
employing more than 500 workers, and 14 employing more than 200. By 1968
there were nine with more than 500 and 28 with more than 200. By 1973 there
were 36 employing more than 500 and by 1978, 81. (See Appendix Table 13).
The initial increase came from large companies usually already engaged in
textiles seeking rapid profits which could be reinvested in other enterprises
(in 1978 depreciation to total expenses in garments was less than 1 per
cent). These were joined by joint ventures with Japanese companies supplying
the Japanese market (legal from 1966) after 1969. Noreover American buying
offices of wholesalers and retailers dealing in garments were established in
increasing numbers in the later l960s.32
The entry of large enterprises led to the rapid development of a dual
structure, very large factories aimed at overseas markets and small firms
catering for the domestic market and occasionally handling subcontracts for
large companies. In many cases the large enterprises used fabrics imported
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from abroad. By 1968—69, approximately 50 per cent of clothing exports were
performed under bonded processing, but the steady improvement in the quality
of the rest of the textile industry and the growth of clothing exporters which
produce their own fabrics (or fabric producers which own their own clothing
manufacturers — a common historical route) this percentage had been reduced to
under 4 per cent by 1979. No more striking testimony to the rapid maturity of
the Korean industry can be given and also an important ingredient in the
ability of the Korean textile and clothing industry to maintain its overall
share in total value—added.
A typical case may well be "S" Trading Company. The President had close
associations with a Japanese Trading Company while Managing Director of the
State—owned Hankuk Raw Silk Co. under the new export incentives of 1959 set up
a trading company listed in 1963 as exporting red beans, rice and cuttlefish
and importing yarns, chemicals and textile machinery.33 Trial ventures in
shirts led to major contracts with a United States/importer/retailer arranged
by the Japanese trading company which supplied the fabric for these shirts.
In the initial stages "S" subcontracted work firms providing
Japanese machinery, finance and technicians to assure quality control. In
1970 "Sn formed a joint venture with his Japanese trading partner and a
Japanese fabric manufacturer to produce higher quality clothing including
ski—jackets and raincoats to United States merchandisers. In 1972 and in 1974
further joint ventures with Japanese firms were formed, one aimed at underwear
for the United States, and the other to Kagen Shirts, a Japanese brand name
retailed through the Seiju Department Store Chain.
A United States branch was opened in 1971 which handled imports and
sought orders. This subsidiary also urged diversification into electronics,
notably watches and "8" Electronics was set up in 1976 with overseas offices
in the Netherlands and then other European countries. Although the President
has also been President of the Korea Garments Exporters Association since
1971, the philosophy has been to use funds from clothing for more slowly
ripening investments, although in 1977 he acquired a Pusan women's wear
factory which he has headed ever since. In 1978 taking advantage of the
construction boom he created a construction company. The company now employs
at least 7,000 workers in clothing.34 Only in 1977 did the company begin to
sell on the open market.
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The dichotomy between large enterprises producing solely for the export
market, and smaller firms producing solely for the home market is bridged by
firms like "S" which are now taking an interest in the local market, and large
concerns like Bando Sangsa (since 1974 part of the Lucky/Goldstar Group) and
to a smaller extent Cheil Moojik (part of Samsung) both of which have operated
retail chain for a long while. A great deal depends on the orientation of the
group. Lucky has always had a strong interest in the local market, until 1978
producing the only toothpaste on the Korean market, and with a chain of
concessionary shops selling only Bando clothes (or Goldstar electronics).
Likewise since the purchase of Shinsegye Department store in 1962, Samsung has
had an interest in the Korean market. On the other hand another conglomerate
which owns the largest producer of dress shirts in the Republic of Korea (and
possibly in the Far East) with a capacity of 500,000 dozen shirts per month
does not sell on the local market at all, and the whole production process
including teams of agents in the United States is geared to export sales. In
building up operations this group has bought up other established companies in
its expansion.
Although no figures are available there appears to have been a steady
concentration of ownership in the past ten years. It can be seen from
Appendix Table 13 that the number of small firms: (under 20 employees)
iucreased until 1968 and then contracted steadily. Between 1968 and 1973
large establishments' share of output increased rapidly, but since 1973
although the number of establishments employing more than 500 employees has
grown by more than 2 1/2 times, this has no more than matched production
increases. The major gain has been by medium sized establishments. But
because no figures for ownership are available, the ownership of these medium
sized establishments cannot be established.
In the knitwear industry, the number of establishments employing more
than 500 has actually shrunk by four and the average size of large firm shrunk
from 933 employees to 881. By contrast small firms under 19 have actually
increased, despite an increase in the percentage of production being exported.
This is taken to be indicative of the problems of the knitwear industry
which in Korean thinking has completed its cycle and is now doomed to
decline. In certain lines exports began to decline from the peak of 1973,
although in total exports recovered in 1976. The largest expansion has been
in the original "winner", hosiery and gloves.
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The garment industry has been badly affected by quotas. In 1919, sixteen
countries, including the United States, E.E.C., Canada and Australia were
restricting imports. This has almost certainly been responsible for the loss
of four large factories and the shrinkage of employees in the largest category
(see Appendix Table 13). Indeed whereas the garment industry grew rapidly
with long production runs in large plants, the future is likely to be geared
towards shorter runs of higher quality goods.35. In particular there seem
to have been a collapse in the knitted outwear sector (32133), the number of
large factories declining from 22 to 11, and an expansion in underwear and
hosiery.
The Japanese market, without formal quotas on a number of items has
remained a major market, although here the Republic of Korea remains a
supplier of the bottom of the market. As Ron Dore points out, the
"administrative guidance" method of dealing with unwanted imports has been
least effective at the bottom end of the Japanese market.36
Nevertheless the knitwear industry's troubles are well illustrated by the
fact that the sector saw a fall in assets at a time when the textile industry
was still investing, and productivity has risen slowly than
elsewhere. Employment began to fall in 1977 as the future of the industry lay
in increasing productivity rather than increasing productive capacity. Older
macrunes, such as flat knitting machines and tricot and rashell warp knitting
machines have fallen steeply in numbers. Like other parts of the textile
industry there has been a steady switch from natural fibres to domestically
produced chemical fibres. While this has increased the quality of the
product, it has also increased the problems of competition since the Korean
raw materials have higher than world prices.
Consequently knitwear has fallen in importance from 45 per cent of
garment exports in 1969 to 28 per cent in 1978. The decline has favoured
smaller knit firms dealing in a higher class of product on shorter runs, but
illustrates one of the problems of the Korean strategy. During the l960s and
l970s, Korea developed a special strength in large runs of cheap quality
products. This permitted the employment of low skilled labour who required
very limited on—the—job training, and limited middle management, since workers
could be relied upon to continue to do the same job methodically without
questioning it (observers have noted that Korean workers will continue to
perform a task exactly as instructed even if it is manifestly incorrect).
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Supervision can be left to a minimum, and inefficient use of labour is
compensated by low wages and economies of scale.
Shorter runs require more skilled labour and more supervision. They also
require more market awareness, possibly more sophisticated machines, and a
different class of imports, or aggressive marketing in the importing
country.37 Up to this point, garment manufacturers had led a very simple
life. The requirements were specified by the purchasers (or, in the case of
Japan, sister companies). The wages paid were at the bottom of the market
(over 10 per cent lower than other textile workers), while the hours worked
per month were longer, 235 in 1979 compared with 227 in textiles
(manufacturing average 225.7), and very little capital was required to set up
a business. (See Table 4.8.).
It is popularly believed that garment factories were set up by large
conglomerates in order to generate cash quickly, which could be invested
elsewhere. Likewise in recent years promising managers have been transferred
to other parts of the conglomerates.
One spin off from the importance of the Korean garment industry in
attracting foreign purchasers has been the rise of leather and imitation
leather garments whose share of garment exports has risen from 3.1 per cent in
1972 to 18.1 per cent in 1978. To some degree this has been the result of
quota problems leading to diversification, although Korean leatherware now
faces restrictions in all four of its major market areas.
Textile manufacturers are reluctant to quantify the effects of quotas.
They specify the major result has been a rise in unit price because the full
economies of scale cannot be utilised in many areas. A guess estimate of a 20
per cent increase in the price to Western consumers is quoted. Labour is more
conscious of the effect on employment. The effect on labour is two—fold,
firstly total employment decreases and secondly the conditions of employees
deteriorate as they are asked to accept lower pay increases and, where
appropriate, work longer hours.
Those trade unionists in Western countries who complain about unfair
competition from low wage countries should remember that the first effect of
quotas is to reduce the standard of living of those working in the industries
affected.
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3. Conditions of labour and labour organisation
The National Textile Workers Union has for most of the period under
consideration been the largest union in the country, though in 1980 it was
marginally overtaken by the Chemical Workers Union. It is regarded by the
Korea Employers Association, the Korea Federation of the Textile Industry and
others as a strong union, despite the fact that 80 per cent of its members are
women and only 27 per cent of workers in the industry according to the
Ministry of Labour figures are members. Moreover, certain leading
enterprises, most publically Samsung, refuse toperinit unionisation in their
establishments
38
In what way can it be considered strong? It cannot bring the whole
industry to a halt through a strike, nor can it achieve the wage claim it
makes. Its strength lies only within certain parameters and presumably in
comparison with other Korean unions. Undoubtedly the most important parameter
is the large number of competing employers within the textile industry. After
labour militancy in the mid—1960s, in 1967 the union won the right to
negotiate nationally with the National Spinners' Association for minimum
wages, but reserved the right for local further the interests of
their members as the maximum.
Only one other Korean union had this system of bargaining, the National
Bank and Financial Workers' Union, where the room to manoeuvre was limited by
the tight control the Government had over the banks. As in other unions the
attempt of the Government to take over the leadership of the union was evident
(in 1980 the head of the Textile Workers Union was one of the first to be
dismissed by the union members) but because of the strength of the branches
and the number of women officials in the union, conventional pressures were
much less effective.
The major struggle in recent years has been to unionise the very small
firms in the garment industry centering around the so—called Peace Market in
Seoul, tlsweat shops" producing low priced garments for the domestic market.
The effort began in the early 1970s led by Chon Tae—il who despairing of this
struggle burnt himself publically to death in 1972. This formed the basis of
the present drive under the figurehead of his mother (known simply as
Mochin—Mother). Strikes are most commonly to be encountered in this
district. The major problem is that the workers are new recruits to industry
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and union activists remain outside the firms (any found within are normally
fired). Under the new Labour Laws of 1980 this type of union activity became
illegal (all unionisation must come from within the firm) an example of an
area where the new law has seriously impeded any efforts by workers to improve
their conditions through collective action.
It is important to keep this in perspective, for critics of South Korea
often confuse the blatant exploitation of workers producing for the domestic
market, with those for export production.39 In general, export workers
enjoy much more favourable conditions in the large firms made possible by
export orders (though some doubts surround those in the Masan Export Zone).
The question therefore arises, given that in many areas large enterprises have
surplus capacity which could sell superior items at comparable prices on the
domestic market, why does the Peace Market and other such small—scale
enterprises still exist? The answer is complicated. Two mains reasons
appear to be important. One is the complex regulations which govern
industries producing for export, which would lead to excessive interference if
such firms also sold on the domestic market. Secondly, the fact that those
firms which do market domestically can, by limiting the quantity sold, achieve
much higher prices. Shirts sold in Bando retail stores may sell at 4 times
the export price. Consequently these firms leave gap in the market
for lower priced, lower quality, products, produced cheaply not through
economies of scale and efficient use of labour, but by sweated labour using
new recruits to industry.
Table 4.8 gives official figures for the average number of hours worked
and wages in the industry over the past ten years. There are problems in
comparisons between manufacturing as a whole and textiles because of the high
percentage of women employed. On average wages in textiles were 80 per cent
of the national average, and since 1972 the number of hours worked per month
has been 1—2 hours longer than average. The wages in the garment industry
averages 70 per cent or less of the manufacturing average and the number of
hours worked except in 1975 have exceeded the manufacturing average by 10 or
40
more hours in most years.
More important perhaps than wages is the problem of occupational
diseases. The MOL suggests an average of 362 deaths and 9,500 physical
disabiities per annun in the whole manufacturing sector. A survey conducted
by the Korea Trade Union Federation concentrated on hearing loss in textile
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factories. This suggested that hearing loss was experienced by nearly 24 per
cent of workers working for 5—10 years in the textile industry, and by 14.1
per cent of workers with one to five years of work. The survey showed that
manufacturers normally provided ear plugs in textile companies but workers did
not wear them (a common problem in promoting industrial safety in the Republic
of Korea) but that garment manufacturers did not even provide ear plugs. The
noise levels in both industries were at a level where hearing loss could be
experienced if sustained for nine hours at a time.41
it is commonly observed that Koreans are n,t "noise conscious" and are
therefore unaware of hearing loss dangers. It would appear that more
positive measures need to be taken in this respect.
4. The Government and the textile industry
In the early l960s the Government was faced, particularly in the cotton
industry with an exceptionally strong organisation, the Spinners and Weavers
Association. Their position was strengthened by the importance of P.L.480
negotiations for cotton imports. Thus unusually in the Republic of Korea,
the Government found itself in a situation with an industrial organisation
stronger and more knowledgeable than itself.
The situation changed by the mid—1960s with the rise of other sectors
within textiles, the need for Government finance and support for chemical
fibre plants and the general strengthening of the Government's position. In
1967 as part of the consolidation, an overlord quasi—agency was created,
KOFOTI (Korea Federation of Textile Industry) which would organise the 18
sectoral associations such as the Spinners and Weavers Association, the Korea
Worsted Spinners and Weavers Association, the Korea Clothing Industry
Cooperative, and the Korea Garment Manufacturers Association.
This was to liaise with the Textile Bureau of MCI and an exceptional
committee set up under the Law on Interim Measures on Textile Industry and
Facilities of March 1967 (amended in December 1975). This law set up a
deliberative committee with representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the
Korea Development Bank the Korea Medium and Small Industry Bank and the
Foreign Exchange Bank. The latter was to ensure a smooth flow of loans to
manufacturers to improve their equipment (a major aim of the law which
permitted the Government to loan or subsidise "a part of the capital needed to
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replace obsolete or worn facilities"). KOFOTI was later given the major part
in negotiating and policing both MFA and bilateral textile quotas.
The measure creating KOFOTI was the major intervention of the Government
to develop the industry, followed by similar measures the following year to
promote the electronics industry. The Goverment was claiming by 1968 that
the move to build large plants, noted above, was inspired by these measures.
Most businessmen comment on the ease with which funds were available at this
time.
By 1976 the textile industry was given a much lower priority under the
Fourth Plan, the main emphasis being on increasing chemical fibre production,
replacing old and obsolete equipment and developing design capabilities and
dyeing techniques along with active sales promotion. MCI attempted to link
this to the growth of a domestic textile machinery industry. This seems to
be universally regarded with suspicion inside the industry. The pressure to
replace older foreign machinery with domestic machinery was intense, but the
general report until very recently has not been favourable to Korean machinery.
In general wherever the owner was closely supervising his factory or
where large companies were involved the pressure In one thread
company domestic machines were acquired on trial butpromptly sent back.
KOTOFI reports considerable resistance. In 1979 a further Law for the
Modernisation of the Textile Industry was enacted whch was to further assist
in the modernisation of the industry with funds which had not previously been
made available except to buy domestic machinery.
Although the tenor of recent documents about the textile industry has
implied that the textile industry has been deprived of funds, a survey of
banking data suggests that the textile sector has received a proportional
share of all loans from commercial banks and only in terms of loans directed
through KDB has it fallen behind. This appears to be the result of the
importance of mandatory credit to holders of L/Cs and other export oriented
initiatives. For instance in 1976, the textile industry obtained a share of
loans and discounts approximately comparable to its share of industrial value
added, but a much lower proportion of these funds was for equipment, 15.7 per
cent, compared with 23.8 per cent for the machinery sector. The large
disparity, however, was in funds from the Korea Development Bank which was
being used to build up the machinery sector. At the same time, even the
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Korea Development Bank was lending to the textile industry. By 1978 the
textile industry received just the same percentage of total loans and
discounts to manufacturing, but only 13.2 per cent went on equipment, compared
with 27.2 per cent to machinery.
5. The future of the textile industry
In 1980 exports of textiles dropped to 31 per cent of total manufactured
exports, but provisional figures for 1981 suggested a recovery to the level of
1979 of 33 per cent. This compares with the Fourth Five—Year Plan projection
of only 23.4 per cent for 1981. During 1978 and 1979 the textile industry
suffered severely from the overvalued won. Not only were Korean textiles
more expensive than their competitors products, but the delivery price was
unstable due to rapid inflation. Importers seemed tolerant of slightly
higher prices, their competitions reflecting the institutional costs of
finding a new supplier in another country, but unwilling to handle increasing
prices from delivery to delivery.
Despite this, the textile industry had performed much better than
predicted, (and heavy and chemical industry rather worse). There had been a
tendency for Government circles to write off textile industry too early,
and recognising this, a "Law for the Modernisation of the Textile Industry"
was passed in December 1979, recognising KOFOTI to be the statutory entity for
carrying out the modernisation of the Korean textile industry. Thus in the
textile industry, unlike the electronics industry as will be seen, the
quasi—Goverment agency appears to be strengthening its position. This may
well be a reflection of the much larger number of firms involved in textiles
compared with electronics. It is also the result of external inf,luences such
as MFA negotiations which demand a cooperative approach which only KOFOTI can
offer.
Current projections suggest that textile exports will fall to 24 per cent
by 1986. This may well be correct. Much depends on the bilateral MFA
agreements, but there is no sign that the world textile market will grow less
restrictive, nor that there will be a major surge of world demand for
textiles. World over—capacity is likely to keep profit margins very low.
The Republic of Korea' s textiles are having to adjust to new LDC entrants to
textile exporting at the bottom end of the market, and having to increase the
quality of the product in terms of technique, style and diversity.
— 272 —
There is still room for increases in value—added through higher value
items and domestic raw materials replacing imported ones. To a large extent
this rests on an increase in the expertise in the dyeing and finishing
industry where many smaller plants still have serious problems in maintaining
consistent quality. As far as styling goes, the Republic of Korea has been
licensing items at the very top of the market, like Pierre Cardin, Christian
Dior and other names which are more likely to appeal to the conspicuous
consumption oriented upper classes of the Republic of Korea than the overseas
customer of the Republic of Korea goods. There are good designs in the
Republic of Korea but they are produced by small workshops for domestic
retailers rather than for export. They would sell well in Western boutiques
and high Street retailers, but exporters are either dependent on importer
dictated styles or concepts of what Westerners wear based on Paris fashion
shows.
Medium size plants appear to have grown past the management barrier of
the early 1970s and the plants themselves seem in good shape. Visitors
familiar with conditions inside United Kingdom textile factories say that
Korean conditions of such enterprises as Dong A cleaner, quieter and
with less obvious hazards. DongA1s main problem is in finding customers,
waiting for importers to come to them, rather than exploring new markets.
One might suppose that the diversity of interests beyond textiles may also
management. Like "S", DongA has diversified over the years, with its
own trading company, a wool textile company, a silk filature company, an
industrial gases plant, a window glass plant, a development company, a
shopping centre and a high school.
This diversification must have implications for the future of the textile
industry as a whole. Whereas once profits may have flowed from textiles to
other investments, it is doubtful if this continues, rather other enterprises
may be subsidising textiles, at least in paying for certain overheads. What
effect this has on entrepreneurial psychology is unclear. Will entrepreneurs
prefer to maintain their "empire" or readily liquidate less profitable
concerns?
These factors will shape the future of the Korean textile industry. In
theory the Republic of Korea must now be entering the stage where the textile
industries'share of value—added declines as It did in Japan during the 1960s
until it finds a new level (in Japan's case around 9 per cent). Whether this
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happens rapidly or slowly depends on the factors mentioned above. In either
case there are not likely to be very extensive increases in employment, all
the pressures being towards a smaller and more skilled workforce. However, a
rapid rundown could increase unemployment.
6. electronics industry
6.1 Overview of the industry's development
- The electronics industry is commonly stated to have begun with the Gold
Star radio factory completed at Pusan in 1959. However, the electrical
industry has a long pre—history dating back to 1918. In the 1930s,
Korea Was exporting light bulbs ona large scafe and during the
dispersion of Japanese industry in the 1940s substantial investments were
made. Most of these investments decayed under the United States Military
Government and the chronic power shortages after the supply of electricity was
cut off by the North Koreans in 1948. Only in 1961 did the transformer
production exceed the level of 1944. By 1962 domestic production of many
items approached domestic demand.
The Goldstar factory was the largest emplojer within the electrical
industry, doubling its employees to 1,600 in 1962, and likewise its production
radio sets. In a typical Korean fashion the imports of small radios were
banned in December 1960 to protect the domestic market, and two more
transistor plants were set up in 1961—62, Taiyand and Samyand. Both were set
up under the technical guidance of Japanese companies (Matsushita and Sanyo)
although relations with Japan were not yet normalised and joint ventures not
legally possible. By mid—1962 Goldstar had fixed up a contract to export
5,000 transistors with a New York mail order contract firm which was to be
concluded as soon as the firm could find out how much export subsidy it could
43
obtain from the Government and could thus fix an export price. Two
hundred samples were also sent to Hongkong to interested importers. There it
was reported that the korean production costs were "much higher" than in
Hongkong. Wages were at about the same rate, but productivity lower,
unskilled management practices, higher interest rates and costs for
electricity and transport.44
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These early export experiences illustrate something of the export fever
in the Republic of Korea in 1962, the necessity of export subsidies and to
exporting at a loss to establish markets.
Nevertheless the major initial impulse was to substitute domestic
products for imports to serve the local market. The Republic of Korea was
described in 1962 as a broadcast rich nation with seven networks operating
from the capita. In the same year domestic production of "luxury" radios was
judged sufficient to ban imports.
Exports of radios reached their peak in 1966, not to be surpassed until
1969. This was presumably due to changes in demand in their major market,
the United States. However, the attractiveness of the Republic of Korea as
an off—shore assembly base was apparent from 1966 onwards. A succession of
United States firms such as Motorola, Signetics (1966) Fairchild Semiconductor
and Control Data, (1967) was followed by a series of joint ventures between
Japanese firms and Korean operations.45 The best indication of the
importance of foreign enterprise in this sector is the percentage of bonded
processing of total electronics exports in 1970 which amounted to 80.8 per
cent compared with 18.2 per cent for Korean exports as a whole.46
Table 4.9 illustrates the change in the balance of the industry. In
1968 foreign firms were responsible for 71 per cent of exports and local firms
for 21 per cent. By 1972 joint ventures were in operation which produced 18
per cent of exports, while the share of wholly foreign owned companies had
fallen to 55 per cent and wholly Korean firms share had risen to 27 per
cent. Between 1972 and 1975 all three types expanded rapidly, but the most
rapid were joint ventures which reached 23 per cent of exports. By this date
there were 190 foreign companies and joint ventures authorised to operate in
the Republic of Korea, 26 United States, 5 from other countries and 159 from
47
Japan.
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After 1975 the most significant feature of the industry has been the rise
of Korean firms in the export business so that by 1980 they were handling 48
per cent of electronics exports. Exports constituted 33.9 per cent of
production in 1968 and reached a peak of 72.9 per cent in 1976. The rise of
a mass domestic market for a sophisticated range of electronics inside the
Republic of Korea thereafter and to a certain extent trade barriers, led to a
steady fall to 59.9 per cent in 1978 and 56.2 per cent in 1979. The deep
domestic depresssion in 1980, however, pushed the share of exports up to 70
per cent of a reduced output.48
This role for the domestic market, summarised in table 4.10, illustrates
the thesis that, even in the most export oriented of the Republic of Korea's
industries, the long—term role of exports can be overstated. During the
early 1979s their importance was paramount, but since 1976, until the current
recession, the domestic market was showing every sign of being an icreasingly
important force. Unlike textiles, the Government has taken a strong lead
since the introduction in 1969 of the Electronics Industry Promotion Law which
recognised electronics as a "strategic export industry" with its own eight
year development plan.
Table 4.10 Production Share of Domestic and Overseas Markets
for Electronics
Overseas Domestic
1968 33.9 66.1
1972 49.9 50.1
1975 67.6 32.4
1976 72.9 27.1
1977 62.0 38
1978 59.9 40.1
1979 56.2 43.8
1980 70.2 29.8
Source: Electronics Industry Association of Korea.
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6.2 Industrial structure
Table 4.1 shows the development of the electronics industry within the
context of the electrical industry. Whereas in 1960 the textile and clothing
industry already had over 4,100 enterprises and 96,000 workers, the entire
electrical industry had only 129 with 4,458 workers. By 1970 the electronics
industry alone had 142 companies and 475 by 1976. The growth of large
companies has been particularly dramatic, from eight with more than 500
employees in 1970 to 72 by 1978, with a corresponding growth of employees in
such establishments from 9,631 to 108,955 in less than ten years.
Despite the Government's efforts to promote other sections of the
electrical industry, the other sectors (electrical machinery and domestic
appliances) have made no such strides. In 1980 77 per cent of establishments
with over 500 employees and 78 per cent workers in classification 383 work in
3832, electronics. However, the number of establishments in branch 3832 is
only 48.8 per cent of the total in 383. In other words the average
electronics establishment has 242 employees whereas the average establishment
in the rest of the electrical industry had only 95.5. Both are larger than
the average in textiles (87) and garments (72) but this is largely a
reflection of the dualistic structure of the textile and garment industry and
the fact that there is a much higher entry cost terms of capital investment
in the electrical industry than in textiles.49
Appendix Figure 15 shows that in 1973 the electronics industry was
experiencing similar production problems as the textile industries in that
medium sized firms of 50—200 employees were getting no benefits from economies
of scale compared with small or very large companies. However, unlike
textiles these problems persisted into 1978 with companies in the 400—500
category achieving half the value—added of those over 500, and 25 per cent
less than those below. In addition to managerial problems must be added the
explanation that many plants were running at well below capacity. The
average operation ratio was 55.2 per cent, as Table 4.10 shows.
One can hardly expect employment in an industry to grow by 919 per cent
in less than ten years and make the jump from simple assembly of imported
components to the manufacture of complete electronic items without
considerable managerial problems. The Korean miracle consists to a large
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Table 4.11 Production capacity of major products
(in million dollars, °7o)
-
1974 1978
Production Production Operation Production Production Operation
Capacity Ratio Capacity Ratio
Consumer Electronics 530.1 258.5 48.8 1,948.3 936.2 48.1
Radios 124.9 61.3 49.1 170.7 61.2 35.8
B/WTV 159.6 104.3 65.4 380.0 292.9 77.1
Color TV 13.7 5.2 37.7 188.2 85.4 45.4
Cassette Tape Recorders 95.4 43.9 46.0 144.7 82.8 57.2
CarStereos 15.2 3.9 25.5 82.8 31.6 38.1
- Phonographs 14.7 7.4 50.2 33.5 25.7 76.7
Amplifiers 71.2 27.6 38.8 393.7 106.2 30.0
Industrial Equipment 178.1 76.5 42.9 364.6 210.2 57.7
Telephones 11.6 6.5 56.2 55.2 18.6 33.6
Telephone Exchanges 49.3 21.3 43.3 87.6 53.4 60.9
Calculators 45.3 20.8 45.8 54.4 34.7 63.9
Parts and Components 711.9 478.6 67.2 1,800.0 1,124.8 62.5
ElectronicTubes 55.8 29.0 51.9 92.5 77.9 84.2
SemiconductorDevices 167.8 114.2 68.1 226.9 136.2 60.0
IC - 162.4 158.7
13.7
97.7 259.0 235.8 91.1
Musical Equipment Parts 29.1 47.1 98.5 88.1 89.4
Equipment Parts 25.7 16.8 65.5 95.4 59.8 62.7
- iota! - 1,420.1 813.6 57.3 4,113.0 2,271.1 55.2
Source; The Electronic Industries Association of Korea.
As quoted in Korea Development Bank:
Industry in Korea 1980, p. 96.
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extent of precisely the ability to achieve this sort of development with a
minimum of mistakes.
Although the textile and garment industry received large inputs of
technology and managerial skill from foreign companies, and a considerable
amount of foreign investment (99.7 million dollars for textiles as against 131
million dollars in electronics) there is a sense in which the textile industry
can be considered to be basically developed by domestic energies.5° In the
case of electronics the role of foreign investment was central. What is
unique in the case of the Republic of Korea is that the past tense is
necessary. In less than ten years the dependence on foreign investment and
joint ventures has dropped away from an almost total reliance. Foreign
investors are now scared of high labour costs, and withdrawing from basic
cheap labour sub—assembly jobs, especially from the export processing zone at
Masan where numerous factories were standing empty by 1980. The future of
the electronics industry therefore lies in the hands of domestic companies.
In understanding this process it is important to remember that several
Korean firms, notably Goldstar, were already significant manufacturers for the
domestic market from the early 1960s. Further, local companies never lost
control of the growing domestic markets. Goldstar, part of the Lucky Group,
is now one of the three largest electronics manufacturers.51
Already in 1974 domestic investment was beginning to rise, and when
investment resumed after the oil crisis, domestic firms emerged as the
dominant investors.52 This would not have been possible given the
Government control of credit without strong Government support (as will be
seen in the next section).
The process by which production and investment shifted from foreign to
domestic firms is most complete in consumer electronics and least complete in
the manufacture of parts and components. Further the Korean industry is only
just beginning the third stage of maturity as exaniplified in the schema of
4.12.
Table 4.12 Development of the electronics industry
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Assembly Direct Foreign Domestic Mastery Producing at the
for Local Investment of Existing Processes Frontiers of
Market Technology Licensing •Existing Technology
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At stage 1 the level of technology is relatively unimportant, since the
domestic market is protected. However in the case of the Republic of Korea,
through agreements with Japanese companies, the technology even at this stage
was good enough to allow limited exports. The transition from the second to
third stage was greatly facilitated by the transfer of skilled local staff
from foreign firms run in United States or Japanese style to domestic firms.
From interviews it seems that most production executives commenced work for
foreign firms and then turned to domestic firms bringing with them their
53
technical skills.
The following stage, which the most advanced domestic firms, notably
Goldstar and Samsung, are entering is to produce new products. Samsung is
completing work on a VTR which will make the Republic of Korea the fourth
nation in the world to produce video recorders. Samsung has produced
videotape; Samsung, Goldstar and Korea Electronics are all beginning wafer
production which will give the domestic parts and components manufacturers a
much larger share of production (and cut down imports).
The problems at stage 3 cannot all be solved way. Advanced
countries have often been reluctant to give Korean company licensing
agreements. The problems of controling joint ventures was raised above.
The promotional literature states "in principle up to 50 percent foreign
investment will be allowed ... local partners must hold more than 50
percent of the total shares in the following types of projects:
1) purely labour—intensive;
2) purely bonded processing;
3) dependent on domestic resources for major raw materials;
4) oriented towards local market sales".54 -
At least in electronics companies local plant managers appear to exercise
complete control by the 1980s, clearly a great deal depends on the nature of
the enterprise and the initial bargaining about employment of foreigners. In
the electronic components firms the tendency has been for the Vice—President
to be a foreigner, but for no other foreigners to be employed once the process
is set up. In Korea Electronics, a joint venture with Toshiba, Japanese
set up the factory with production lines "just like Toshiba's factory", and
handled the export of production into Japan, but appear not to interfere in
the running thereafter as long as the product is supplied at the right price.
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Nor apparently can they control the export of parts in competition to the
parent company. In the Korea Electronics' case the control has been
exercised by refusing to sell more machines to increase semi—automated
production line capacity. As a result Swiss machines have been imported, but
have proved not to provide the level of accuracy. In Goldstar, however,
where the output is consumed largely in the rest of the group and the joint
venture is with Western Electric there seems to be no problem about obtaining
machinery, United States machine producers being happy to sell their machines
55
with the aid of United States Exim bank.
Although thernachines are available, the local staff have trouble getting
the right level of skill in operation to obtain a satisfactory rejection
rate. The present level of rejection is unacceptably high and probably
requires closer supervision from trained Western engineers to help the
existing staff reach the right process. Viewing various joint ventures there
seems little doubt that these are essentially Korean firms assisted with
Western capital, technology and then running themselves.
Apart from technology, the major problem is the question of scale of
investment. As table 4.11 showed, with the exception of IC, Musical
Equipment Parts, Electronic Tubes, B/W Tvs and Phonographs, all of the
industry was running far below capacity. In other words there had been
over—investment and a misjudging of the market. Although difficult to
quantify quotas and non—tariff barriers can only be responsible to a limited
extent since only a limited number of products have been affected in a limited
number of markets, notably the United States quota on colour televisions
introduced at the end of 1978, just when the colour television industry in the
Republic of Korea was getting into its stride. This was already only
functioning at 45 per cent of capacity, and fell to 30 per cent. It should
be noted that this was largely because of the refusal of the Government to
permit the sale of colour televisions on the domestic market, one of the more
revealing conflicts within Government policy and illustrating some of the
contradictory thoughts about the domestic market.
If the problem displayed in Appendix Figure 15 were the result of
overcapacity, then the reason why this did not affect firms over 500 needs to
be explained. A suggested partial explanation is that established companies
were reluctant to shed labour, and that medium sized companies were top heavy
with office staff, all suggesting serious organisational problems with a
shortage of experienced executives at the managerial level.
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A further feature of the electronic industry is that domestic value—added
in the electronics industry had shown no signs of increasing since 1973. In
other words, despite the increase in the share of domestic firms and expansion
of the parts and components industry, this process had not increased the share
of value—added. Although the profits might now remain in the Republic of
Korea, the domestic firms contributed no more to total value—added in the
manufacturing sector than foreign firms.
From this point of view the appearance of a transition to stage 3 and 4
is partly illusory. As Table 4.13 shows the industry is still heavily
dependent on imported components, notably for sophisticated processes such as
coloured televisions. The development of domestic technology and production
of such items is a task for the l980s and Korean firms were claiming to have
solved the colour tube problem. But in developing such techniques Korean
companies are always likely to find that they cannot match the scale of
Japanese or United States producers who have much larger domestic markets.
Thus, as In the textile industry, it may turn out that value—added can only be
increased at a higher unit cost than importing the original component.
7. The Government and the electronics industry
In 1960 the Government adopted the electronics industry as a strategic
export industry and enacted the Electronics Industry Promotion Act formulating
policy measures for government assistance which included protective measures
for the industry.57 The most important measure was the creation of an
eight—year electronics development plan (a considerably more detailed measure
than for the textile industry where the flow of funds was the main purpose)
and the creation of an agency which would promote the industry, including
organising the Korea Electronic Show, held for the first time in 1970. This
agency was named somewhat misleadingly, the Fine Instruments Centre. In 1979
the centre was absorbed in the Electronics Association to form the Electronic
Industries Association of Korea which has taken over all its former functions.
The FIC was therefore the quasi governmental agency which would be
responsible for implementing Government policy. From the start overseas
offices were located in New York, Tokyo, Bonn and San Francisco under the
KOTRAKTA umbrella with the major purpose of attracting foreign investors.
The role of FIC in actually producing foreign investors is difficult to
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Table 4.13 Supply and demand for the electronics industry
1968
.
1972
.
1976 1978 1979
Annual Average
Growth Rate
(1968-79)
Total Exports of the 455 1,624 7,751 12,711 15,055 37.4
Nation (A)
Total Imports of the
Nation (B)
Total Demand
Domestic Demand (C)
Exports (D)
Domestic Production (E)
Imports (F)
D/A (°lo)
F/B (%)
D/E
F/C("io)
1,463
95.9
76.5
19.4
56.1
39.8
4.3
2.7
34.6
52.0
2,522
384.5
242.5
142
207.5
177
8.7
7.0
68.4
73.0
8,774
2,271
1,235
1,036
1,422
849
13.4
9.7
72.9
68.7
14,972
3,335
1,976
1.359
2,271
1,050
10.7
7.0
59.9
53.1
20,339
.
4,744
2,899
1,845
3,281
1,463
12.3
7.2
56.2
50.5
.
27.0
42.5
39.0
51.5
44.7
38.6
Source: KDB, Industry in Korea 1980, Seoul, 1981, p. 91.
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evaluate. Prior to 1970 one investment project had been established. In the
five years after the FIC's establishment there were 179. To attribute this
to the FIC would be easy, especially as under 30 investments were made in the
following five years when the FIC was presumably even more efficient. But
the FIC could only have helped at the margin, offering feasibility studies for
potential operations in the Republic of Korea, market information and market
forecast projections etc. At the least it showed that the Government was
serious in its intentions and offered an initial point of entry into what is,
after all, a difficult country to establish investments from the point of view
of innumerable regulations, mostly not translated into English, and open to
ambiguous interpretations.
The FIC also had a role in qualifying technicians and testing the quality
of the products. It also negotiated agreements with quality control agencies
such as the Canadian Standards Association, the British BSI and japanese JMI
which would ensure that exports from the Republic of' Korea met the minimum
requirements in importing countries. This included testing instruments in
factories. Perhaps most important, they conducted a two—year training course
at the Junior College level and short term courses for technicians and
engineers covering the electronics field.
The eight—year plan ended in 1976 and was succeeded by the targets of the
Fourth Five—Year Plan. In this the electronics industry was listed as the
second most important sector under the plan (the first was the machinery
industry). Ambitious targets were set for exports and 56 items were selected
"on the basis of product life—cycles and comparative advantage", including
"semi—conductors, computers and related items". Thirty—one of these were
defined as for "strategic development" and 25 as "key items". Eight general
policies were enunciated:
1) Boosting the electronics industry as a leading export sector and
diversifying export markets.
2) Promotion of technical development and renovation.
3) Strengthening of competitive power in international markets through
conformity with electronic products of superior quality.
4) Development of Korean models and renovation of designs.
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5) Standardisation of products in order to cut down the cost of production
and achieve a mass production system.
6) Active inducement of foreign investment and international specialisation
and introduction of foreign capital support and techniques.
7) Realisation of industrial rationalisation through improvement of
manufacturing techniques and production processes.
8) Increase the use of locally—made parts and raw materials.58
The main aim of the plan was to encourage the change from stage 2 to
stage 3 which would include the special encouragement of the semi—conductor
industry since "the electronics industry will change structurally from an
assembly—type production to one which mainly produces basic components and
parts".
As part of this process, a semi—conductor and computer industrial estate
was announced. None of the companies involved can have liked this idea, and
ultimately the existing electronics and textiles at Kumi was
designated. Even so, Samsung Semi—Conductors refused to consider moving to
Kumi from Suwon where it was next door to its partner, Samsung Electronics.
Thus only Goldstar, which had all its sister companies at Kumi, and Korea
Electronics moved to Kumi. Nevertheless in 1980 the Government proceeded to
move the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET), founded in 1976, to
Kumi on the basis that it would then be next to the relevant industries.
This move incited complaints by Samsung that KIET was favouring its
rivals. This included supplying Goldstar with hydrogen from KIET' hydrogen
plant, and several finns with low volume runs of wafers from KIET's own
facilities. KIET was after all a Government institute supplied with
Government funds through the Electronics Industries Association of which
Samsung was a member.
This series of events is interesting for three reasons, firstly the
ability of companies to resist Government direction in location, and secondly
a clear sign that the old order of quasi—govenrment associations was under
threat from giant corporations which felt they could do perfectly well without
such assistance.59 Companies wanted to locate related plants together,
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rather than according to some tidy—minded bureaucrat's plan of putting all
components factories together. The third reason was a dispute over KIET
which in many ways is an interesting experiment in developing from stage 3 to
stage 4. It is an industrial research institute supposed to be working at
the leading edge of manufacturing, developing processes which will not enter
production in the first Korean manufacturer for the next 18—24 months. It is
also charged with developing the Han micro—computer for educational
purposes. Being located next to the industries it serves it can also act as
a trouble shooter.
A major function is the design of circuits which will provide indigenous
technology. In order to keep abreast of the latest developments, KIET
maintains a branch institute in Silicon Valley, United States. Although in
1978-79 KIET developed a stereo decoder and audio amplifier design, the
institute is strongly opposed to entering the field of consumer electronics.
Theoretically, however, any electronics company could approach the project
management department for a quotation for any specific problem.
At present there are many problems in establishing the role of KIET
vis—à—vis private industry. If the concept succeeds will be a valuable
tool provided by the Government to lift the industry stage 3 to stage 4.
The feeling in Samsung, and to a lesser extent in Goldstar, is that they are
large enough to make the leap from stage 3 to stage 4 by themselves, as indeed
Samsung seems poised to do.
However, in its recent change in policy since 1980, the Government has
decided that the old preoccupation with domestic industry as opposed to
foreign investment needs to be overturned. The reasons were two—fold, first
the failure of electronics exports to come anywhere near the target set in the
Fourth Five—Year Plan, and second a desire for a much more open economy
concentrating primarily on exports. It was therefore felt that any investment
was good investment, and the minimum investment limit was lowered, with much
greater scope for up to 100 per cent investment.60 In line with this the
Electronics Industry Promotion Law was amended in March 1981 to facilitate
development.
Under the Fourth Plan exports were to reach 1.94 thousand million dollars
at 1975 prices, or about 3 thousand million at current prices. Final figures
for 1981 are not yet available, but in 1980 electronics only managed 2
thousand million.
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Moreover, for two years the industry had been struggling with the
Government for permission to sell colour television sets on the domestic
market. This struggle illustrates the nature of Government thinking on the
domestic market in the later 1970s. Investment had proceeded according to the
estimates drawn up by the FIC, MCI and other authorities, but demand had not
developed on the scale expected. There is no clearer demonstration of the
problems the country was encountering in planning exports in the Fourth plan
period than the failure of one of the most successful sectors to reach its
targets.
It seems clear that exports were being projected at rates required to
achieve domestic GNP growth targets rather than at rates realistically
adjusted to the conditions in the world market. In particular the appearance
of quotas on Korean electronics goods, notably black and white and colour
televisions, curtailed sales. The Government, however, refused to permit the
sale of colour televisions on the domestic market on two grounds. First it
would discourage consumer savings and second it would increase social tensions
emphasising the difference between rich and poor.6'
While the social reasoning was sound enough very much part of the
character of Korean development that ostentatious ownership of wealth should
be discouraged, the second reason ignored the fact that it was companies which
saved most and consumers least in the Republic of Korea. When finally in
December 1980 the restriction was lifted, 544,000 colour sets were sold in a
few months, despite the fact that hotels had been able to buy previously (a
concession to the manufacturers) and individuals had been able to import by
hand.62 Sales of black and white televisions, however, dropped from 1.6
63
million sets to 0.54 million in the same period. Some 1.2 million colour
sets were sold in the Republic of Korea in 1981.
8. Employment conditions
Employees of Saxnsung's six electronics companies make up 42.1 per cent of
the group's industrial employees.64 This gives some idea of the employment
potential of the industry. In turn Samsung employs about 10 per cent of all
workers in the industry, compared with 1.9 per cent of textile workers.
Goldstar's share may be as high as 14 per cent of electronics
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workers.65 Most other large electronics, but few have more than 1,000
employees.
Employees in the industry grew by 900 per cent during the 1970s, 65 per
cent of them women. Working conditions on the whole are more favourable than
in garments or small textile firms. But this is a product of larger and newer
factories as much as anything, and in some of the older electronics plants the
shop floor looks hazardous with pipes and other objects on the floor. The
fumes involved in some processes also tend to affect the whole factory.
Even if the value of exports grows as predicted along with an increase in
domestic demand employment in the industry will not increase by anything like
its previous rate. This is because in order to keep up with competitors it
has become important to automate. Wages are no longer so cheap that employers
can disregard labour costs. The share of labour costs in manufacturing is
higher in electronics than in textiles or garments by about 2 per cent (1977,
15.42 per cent, 1978, 15.68 per cent) and rising. In particular male wages in
electronics are significantly higher than for male textile workers. Female
wages rose rapidly in textiles in the l970s reflecting the tighter labour
market and in 1980 actually were higher than for electronics. However, when
it is considered that electronics workers work 15—21 less per month, the
hourly rate is considerably higher than for textile workers.
Within electronics factories, idle lines of old labour—intensive
machinery can be seen while their work is handled by a single automated
machine which also offers a much higher level of accuracy and therefore also
cuts down wastage. The replacement rate is between five and ten production
workers in labour—intensive production to one worker afterwards. The
production workers are universally women, and the men are given overseer
status. Their importance is basically in the area of quality control which is
very essential in electronics at every stage of the process.
It will be seen that workers in electronics get much better wages (if
male) than textile workers and slightly better (if female). The wage figures
are based on Ministry of Labour statistics which exclude small firms which
undoubtedly pay lower wages but are more predominant in the textile sector.
Conditions for all classes of electronics' workers are distinctly better than
for textile workers, especially in Kumi. There, workers are given free
housing (as in other industries) but instead of dormitory accommodation,
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larger firms offer small apartments shared by two workers, a vastly superior
situation to workers in other areas. Textile workers at Kumi appear to still
be in dormitories of no better quality than in other places. Goldstar reports
this is a major expense but necessary to draw the necessary quality of workers
(middle and high school graduates in the case of women). In general, although
living costs are higher in Seoul, wages are higher in Kumi as a compensation
for not being in the capital.
It should be stressed that the difference is not so much between workers
in Seoul and Kumi as far as general conditions are concerned, but between
workers in electronics and textiles. But if the conditions bf the larger
electronics factories at Kumi were the model for the l980s in all industries,
then Korean workers would be enjoying a distinctly better standard of living
than in the 1970s.
Electronics workers fall under the umbrella of the Metal Industry Union,
which had a membership in 1978 of 128,040 workers; 86,124 men and 41,916
women, about 22.2 per cent of all workers in category 38. As already
mentioned, Samsung does not permit unionisation, and Goldstar officials
profess ignorance of any labour organisation. It is too early to judge how
the labour councils will fare in these organisations.
A very serious labour dispute affected Control Data (Republic of Korea) —
a wholly owned subsidiary of Control Data U.S.A. A serious industrial dispute
in 1982 over wages and working conditions provoked the intervention of the
National Security Police (NSP). Two versions of the dispute are circulating.
The Korean version is that the operation was unprofitable and the trouble with
the workers gave the parent company the opportunity to close the operation
down. The other version purporting to come from Control Data and United
States Embassy sources is that the management was prepared to meet the demands
including reinstating the union leaders but was prevented by the NSP from
rehiring the former union officials. As a protest against Government
interference the whole operation was closed down.
Control Data has had a long history of attempts to establish a union.
Even if the company version is correct in every detail one must presume that
the operation was not outstandingly profitable, or Control Data would not have
been willing to sacrifice their operation for a principle. It does, however,
represent a further case of foreign companies' unease about Government
intervention.
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9. The future of the electronics industry
The Fifth Plan states "the major task of the electronics industry during
the plan period will be to improve its international competitiveness through
technological innovation and development of high quality new products. In
particular, the development of industrial electronic machineries such as
semi—conductors, computers and communications equipment will be stressed more
than that of consumer electronics".
Exports of electronics are to rise by 25.3 per cent per annum, compared
with the projected 31.5 per cent of the Fourth plan. On this basis they would
reach 13 per cent of total exports, compared with 9.4 per cent. in 1981. The
Fourth plan had anticipated a 1981 share of 13.7 per cent.
These estimates may be over—optimistic. Goldstar, in early 1982,
entirely readjusted its projections to 1984 downwards. Employment was due to
reach 1,567 by the end of 1982 in the semi—conductor plant, but this was cut
back to 1,000. With investment schedules also cut back it will be difficult
to reach the 1986 targets.
What is at issue is business confidence. During the 1970s companies
trusted Government estimates, and willingly invested far in advance of
They now have ample surplus capacity in most fields and will not
invest further until they expect that capacity to be fully utilised. The
Government complains that there is an unreasonable lack of confidence and that
is holding the Republic of Korea in a prolonged recession. From the business
point of view it is entirely rational, but at the same time illustrates how
much of the Korean process of development has rested on high business
confidence reinforced by success.
The assets of the Republic of Korea's electronics industry is that it now
has some giants. Samsung Group is 109th in Fortune's list of the top 500
non—United States companies, and the Lucky Group, of which Goldstar is a part,
227th. They therefore have the assets to develop advanced technology.
Samsung has just perfected the 64K chip, making ROK the third country in the
world to achieve this. At this point a further major asset is the large
number of Korean expatriates who are electronics experts. Most of KIET is
staffed in this way. Since the Republic of Korea lacks the general level of
electronics students a developed country possesses, this reserve remains
important.
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At the same time it remains clear that there are very substantial
problems to be overcome. Probably only the very large Korean companies can
tackle these problems. For one thing, such companies as Goldstar
Semi—Conductors make a loss, but are justified in terms of the national
interest. Presumably for similar reasons Samsung Semi—Conductor was merged
with Samsung Electronics in early 1980 where the loss would be less obvious.
Small companies not belonging to such groups could hardly afford this sort of
state of affairs.
The question of trade barriers remain. Although the industry has made
loud noises about quotas, the number of barriers is still very small. The
United States limited the quota of colour televisions to 300,000 sets for 7
months, but in subsequent negotiations this was raised to 570,000 per annum
and was abolished in 1982. As it had no patents for PAL or SECAM systems
until late 1983 the industry could not sell in any of the markets such as
Europe which use these systems.69 Apart from the orderly market agreement
for colour televisions the Republic of Korea has with the United States, the
United Kingdom imposes a unilateral quota on black and white televisions and
France a buyers quota on CB radios. France has also a quota on
semi—conductors and Australia on other components and freezers.
Compared with textiles and the range of electronics produced in the
xepublic of Korea this is mild and could become a great deal worse. Since
there is no sign of a reduction of protectionist tendencies one should
forecast that further items produced by the Republic of Korea will be subject
to restrictions in the near future and this too will cause problems for the
industry.
The resilience of the domestic market in achieving sales of 1.2 million
colour televisions in 1981 despite the recession suggests that the domestic
market has the potential to play a continuing role in the 1980s which will
help support the industry. Videorecorders and microcomputers will certainly
follow colour televisions if offered for sale widely. The 1981 figure
suggests about 14.2 per cent of Korean households bought colour televisions in
one year. This reflects pent—up demand, but is nevertheless impressive.
From the point of view of employment, the prospects are less optimistic.
Automation is likely to hold total employment at existing levels, or perhaps
even reduce it. The worker will need to be more skilled than before either
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through longer inhouse training or through Government schemes. The latter
seems more likely, but this will put heavier burdens on poor households'
budgets as they support their children through more years of education, while
for women workers, unless social customs change, the working life will be
70
shorter.
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UtlAk'iM( V
LESSONS AND PROSPECTS
I. Introduction
Throughout the preceding four chapters adjectives with the approximate
force of "remarkable'1 have been consistently used to describe aspects of South
Korean's experience. Because the Republic of Korea exists, and has been so
successful it is important to remind oneself how "remarkable" this process has
been. It has become trendy to use the ghastly phrase the Asian "gang of four"
without remembering how different these four countries are. In practice these
four countries have little in common except their success and the association
with labour—intensive exports.
Two are city states, and while Lim and Fong remind us that a city state
is not predestined to become successful if the wrong policies are pursued (as
in the case of Aden), nevertheless the sorts of problems city states face are
different from those faced by larger countries) The Republic of
Korea is the largest of the countries in this group with correspondingly much
greater problems. On a larger scale successful export promotion has not been
on a large enough scale to transform the whole of Brazil or Mexico which are
three to four times the size of the Republic of Korea.
While facing disadvantages compared with Asian NICs, the Republic of
Korea could therefore be held to have considerable advantages over American
NICs. The small area of the country permits more inensive infrastructure
investment and the more rapid unification of the domestic market. The
question of scale and size of the economy has rarely been posed. The quest of
Hollis Chenery and others for some "norm" has largely disregarded this
question. Yet it is of vital concern especially where the role of export led
growth is concerned. If the Republic of Korea required a 1 per cent share of
world trade to get where it is, a country like Brazil would require at least
3.5 per cent. In practice both have about the same share, but by any
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standards the rate of growth in the Republic of Korea is impressive. Most
other countries started from a higher level of per capital income than the
Republic of Korea, which in 1960 had a per capita income no higher than India
or other poor LDCs.
As has been stressed the initial stages of growth were largely derived
from internal sources. Although export growth was the most rapid element,
until 1971 it was furnishing less than 30 per cent of annual GNP increase.
The psychological element in the rapid expansion of exports may well have been
greater to foreign investors and lenders, to Government and to private
enterprise. But this cannot hide the fact that manufactured exports were not
the prime motive force. In the 1970s, however, they became so.
The pace of change within each industry was equally dramatic as the
sectoral studies show, going from a primitive level of manufacturing towards
something approaching the level of advanced countries by the beginning of the
l980s.
Because it has happened, the Republic of Korea seems less remarkable.
But it need to be remembered that in the early Kennedy
Administration stated that it was not committed to Korea's First Five Year
Plan which was "too ambitious" and "trying to do toomany things in a too
short time". In the mid l960s IBRD consultants were told to reduce their CNP
growth rate estimates because "countries do not grow at 8—9 per cent per
annum".2 By the 1970s the Republicof Korea was expected to achieve
whatever targets it declared and the remarkable became commonplace.
To recover something of this sense it would be necessary to conceive of
Bangladesh reaching the Republic of Korea's current percapita income within
20 years.
2. Which lessons?
Are there lessons to be learned from Korean experience? Or was the
Republic of Korea so unique, or the historical circumstances of the world
economy between 1960 and 1973 so unusual, that nothing can be learned from the
Republic of Korea?
In approaching the question it is important to differentiate between the
concept of a Korean "package", a distinctly Korean model which would be
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applied wholesale, slightly modified no doubt, to another developing country,
and an a la carte menu which developing countries might ponder and select or
reject at will. The latter is obviously attractive. There are many "tricks
of the trade" which other countries' planners might pick up from the Korean
experience at various stages of development, and all of them worth
considering. But picking up a few tricks will not transform a country's whole
economy and the Republic of Korea's achievement lies in its total development,
not merely the growth of exports.
There are two aspects of the country's development which deserve close
attention. Firstly the transformation from low growth to high growth which is
of as much interest to many developed countries as to the developing world,
and secondly sustained high growth.
The language and conceptual framework used to describe its achievements
is important. A considerable number of local and foreign writers have
described the country's policy in neoclassical language, either criticising
contrary policies or denying their role. This has resulted in a stream of
contrary advice and direction from outside agencies based on such precepts.
Descriptions which take Keynes' view "that the postulates of the classical
theory are applicable to a special case only and to a general case "are
much rarer".3 This is not to say that Korean officials and planners have
oeen steeped in Keynesian theory. Far from it their theory has been ill
defined and based on precepts or prejudices transmitted from the Silhak school
of Confucian economists of the eighteenth century in which the national
interest is the clear priority, in which farming is highly revered, which
advocates interventionist, reformist and redistributive policies.
Constant pressure from outside has frequently been a valuable corrective
to force the Government to leave well enough alone. The close interaction
with through quasi—agencies and informal
has also kept officials in touch with the rest of the world. The interaction
of these three pressures have produced a policy which broadly suited the
country's circumstances.
2.1 The transformation from low growth to high growth
Koreans were not prepared to sit still and wait until the export sector
had geared itself up along the lines of comparative advantage and begun to
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have an impact on the rest of the conomy. Indeed in 1961 no one had thought
of export—led growth, all people were trying to do was to promote exports as
part of a collection of measures including import substitution to solve the
enormous trade deficit. Enacting a set of neoclassical measures which would
(time period unspecified) produce optimal results was not part of the the
Republic of Korea's package. Many accounts start with the exchange rate,
interest rate and tariff reforms of the mid—1960s, where as growth began in
1961 masked by the disastrous harvest failure of 1962.
This growth was achieved by getting the prices right in the agricultural
sector and pumping credit into rural society. Abandoning the "cheap food for
urban dwellers" policy pursued in so many developing countries has obviously
had an effect on industrial wages. Manufacturing wages could have been lower
if free food imports had been encouraged, but this was never considered a
serious option after 1961.
The Kennedy administration was correct; the aims of the first plan were
"too ambitious", but only an ambitious plan could harness the energy of the
people at multiple levels. Harvey Leiberstein has given the concept of
harnessing energy a respectable (or at least trendy) in terms of
X—efficiency, which measures effort. In any cross country comparison, the
Koreans must measure very high in X—efficiency. this effort confined
tc ke ROK, the Taein factory system of DPRK in the late 50s and early 60s was
based precisely on the concept that effort by workers can overcome limitations
of installed capacity, or any other physicl problem.
The force that mobilised the ROK was not merely a highly competitive
nationalism, but a self—reinforcing system. There was no sector of society
that was cushioned and could grow fat without effort. To a large degree
inflation ensured that. Moreover the Republic of Korea was probably fortunate
in starting from a position in which the stagnation was obvious to all. The
Military Revolution, was a revolution and not a coup, in that large numbers of
the elite who had prospered under the old regime (at least) temporarily lost
their positions and wealth.
Talk of concensus does not mean that in the early sixties there were not
substantial groups in society who adopted a wait and see attitude, but that
the setting of clear and very ambitious targets and a mobilisatlon of funds and
energies were the major ingredients.
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2.2 Sustaining rates
Growth through sheer enthusiasm is not sustainable. Bottlenecks appear,
existing overcpacity is exhausted. What had been demonstrated was that high
growth was possible, business confidence was restored, and in the first plan
the grossest bottlenecks were foreseen and prepared for.
The Second Plan and associated reforms brought a very different approach,
close to neoclassical precepts. However many of the benefits of the Second
Plan were not apparent until the Third Plan period, while the disbenefits
became apparent almost immediately in the massive flight from the countryside
in the later l960s and the rapid growth of shanty towns around the major
cities. The Korean achievement was to stem this growth into the cities
through putting more money into the countryside under the third and fourth
plans and urban redevelopment which meant that Seoul went through its shanty
town phase in ten to fifteen years.
Doubtless the funds deployed in these ways would have had a higher rate
of return in manufacturing, but their benefits would have been less evenly
according to the best rate of return in the second half of the sixties, an
adequate industrial base was created which could much more
self—sustaining in the 1970s, when Government attention was diverted back to a
oroader view of development.
The Heavy and Chemical Plan of 1973 has to been seen as born in the
crisis of the late 1960s and early l970s. Migrants were flooding into the
cities and light industry was not growing fast enough. A broader range of
industries was felt to be necessary. Possibly the signals the Government
responded to were short—term rather than long—term, but by the end of the
l970s the Republic of Korea required the industries that had been created
ahead of demand.
In both the l960s and 197Qs the control of credit must be seen as vital.
Of all the lessons the Republic of Korea offers, although it is an
unfashionable one in the period when znonetarism rules, the way in which the
Government can control credit to produce industrial investment is the chief
lesson. Inflation undoubtedly resulted, but this only enhanced the rate of
capital accumulation since it encouraged investment which could be paid off
more easily once the policy of real interest rates was abonded in the late
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1960s. Inflation has a bad name in the early 1980s, but there is a
respectable theoretical case which can be made for inflation having assisted
the Republic of Korea's development.5
Readers familiar with Japanese development between 1953 and 1969 will see
very strong parallels between the financing of Korean development between
1961—1979 and Japanese development, including the close direction by MITI in
Japan and to a lesser degree MCI in the Republic of Korea. In one sense what
the Republic of Korea demonstrates is that Japan is not unique. The Republic
of Korea showed that a much smaller and poorer country could adopt the same
strategy and perform as well, if not better than Japan. Countries wishing to
learn lessons from Korean development will also (however unpopular this may be
in Korea) need to cross—refer to the corresponding strategy at the similar
phase in Japan.
The people of the Republic of Korea will be quick to point Out the strong
differences between the themselves and Japanese, both in character and in
history. They are right to do so, and this in turn offers hope for other
countries trying to adopt the Korean strategy. The interesting question is
whether the control and creation of credit could not ;be combined with the
Singapore method of funding both investment and social security through CPF,
the workers retirement scheme, to which both employees and employers
ccribute, which kept inflation at a lower rate than either Japan in the
6
l950s or the Republic of Korea in the 1960s.
2.3 Lessons for would—be NICs
Table 5.1 compares manufactured exports of the Asian NICs, Mexico and
Brazil. It can be seen in 1963 the Republic of Korea exported the lowest
total of manufactured goods and in 1977, the highest. Likewise, despite the
Republic of Korea's poor resources, when total exports are compared the
Republic of Korea's exports narrowly exceed those of the other countries.
Curiously for all their diversities, all but Mexico have total exports of
roughly the same order. Is this more than a coincidence? In a recent article
William Cline argued that even if a large group of LDCs could achieve a high
level of export orientation, the impact on Western Markets would be more than
the latter could absorb, and increased protection would be the likely
7
result.
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Table 5.1 Exports of Asian and American NICs
Exports Per capita
Manufactured goods Total Income
1962 1977 1978 1978 1979 1979
Korea 10 8,480 11,220 12,711 15,055 1,480
Mexico 1L2 1,bZO 1,9/3
Brazil 39 3,141 4,335 12,527 15,244 1,780
Hong Kong 642 7,267 10,693 11,499 15,156 3,760
Singapore 328 3,626 4,679 10,134 14,233 3,830
Spain 227 7,214 9,620 13,115 17,903 4,380
Source: World Development Report, 1980 and 1981.
In practice such a development would be unlikely. It is probable that at
any one time, only a cohort of LDCs would achieve high levels of exports in
labour—intensive manufactures. By this time the NICs would have
up a "Bela Belassa style ladder" of development above the lower rungs.
This can be seen in the Republic of Korea where the lowest grades of textiles
and garments have lost their export markets.
What development economists have only just begun to consider is that fact
that the bottom rungs of the ladder may no longer exist by the end of the next
decade due to automation. The Republic of Korea and other NICs may be high
enough up the ladder. The problems automation poses are considered below.
But what hope do other, poorer, countries have? It is at this point that the
degree to which the Republic of Korea developed without excessive reliance on
exports, i.e. the first decade, that requires reevaluation. Secondly and
closely related it is important to look closely at the way the benefits of the
modern sector "trickled out", as opposed to "trickled down". That is, how did
general modernisation proceed? Despite the fact that export manufacturing was
at first confined to narrow areas of the economy, modernisation and
industrialisation proceeded in all sectors.
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Here the role cf the Government in planning for all sectors and carefully
allocating scarce resources becomes important. An across the board adoption
of the "best" neo—classical policies might have developed an export sector
based on comparative advantage, but would not have ensured parallel
development in other sectors. In practice leadership in the sense of general
mobilisation and setting an example was extremely important. This worked in
many fields and numerous examples can be found of companies setting themselves
five year plans in imitation of the Government.
There is an important lesson which is likely to be missed if Korean or
Japanese development is described in neoclassical terms. Government
intervention and assistance has been pervasive, but rules and regulations have
been extremely flexible. The British system has encouraged a gargantuan
bureaucracy which enforces rules inflexibly, whereas the much smaller number
of officials in the Republic of Korea are given much greater leaway to
interpret regulations according to individual circumstances.
Industrialists have had a much higher nationalist priority than in the
United Kingdom and have accordingly been rewarded by the Government. British
observers have looked labour relations without setting it in the context of
Korea or Japan, where in the past many workers never doubted the Government
stands for the whole nationts interest, and that Government might discipline
prorit—seeking industry as much as fractious labour. The workers accepted
sacrifices in the national interest; all they asked was that the rich made
the same sacrifices.
The degree to which EPB and MCI have created a government machine which
puts growth first, and evolves a clear set of targets and means to reach the
targets worked out with industry is perhaps the most striking contrast with
the United Kingdom.
3. The future of the Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea has grown fast, and an average growth rate of 9 per
cent allows a lot of margin for government and business errors, which 2.3 per
cent does not. It still has a per capita GNP half that of Singapore and Hong
Kong, and a quarter that of the United Kingdom There is every reason to
suppose that growth rates will be slower in the 1980s. The last two years
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have been around 6 per cent, and the Fifth Plan predicts 7—8 per cent compared
with the 10 per cent confidently predicted in 1978 by KDI for the 1980s.
The Republic of Korea may do well to averge 6 per cent during the first
half of the decade with world overcapacity, a strong dollar and continuing
recession. Even were world recovery to take place at the end of 1983 with a
fall in oil prices, the country faces a number of structural problems. The
obvious one is that wages in industry are low compared with the service
sector, but that there is an enormous reserve of self—employed farmers and
shop—keepers who in the Federal Republic of Germany moved into more productive
occupations in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Republic of Korea, however, is
likely to need to automate many industrial processes in the 1980s in order to
keep up with its competitors in advanced countries so that full employment may
be much more difficult to achieve.
The implications of these changes fall into three categores:
a) Implications for export prospects, especiall in growth industries;
b) Implications for the employment structure of the Republic of Korea and
social policies;
c) Implications for the balance between exports and the domestic market.
The "chip" technology has the potential to destroy pre—existing
certainties about the Republic of Korea's comparative advantage. It should
anticipate a rapid rise in the efficiency of many sections of western industry
in the post—recession world. In the motor and engineering industries, where
advance is expected, much more limited markets may be available. Indeed even
in areas where the Republic of Korea has established supremacy such as
textiles and garments, competition may come not from lower income countries,
but from high income countries.
There are special dangers in the country's system which could lead to
wasted investment because new plant becomes obsolescent before it has paid for
itself. There may be special problems for small and medium firms, the
selected group according to government plans for certain industries which tend
to be less well informed than large firms and which rely on the traditional
high costs of retooling for short production runs. Computer aided designs on
one hand and the type of one—man operated automated plan now evolving in Japan
on the other may eliminate much well paid employment which traditionally
required highly skilled labour.
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The basic problem is that the new technology can make a labour
productivity gain (including elimination of faulty products) of five or more,
which is sufficient to eliminate any advantage of low wages. As explained
above, in the case of a number of modern Korean enterprises, it is not so much
iow wages but high labour productivity compared with less efficient western
competitors which has given the country its leading edge. It had newer,
better designed and cheaper plant than its rivals. But part of the labour
productivity was in terms of a working week which might add 25 per cent more
labour. There must come a time when Korean workers demand higher rewards as a
sense of international comparison grows. One might suppose that they, like
the Japanese will prefer more money to increased leisure. But either option
would decrease the competitiveness of Korean industry.
Not only recession and protection but also unpredictable leaps in the
efficiency of Korea's competitors may pose special problems for companies and
Government alike. Certain Korean companies are now powerful enough to be in
the forefront of this technology. There is no reason why Samsung, Daewoo,
Hyundai, the Lucky Group and Kukje should not import scientists, or finance
their own research and development. In introducing automation as they must,
to keep their markets, because internationally the country is a price taker
rather than a price giver, there will be a profound on employment.
the Republic of Korea will be forced to import structural unemployment in
order to retain her competitiveness and this means that new recruitment in
labour intensive industries may be low. Small and medium companies may find
themselves forced out of domestic markets as the more flexible automated
production processes make short runs cheaper.
As early as 1976 a World Bank model predicted that if GNP growth fell
below 8 per cent, given the age structure of the country's population, serious
unemployment would result. This was based on existing relationships between
GNP growth and employment. Since then growth has fallen and is not expected
to rise as high as 8 per cent during the Fifth Plan period. At the same time
labour demand in manufacturing per increment of GNP growth will fall.
Consequently it would appear to me unlikely that the manufacturing labour
force will rise as high as predicted in the Fifth Plan, which is by a factor
of nearly 25 per cent. It certainly has the potential to stay where it is,
producing a job deficit of about I million by 1986.
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Employment in manufacturing has been falling since 1979 and in 1981 was 8
per cent below 1979 levels, although the manufa uringp r index Was 8
per cent higher. The number of people working in agriculture has risen
slightly and those in services jumped considerably. This has however only
served to increase the inefficiency of the two most inefficient sectors of the
economy, agriculture and services. The Fifth Plan projections for
agricultural employment are very high, with a minimal drop, suggesting that
the gap between rural and urban living standards will widen. Structural
unemployment will only serve to widen t-his gap.
The services in Korea are already ripe for a massive reorganisation. If
anything the microelectronics industry already has the potential to trim the
labour force in the service sector increasing unemployment further.
In the West workers are generally prepared for increased leisure. In
Korea and other Far—Eastern countries the leisure ethic is hardly
developed. Consequently one might expect underemployment in marginally
productive activities. Such a trend would actually increase the dangers of
the remergence of a dual economy. Under such conditions can the family be
expected to shoulder the burden of unemployed members when all members may be
unemployed? Korea could face considerable unrest under such circumstances if
an unemployment scheme is not instituted. The Fifth Five Year Plan appears to
contain no scheme for unemployment pay, although the projected number of
unemployed under existing projections is high in human terms, appraoching
700,000 workers and their dependents.
I would argue that Korea cannot avoid structural unemployment being
imported. The question is, firstly what measures are to be adopted to prepare
for it, and secondly what measures will need to be adopted when it becomes
apparent? There are clearly a range of policy variables Which deserve
consideration. However the strongest case must be made for studying the
measures adopted by advanced countries and their relative success or failure.
Secondly there is a need to consider the balance of policy towards export
and domestic growth. There can be little doubt that it in the future exports
must become more efficient which inevitably means a reduced labour force, then
the domestic economy becomes the major source of employment. This requires a
radical reassessment of the nature of government incentives which since
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September 1980 have tended to push exports as the major driving force in the
economy. Ironically the major source of employment may well be a growth in
the leisure industry.
Finally, as argued above, the nature of the microchip revolution is to
shift the balance between capital and wages in national income. As a recent
article by Cherns states "society has traditionally relied on employment to
allocate its resources among the various claimants; but how will this be
possible when goods and services can be produced with less and less labour
'9
time'
It has been noted that the policies adopted since 1980, if followed up,
mark a radical departure from those of the seems determine let
market signals play a dominant role. Unfortunately the market signals
indicate to businessmen that it would be wise to slow down investment. At
other times of depression the Government has taken a strong lead and made
concessionary credit available. In 1980—81 interest rates remained high, and
the Government remained more concerned with than growth. Not
unnaturally businessmen too became more concerned with stability than growth.
Every businessman has reconsidered his payroll and shed fat. He has been
forced to consider efficiency and productivity as before which
rapid growth, low interest rates and high inflation rates concealed
underlying problems if the growth were ever to stop. Most major enterprises
seem to think the experience may have been useful, but from an employment
point of view it has been negative. Wages have failed to keep pace with
inflation and labour unrest appears to be growing despite a fall in union
numbers.
Enterprises thrived in a rapid growth situation. There were advantages
as well as disadvantages to inflation)° It was the rising middle class
rather than business which urged inflation be seen as the major problem. The
decline in living standards has had an immediate impact on most enterprises.
For the first time in nearly two decades per capita consumption of textiles
actually fell in 1980. Domestic demand for electronics dropped sharply.
Companies began to realise the extent to which they relied on the domestic
market.
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So far the Government has refused to take cognisance of the problems a
domestic recession created for industry. It has re—emphasised the importance
of exports. In the world context of the 1980s this may well be a mistake, and
a clearer recognition that the ROK economy stands on two equal pillars the
domestic and the overseas market seems essential.
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Table 1
Exchange Rates of Won to U.S. Dollar
Year Official Rate Year
BOK buying rate
from foreign
exchange banks
Year
Basic Exchange rate
by the
Bank of Korea
1950 1.1 0.9 1964 5.3 255.51 1967 12.31 274.60
.1 1.8 9.30 255.51 1968 12.31 281.50
5.15 1.6 12.31 255.51 1969 12.31 304.45
€.15 1.8 1965 3.31 262.93 1970 12.31 316.65
11.1 2.5 6.30 271.10 1971 12.31 373.30
1951 5.1 2.5 • 9.30 271.10 1972 12.30 398.90
11.10 6.0 12.31 271.50 1973 12.31 397.50
1953 8.28 6.0 1966 3.31 271.40 1974 2.71 484.00
12.15 18.0 6.30 270.90 1975 12.31 484.00
1955 1.10 18.0 9.30 270.90 1976 12.31 484.00
8.15 50.0 12.31 270.90 1977 12.31 484.00
1960 1.20 50.0 1967 3.31 269.22 1978 12.31 484.00
2.23 65.0 6.30 269.17 1979 12.31 484.00
1961 1.1 100.0 9.30 268.39 1980 12. 580.00
2.2 130.0 11.24 268.11 1981 12 659.90
Note: With the adoption of a unitary fluctuating rate system and a floor rate
of 255 won per U.S. dollar on May 3, 1964, the selling rate to
customers and buying rate from customers by foreign exchange banks are
determined and posted daily by the Bank of Korea. Taking the free
market rate into account.
Source: The Bank of Korea.
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Appendix
Table 4
Government Purchase Prices and Market Prices
versus Cost of Production for Rice, 1948-1975.
per 80 kg)
Purchase Cost of Marketa
Price Proditction Price A/B A/C
Year (A) (B) (C) .(%) (%)
1948 2.47 3.72 7.10 66.3 34.8
1949 2.67 6.71 13.21 39.9 20.2
1950 16.40 . 15.88 52.30 103.6 31.4
1951 65.37 n.a. 157.50 - 41.5
1952 200.62 329.09 447.50 61.0 44.8
1953 200.62 330.94 350.00 60.6 57.3
1954 308.33 330.94 581.00 93.2 53.1
1955 390.56 838.44 962.00 46.6 40.1
1956 1,059.00 1,134.00 1,591.00 93.4 66.6
1957 1,059.00 1,384.00 1,311.00 76.5 80.8
1958 1,059.00 1,297.00 1,157.00 81.6 91.5
1959 1,059.00 1,300.00 1,368.00 81.4 77.4
1960 1,059.00 1,313.00 1,687.00 80.7 62.8
1961 1,550.00 1,377.00 1,768.00 112.6 87.7
1962 1,650.00 1,422.00 2,801.00 116.3 58.9
1963 2,060.00 1,373.00 3,470.00 149.7 59.4
2,967.00 1,936.00 3,324.00' 153.3 89.3
1965 3,150.00 2,672.00 3,419.00 117.9 92.1
1966 3,306.00 2,495.00 3,750.00 132.5 88.2
1967 3,590.00 2,735.00 4,289.00 131.2 83.7
1968 4,200.00 3,403.00 5,140.00. 123.4 81.7
1969 5,150.00 3,565.00 144.5 89.0
1970 7,000.00 4,642.00 7,153.00 150.8 97.9
1971 8,750.00 4,682.00 9,844.00 186.9 8a.9,
1972 9,888.00 6,115.00 9,728.00 161.7 101.6
1973 11,377.00 6,578.00 12,175.00 173.0 93.4
1974 15,760.00 7,959.00 17,821.00 198.0 88.4
1975 19,500.00
Sources: MAF, Grain Statistics Yearbook 1967—1915.
MAF, Cost of Production Survey, j961-1915.
Note: average pnces.
Prom Ban et al. Rural Development,
HoP., p. 240.
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Table 6
International Comparison of Aid to Korea
/($ million)
to 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Burma 22-0 317 453 243 149 16-2
Ceylon 14-4 i8'i 14-8 1 19 157 3P5 459
India 663.3 7283 972-9 1,201-4 1,28&7 I,2257 1,3502
Nepal 10-7 g-o i6-6 19-6 17-8 13-2 14-0
Pakistan 2662 3926 505-1 5232 411-5 533-2
Cambodia 27-0 22-2 13-3 13-7 11-2 10-9 13-7
Formosa 113-6 77'6 76-I 493 67-5 6o'8 854
Indonesia 115-0 1577 108-2 669 429 2479
Korea,
Republic 2292 2362 2622 1726 2205 2092 2614
Laos 51-6 3P2 365 45-8 682 68-5 73-8
Malaysia/
Singapore 20-3 31-8 14-1 i6-6 38-9 590 48-9
Philippines 19-I 349 3P4 83-0 109-2 67-6 I 13-8
Ryu-Kyus 5-0 1O0 6-o 190 18-9 13-0 !5'O
Thailand 38-8 52-8 42-I 332 468 53-6 614
Vietnam
167-1 1760 2266 2445 3157 508-7
Total (inc. ,
others) I,7808 2,025-5 2,398.3 2,536-9 2,8054 2,852-6 3,369-0
Note: Members of the Development Assistance Committee, from which almost all of the bilateral
ad comes, are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA; data prior to 1965
do not include Australia which joined the DAC (though it is not an OECD member) in 1966
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, The Relationship of
Aid to Trade in the Far East, London, 1969, p. 47.
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Table 7
.1
Ranking of Loan Priorities
Class A Funds
Primary & Soc Sectors
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery, Mining, international Trade, Cargo
Handling, Salvaging, Government Monopolies (Salt & Tobacco),
Electricity,2 Water & Sewer Service,3 Construction,2 Transportations3
and Warehousing.3
Manufacturing Sectors
Food3 : Starches, Canned Food, Frozen Food (For Export)4
Textiles : Cotton Yarn,2 Cotton Fabrics,2 Silk,2 Silk Fabrics,2
Woolen Fabrics, Chemical Fiber Fabrics, Knitwear.
Chemicals : Fertilizer, insecticides, Carbide, Glycerin, Alcohol,2
Sheet Glass, Paper, Cement, Bricks, Dyes,8 Special
Type Rubber3 Drugs,3 Leather,3 Paints,8 Sulphuric
Fire-Proof Material,4 Rubber Products.4
Metal Product3 : Iron or Copper Wire, Nails, Rolled Steel, Basic
MetaL4
Machinery3 : Pump3, Farm Machines, Motors, Textile Machines,
Electrical Equipment, Measuring instruments, Ve-
hicles, Shipbuilding, Working Machine,4 Industrial
Machines,4 Power-Using Machine,4 General Mach-
ines,4 Communication Equipment.4
Others3 : Saw Mill Products, Cement Products, Military
Procurements, Textbooks, Mintage, Batteries,
Briquettes,2 Handicrafts for Exports, Smelting.
Class B Funds
Funds not included in either Class A or Class C group.5
Class C
Primary & SOC Sectors6
Flower or Fruit-Culture, Charcoal Manufacturing and Highway
Transportation.
Service Sectors
Wholesale. & Retail Trade,7 Small Scale Transportation & Storage,
Entertainment, Hotels, Restaurants, Other Miscellaneous Personal
Services, Leasing.4
Manufacturing Sectors
Brewing Cosmetics, Clothing, Toys, Office Equipment,2 Kitchen
Equipment, and Wooden Articles. Soft Drink,4 Confectionary,4 Meat,4
Leather Footwear,4 Ornaments,4 Sports Goods,4 Seasonings,4 Furni-
ture,4 Jewelry.4
Notes: 'Monetary Board Decision on December 20, p1953.
2 Shifted to Class B funds on August 4, 1955 or on December 29, 1955.
3Added to Class A funds from Class C funds on August 4, or December 29, 1955.
4Added on March 7, 1964 and amended on June 16, 1964.
Ice-Manufacturing, Marine Transportation Equipment and Warehousing were
shifted from Class A to Class B funds on December 29, 1955. Tourist services were
added to Class B funds (from Class C) on December 30, 1958.
6 Shifted or added to Class C funds on August 4, 1955.
7Except the loans for super-market chains to improve the distribution system. (Sta-
bilization No. 1200—26 promulgated by the MOFon January 10, 1974.)
From Wontak Hong: Trade, Distortions and
in Korea, pp. 113—114.
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Table 8
Exports, Final Demand and Labour Intensity: 1978
Exports Labour Intensity
Final Demand
10 Dairy and Slaughter 6.4 0.1 0.1
11 Proc. Sea Food 47 0.15 0.1
12 Grain Polishing 0 0.5 0.46
13 Cereal Flours 0.01 0.03 0.03
14 Other food proc. 4.2 0.1 0.09
15 Beverages 2.5 0.06 0.05
16 Tobacco 0.05 0.05 0.05 3.9
17 Fibre Yarn 107.2 0.1 0.1 1.1
18 Textile Fabrics 68.6 0.15 0.15 4
19 Fabricated Text. Prod. 647 0.33 0.31 12.5
20 Leather and Leather Products 71.5 0.13 0.12 2.7
21 Lumber and Plywood 97.6 0.1 0.1 1.5
22 Wood Products and Furn. 40.6 0.4 0.3 0.5
23 Pulp and Paper 65.3 0.12 0.11 0.2
24 Printing and Publishing 7.2. 0.21 0.2 0.7
25 Basic Organic Chemicals 85.7 0.03 0.03
26 Basic Inorganic Chemicals 73.2 0.06 0.06
27 Chemical Fertilisers 99.8 0.03 0.03
28 Drugs and Cosmetics 3.3 0.08 0.08 22
29 Synthetic Resins 35.8 0.06 0.06
30 Other Chemical Products 11.2 0.09 0.08 0.6
31 Petroleum Products 41.8 0.003 0.003 1.5
32 Coal Products 2.2 0.066 0.06 1.4
33 Rubber Products 66 0.14 0.14
34 Non—Metallic Mineral Products 86.7 0.13 0.12
35 Pig Iron and Raw Steel 0.03 0.03
36 Primary Iron and Steel 94 0.03 0.03
37 Non—ferrous Metal Ingots 107.3 0.07 0.07
38 Fabricated Metal Products 73.2 0.11 0.1
39 General Machinery 3.9 0.12 0.12 11.4
40 Electrical Machinery 13.7 0.07 0.07 4.2
41 Electronics and Comm. 52.8 0.15 0.15 7.5
42 Transportation Equip. 29.5 0.09 0.09 11.2
43 Measuring, Medical, etc. 29.2 0.14 0.14
44 Miscellaneous Manufact. 69 0.25 0.23
Averages 0.11 0.11
Source: 1978 1—0 Tables, Competitive Import Model and Labour Tables, B.O.K.,
1980.
Table 9
External Debt (Outstanding)
Matu
3 yrs or
more
rity of:
1—3 yrs less than
1 year
Foreign
Banks'
Account
Total
Non—inter Interbank
—bank
1972 2,834 116 600 40 3,143 406
1973 3,421 139 612 89 3,922 338
1974 4,546 153 1,136 103 4,561 1,376
1975 5,745 302 2,167 242 6,457 1,997
1976 7,080 408 2,681 364 8,052 2,481
1977 8,583 350 2,924 792 9,655 2,993
1978 10,533 483 2,592 1,262 10,923 3,948
1979 13,871 554 4,651 1,951 13,789 6,716
Source: Handbook of the Korean Economy. 1980. Table 74.
Appendix
Appendix
Table 10
Types of Manufacturing Establishments (1978)
Total Joint Stock Co. Other Corporations Individuals
3 29,864 6,052 (253) 336 (109) 23,476 (23)
31 4,448 614 (183) 149 (35) 3,685 (14)
32 7,990 1,385 (349) 47 (125) 6,558 (31)
33 2,388 198 (233) 15 (32) 2,175 (15)
34 2,001 410 (124) 35 (158) 1,556 (19)
35 2,737 876 (228) 26 (162) 1,835 (25)
36 2,314 364 (173) 18 (89) 1,932 (15)
37 885 295 (229) 4 (96) 536 (29)
38 6,123 1,635 (277) 34 (171) 4,454 (25)
39 1,028 275 (197) 8 (102) 745 (32)
Source: EPB: Report on Mining and Manufacturing Census 1978
Seoul, 1979.
Note: Average number of employees in parentheses.
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